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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is the attempt to understand 
the Christian conception of sin through the disciplines of theology 
and IEycllOlogy. It is asrumed that theology and psychology are sep-
arate disciplines but that the,y are involved in a polar relationship 
with each other in regard to the datum of human experience. Both 
disciplines interpret and conceptualize this datum from the vantage 
points of their respective presuppositions, needs, and goals. This 
separation between the dLscip1ines promotes the creation of appropri-
ate language s.ymbo1s and methodological approaches within each dis-
cipline and inevitably raises an in-group cOJllIllWlity in contrast to 
those who are outside the community. This dissertation attempts to 
bridge the separation between t,he two com.r.unities by focusing upon 
a particular theological conception, sin, and utilizing ps.ychological 
conceptions, primarily shame and guilt, to promote its understanding. 
2. The Method of the Dis serteiiion 
This dissertation utilizes the method of correlationl in the 
understanding of the conception of sin. There are three main elements 
1. Paul Tillich has an extended discussion of this method in Systematic 
Theology (Chicago, ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 
Volume I, Chapter 1. 
1 
to this method which can be sUl!ll'llarized in the words: structural wholes, 
correspondence, and interdependence. 
i. Structural Wholes 
Ps,ychology and theology are, to some extent, autonomous bodies 
of knowl&dgc ~ircumscribed by definite limitations and intentions. 
Each has its own history, its own method, its own language system, and 
ita own cODmm~ity. The concepts and inter-relationships of concepts 
within each system are intelligible wi thin the bourrlaries of the s,ystem. 
A particular concept gains its meaning within the system in which it has 
arisen and, those who participate in the community which has evolved the 
system, have the necessar,y experience to give meaning to it. 
The IOOthod of correlation begins with two separate disciplines and 
attempts to work within each system in order fully to explicate the 
manings of core epts in their contextual configurations. In this first 
stage there is no attempt to cross the boundaries between systems. In 
fact, particular care is taken to stay within each s,ystem. As far iiS 
possible the disciplines are kept separate from each other in order that 
particula r concepts may bs ful:J.y analyzed and conununicated. In this 
dissertation, the conception of sin is analyzed within a theological 
frane of :,,~fclrence and the concepts of shame and guilt ~re analyzed 
within a psyci.'1oaD.alytic context. 
ti. Correspondence 
One of the basic concerns of both theology and psychology is man; 
his experiences, his structure, and his natura. Each discipline con-
ceptualizes man in terms consonant with its own 5.1stem; yet the basic 
2 
data out of 'Which these conceptualizations arise are the same for both 
disciplines in many instances. At these points there is a correspond-
ence between the concepts of p5.Ychology and theology. This does not 
mean that the concepts are identical or that they have the same meaning. 
It means, rather, that they ~ve some ~lements that are parallel. 
The method of correlation attempts to identll'y these correspond-
ent concepts, and more specifically, to designate the correspondent 
elements. Many theological conceptions seem to have psychological cor-
relati~es, e.g. salvation and wholeness, reconciliation and healing, 
being in Christ and maturity. These psychological correlates are not 
fUll explanations of the theological conceptions nor is the reverse 
true. Each term is meaningful within the context of its system and 
only within that system can the full dimensions of a particular term 
be analyzed. However, a description of the correspondent elements 
helps partially to describe the nature of a particular corre'sponding 
conception ani gives some insight into the meaning of that concept on 
an experiential level. 
It is one of the assumpti. ons of this dissertation that the theol-
ogical conception of sin has correlative element s in the psychoanal,ytic 
'frame of reference. Shame and guilt are the specific psychoanalytic 
concepts that correlate closely with the elements of the theological 
conception of sin. 
There is a second aspect of correspondence thaJ , is relevant to 
the correlative method. Correspondence refers not only to the cor-
responding elements upon lihich particular concepts are based, but also 
~o the correspondence of different series of data. In this sense, as 
3 
Paul Tillich would describe it, theolo.'P' gives the answers to the 
implied questions of osychology. The ps.Ychological ana~sis of the 
experience of man and the subsequent manifold conceptualizations of 
this experience imply questions about the fundamental na ture, purpose, 
and goals of being man. Theology seeks to give the answers to these 
implied questions on the basis of its normative eOllrces of data e 
Al~~ough this dissertation is not primarily concerned wi~~ this 
particular aspect of the correlative method, the ultimate goal of this 
research is to enable theology to give meaningful answers to the 
questions raised by psychology especially with regard to pastoral coun-
seling and pastoral theology. 
, iii. Interdependence 
Within each of the disciplines of psychology and theology there 
is an interdependence of conce!)tions o One concept necessitates the 
formation of another concept and this very formation structures the 
reformulation of t.'le pr'eviou5 conception. The systems as a whole form 
a Gestalt in lihich there are mutual reciprocal relationships between 
all aspects of the system. 
This same fact is true of a larger Gestalt formed from the polar 
relationship between psychology and theology. A theological analysis 
of the concept of sin determines ~he psycbological correlates of the-
ological elements particular to the nature of sin. At the same time, 
however, the psychological correlates shape the nature of the theolog-
ical questions asked about the concept of sin. The criterion for the 
isolation of particular int6rdependent polar elements thus e~rges 
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from witbin both systems as well as from within the interdependent 
polar relationship itself. Within the framework of this dissertation 
this means that those aspects of sin are isolated which have parti-
cular meaning within the theological system. These aspects are then 
related to corresponding elements within the psychological system in 
such a way that neither loses its primary meaning within its own 
system, but that the theological elements are clarified and. illumi-
nated by the ps,ychological correlates. 
3. The Development of the Dissertation 
The problem of the dissertation will be developed in the following 
way. First, a theological understanding of the corx:ept of sin will be 
ascertained through a survey of the writings of selected theologians 
in selected historical periods. Other theological conceptions will be 
examined only as they are pertinent to the central focus of the 
dissertation. 
Second, an attempt will be made to determine and delimit the 
fundamental components of the ooncepts of sin examined in the survey 
of the selected theologians. The criterion for ascertaining which 
components are fundamental will be consistency of reference throughout 
the various writings examined. From these components a theological 
definition of sin will be attempted. 
Third, the psychoanalytic theory of personality will be s-1CaIlLi.ned 
and the particular ccncepts of shame and guilt will be explicated 
wi thin this oontext. The psychoanalytic theory of personality will be 
elucidated with some detail although sane elements not fundamental to 
5 
the dissertation will be given only cursory attention. Special atten-
tion will be given to the conceptions of shame and guilt. 
Fourth, the theological conception of sin will be correlated 
liith certain corresponding elements, particularly shame and gu.ilts 
arising out of the psychological material. 
Fifth, two clinical examples will be analyzed in the light of 
the previous examination of the conception of sin. One of these 
examples will be a historical figure, namely, Martin Ltl.ther, and. the 
other example will be a woman lihom the author has counseled. 
Finally, this ~thod of research will be evaluated in terms of 
its possible applications as a research tool to examine the nature of 
other theological conceptions. An attempt will also be made to project 
this type of research toward ·the goal of formulating a conceptual model 
for the p~cho-religious development of personality. 
4. Limitations 
The methOd of this dissertation gives rise to certain inherent 
l~tations which can be identified but only partially overcome. A 
complete correlation between theology and psYChology would necessitate 
a comprehensive am thorough explication of the whole of each system 
as well as all the parts of each systeIllo This is impossible not only 
because of the obvious l~its cf time, space, and energy, but also 
because of the necessary but misleading assumption concerning the unity 
of each discipline. Both disciplines have divisions and subdivisions 
within themselves with consequent barriers to communication within the 
disciplines as well as between disciplines. This dissertation has 
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attempted to minimize this limitation tosume extent by confining itself 
to: a) that branch of psychology which has developed its theories and 
practices upon the work of Sigmund Freud and has identified itself as 
p5.1choanalytic psychology, and b) those conceptions of sin that have 
been developed in the historic stream of Christianity based primarily 
upon the Pauline formulation of the message of Jesus and identified as 
Western. This latter deli;niting has been further narrowed by dividing 
the Western stream of Christianity into four periods and focusing upon 
the writings or recorded words of two selected theologians in each 
period. The selection of the theologians was primarily determined by 
their importance in the history of Christianity although other factors, 
such as the availability and extent of their writings, were considered. 
A second limitation is the distortion that arises because of the 
necessit,y of isolating a particular concept from its context. Although 
this limitation has been minimized sometihat in the case of t.he p5.1cho-
analytic conceptions of shame and guilt, it was impossible to consider 
all the theological concepts interrelated with the conception of sin. 
Only a complete systematic theology and a complete historical survey 
could overcome this limitation. 
A third limitation is involved in the meanings of theological 
words in distinction to words within other disciplines. Sin has lOOaning 
above and beyond any meaning that might be asserted through anal,ysis, 
no I1Btter how comprehensive. Theological words are ~~nbols that point 
to ultimate meanings beyond the realms of human understanding and com-
prehension. The nature of theological words as symbols that point to" 
am comprehend, ultimate meanings limitsall att,empts at understanding 
7 
to partial definition and partial comprehension. Exhaustive analysis 
of the conception of sin would still leave a residue of meaning in the 
realm of the ~sterious. 
Furthermore, theological words comprehend within themselves large 
expanses of the historical and temporal world. They are both inter-
personal and intra-personal, bo~~ trans-temporal and within time, both 
trans-historical and within history. The specific focus of this dis-
sertation, sin, for instance, connotes not only a relationship between 
JI11'1n and God, but also between man ani man, man and nature, man in his-
tory, and. man in a moment of time. It is aDplicable not only to generic 
man but also to individual man. Consequently, and inevitably, an e..~­
haustive correlative study of sin WJuld necessitate correlations with 
the disciplines of anthropology, oociology, history, etc, as well as 
correlations with the complete life history of an individual man in 
his changing cultural milieu, his constant~ altering relationships 
with significant persons, his biological, physiological, and psycho-
logical inheritances, etc. This dissertation limits itself to one 
discipline, psychoanalytic psychology, a r.d wi thin tba t dis~ipline con-
centrates JOOst comprehensively on two conceptions, namely shame and 
guilt. Thus there is no claim to complete or adequate comprehension 
of the theological conception of sin. 
Further limitations relevant to each chapter and each section 
will be explained in the appropriate places. This section has been 
primarily concerned with the limitations imposed by the nature of the 
dissertation itself. 
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5. Definitions 
The definition of particular words in this dissertation will 
refer to the particular discipline in which the word has meaning. 
Sin is a theological word and thus has theological o:>ntent as its 
definition. Shame am guilt are psychological words and thus have 
psychological content as th eir definitions. 
A particular word needs to be said about guilt. Guilt, in this 
dissertation, does not refer to moral, ethical, or religious content 
or process. In consonance with ps,ychoanalytic usage guilt refers to 
a dynamic process, a feeling, or a particular oontent,., A person may 
have unconscious guilt; he may have feelings of guilt; he may be 
guilty about something. There is no atte:~pt to separate these various 
definitions of guilt except as they are separat eel by contextual 
considerations. 
6. Previous Research in the Field 
Since the advent of depth psychology, theology has becone in-
creasingly interested in using the tools and knowledge of that disci-
pline to illuminate ani explicate religious behavior, religious belief, 
and other religious phenomena. The rise of pastoral psychology has 
precipitated the appropriation of a large amount of p5,1chological 
material within a theological framework in order to help the pastor 
function more adequately in his ministry. 
The appropriation of ps,rchological knowledge by theology has 
sometimes had disturbing consequences. Very often the attempt at 
dialogue between the two disciplines eventuated in a tendena,r either 
9 
toward a psychological theology or a theological psychology.l A dif-
ferent approach has been propounded by Pall Tillich2 am has been 
utilized by him in reference to the relationship bet~~en theology and 
other disciplines. Albert Outler and David E. Roberts3 have attempted 
spec:lfically to relate the psychological and theological disciplines 
by w~ of this Bame method and have made valuable contributions which 
form the context from which thi~ dissertation springs. 
Specifically, both Outler and Roberts apply Tillich' s method 
aver a broad spectrum of the interrelationship of p~chological and 
theological material. This dissertation L,tends to focus on only 
one area of the theological spectrum, namely the doctrine of sin, 
and correlate the appropriate insights am contributions gained from 
psychoanalytic psychology with this specific doctrine. 
1. Examples of these alternatives are: B. G. Sanders, Christianity 
after Freud (London: Geoffrey Bles Ltd., 1949)} R. S. Lee, Freud 
and chrI:S:tia~ (N. I.: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1949); Wayne E. Oates, 
ChriSt and SeIfhood (N. I.: Association Press, 1961). 
2. 
3. 
Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I, Chapter 1. 
Albert Outler, PsychotherapY aoo the Christian Message (N. Y.: 
Harper and Brothm-s" 1954). David E. Roberts, Psychotherapy 
and a Christian View of Man (N. I.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1950)e 
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CHAPTER II 
A SURVEY OF THEDLOGICAL CONCEPl'IONS OF SIN 
IN SELEcrED HISTORICAL PERIODS 
1. Introduction 
The concept of sin is embedded in a matrL~ of related theo-
logic.al concepts. Like all knOl'lledge building enterprises, theol-
ogy is more or less a wl1ty. To subtract one item from the total-
ity is to distort both the item aOO the totality. Accordingly, the 
concept of sin is most fully treated theologically when it is exa~ 
ined within the total theological context. Related concepts such as 
the church and creation would give some insight into the meaning of 
sin. More closely interwoven with the concept of sin, and thus 
more illuminating, would be such correlates as forgiveness, the 
atonement, and man's freedom ani responsibility in the light of 
revelation. 
Although the writer holds that this total emphasis is the 
implicit context and goal of the theological pursuit, it has become 
increasingly clear that certain part aspects of the total must be 
isolated, with the risk of some distortion, in order that profi-
table correlations can be made with the insights of other knowledge 
buildjng disciplines. For example, even though David Robertsl is 
a mentor of tl:is dissertation, he see.'llS to make certain fundamental 
errors that are unavoidable because of his totalistic approach. 
10 Robert~$ Psychotherapy and a Olristian View of Ma!1 o 
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In order to deal with both sin and salvation he takes the psycho-
therapeutic process as the correlate. This disregards the fact that 
p5.1chotherapy is a highly stylized and rigidly structured situation 
in \h ich there is a peculiar focus on the analysis of a one to one 
interpersonal situation. It is questionable Whether sin and salva-
tion really have analogues in the pff,Ychotherapeutic process. Prayer, 
confession, and same forms of worship would seem to be more analogous 
to ps,ychotheraP,1 on the basis of formal characteristics. Sin and 
salvation are prior categores to these religious processes just as 
neUT~sis and health are prior ca~egories to the psychotherapeutic 
process. 
Conseqll:mtly the survey of conceptions of sin is limited by 
the method. of the dissertation. l All aspects of the concept of sin 
are not examine:i. This is not to say that a nore complete doctrine 
of sin could not ani should not be presented. It is to say that, at 
this juncture of tentative attempts at inter-disciplinary dialogue, 
the writer feels that the characteristics of the correlative method 
must be of great importance. Therefore, to some extent, the concept 
of sin is isolated from its theological matrix. Certain important 
theological propositions concerning sin are considered only in a supeP-
ficial way. For example, the effects of sin on the nature of man are 
not specifically elaborated alth, .Lgh references to this are IlBde through-
out the dissertation. The Bame consideration applies to sin and its 
effects on the relationship of man to man. To deal with these questions 
1. See above, pp. 4-5. 
would mean that the concepts of neurosis, the family, and the social 
and cultural milieu would have to be examined more fully than this 
dissertation allows. At the same time, there is not a complete iso-
lation of the concept of sin from the theological circle. Certain 
related doctrines and the implications of these are considered, if 
not in detail, at least in general. However the main focus remains 
on the nature of sin as it can be illuminated by correlatives in 
the psychoanalytic theory of man in general, and in the concepts of 
shame and guilt in particular. 
2. The New Testament Period 
i. The Conception of Sin in the Sayings of Jesus 
Limitations 
It is trB intent of this section to deal with the conception 
of sin as,. it is elucidated in the sayings attributed to Jesus in 
the Synoptic Gospe1~.. S~ce it would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to deal with historical and textual problems, only 
the Synoptic Gospels are used as source IlBterial. Even within 
this limited context there is no attempt to discover which of the 
sayings of Jesus are preswned to be authentic. Instead, this 
section will concentrate on Jesus l view of sin as it is portrayed 
by the Synoptic writers. 
A second limitation is the fact that Jesus did not attempt 
to deal with sin as a theoretical construct abstracted from the 
lift.." of man. In fact, there are very few direct references to the 
word, sin, in the S,ynoptic Gospels. Jesus is presented as dealing 
1.) 
with sin in its concrete reality in response to individual circum-
stances or situations. l Thus the examination of Jesus' conception 
of sin is necessarily handicapped in that it must rest heavily 
upon inferences and contextual assumptions. 
Definition of Sm 
In the light of the peculiar nature of his ministr,r, Jesus 
was more concerned ~~th sin L~ particular than sin in general o It 
is usually implied tha t these particular sins are transgressions 
of the J Mah moral law handed dOin :in the Decalogue and its sub-
sequent additions. 2 Certain behavior is sin because it goes beyond 
that allowed in the revealed law of God. Adultery, murder, pre-
varication, ani hypocrisy are specifically condemned. The response 
of Jesus to the rich young rule!' begins with quotations from the 
law. 3 
Behind the explicit condemations of behavi.cr that transgress 
the law is ca~ied a conception of the sinfulness of inner motivations. 
1. Kenneth Gray-ston, "Sin"" A Theological Wordbook of the Bible, 
edited by Alan Richardson (London: Cam910t Press Ltd., 1950), 
pp. 226-229. Also, Gottfried Quell, Georg Bertram, Gustav 
Stahlin, and Walter Grundmann, ~, volume In of Bible Key 
Worde, translated and edited. by J. R. Coates from Gerhard 
Klt'tel, Theole sches W'arterbuch zum Neuen Testament (New 
2. 
York: Harper a ro 9, • 
Howard Kee and Frankl:in W. Young, Understammg the New Testament 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 
128, 130. Many writers point out the fact that the mission of 
Jesus was to fulfill the law, not to abridge it. Thus hiB 
statements have a direct reference to the law. 
3. Mark 10:17-22. All references to Scripture are taken from The 
Ho~ Bible! Revised Standard Edition (New York: Thomas Nelson 
an Sone, 952). 
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Not only does the act violate the law, but the spirit of the law is 
also violated. Murder and anger are equated; adultery and lustful 
intentions are on a continuum; the law of equal retaliation must be 
extinquished in favor of love for enemies; the essential focus of 
religiolls oblieations is the irmer motivation rather than the correct 
behavioral manifestation.1 This attitude of Jesus is express~ 
stated 1fhen he says, 
What comes out of a man is "hat defiles Il man. For from 
within, out of the heart of man, come evil thou~tsJ for-
nication, theft, murder, adultery, coveting, wickedness, 
deceit, licentiousness, envy, slander, pride, foolishness. 
AU these evil things come from within, and they defile 
a man. 2 . 
Sin is not only the transgression of the law but it is also the per-
verted. motivation of man. It is the disposition of mano It is his 
inclination and attitllde. This emphasis on the inner motivation of 
man as essential to the understanding of sin runs through almost all 
of Jesus' words.) 
The teaching of Jesus on sin can be summarized in his emphasis 
upon the essence of religion as the love of God and neighbor4 and the 
1. Matt. 5:21-6:18. 2. Mark 7:20-23. 
3. Jesus' emphasis on the inner disposition of man is clear~ out-
lined by the concept of "heart". Heart,:in the Biblical sense, 
refers to the inner man or the organ of the whole personality 
'Which controls all the activities o:f man. It is the seat of 
reason, uill, and emotions. Thus, "out of the heart" refers to 
something occurring in the center oi.' the personality which 
af:fects and guides the acts of the person. H. A. Guy, The 
~PtiC Gospels (London: Macmillan and Co. 1 1960), p."'U9; 
. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation am Rede tion, 
Volume II of DOgmat cs Phi.: e Westminster reSB, 9 p. 63, 
94; E. C. Blackman, "Mind", A Theo1ogical Wordbook of the Bible, 
PP. 144-145. 
4. Matt. 22:35-40. 
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overwhelming need of man for repentance~l Sin is the dispostion of 
the heart towards self-centeredness and trust in false gods. It is 
the centering of the self without regard for God, the creator and 
true center of selfhood. This naturally involves hostility to God 
and the rejection of H~2 
The Natura of Sin 
Creaturehood and Corruption. The words of Jesus do not give a 
direct indication of his views on the creaturehood of man. An anal-
ysis of his conception of God's rehtio!lship to man infers the dignity 
and value of each hwnan being. Han is a creature of Go::! and is under 
God's care.3 Man is man only a s he is related to God. 4 At the sane 
ti!rle that Jesus seems to assert the creaturehood. of man anI the neces-
sit,y for relationship with God, he also asserts the sinfulness of man. 
Out of the heart of man come all kinds of sinful activities.5 Man 
gi ves good gifts but this is set in contrast to his basic sinfulness.6 
Han cannot speak good things ~n he is evil in his heart. 7 
The ~ole tone of the message of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels 
is that man is a creation of God" that he is under God' s rule and 
1. T. W. Manson, The Teaching of Jesus (London: Cambrid~e University 
Press, 1939), pp. 297ft. AlSo, Quell at aI, Sin, p. b4~ 
2. Nolan J. McClurg, Tho Doctrine of Sin Ln the 0 tic Gos els 
(Unpublished ThD D ssertation, Boston Univers~ty School of 
Theology, 1951), pp. )6-37. 
3. Matt. 5:45b; Matt. 6:25-33. 
5. Matt. 15:19. 
7. Matt. 12 :33-34. 
4. Matt. 4:4; Luke 20:38. 
6. Matt. 7:11. 
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care, and that he finds true life only as he is :in relationship Hith 
God. The second pole of his message is that man is sinful both in 
deed and in intent, that the center of his inner be:i.ng has become 
perverted, and that he is in a lost condition apart from God. These 
two poles fo~n a paradox that can not be resolved logically; man is 
both a creature of God and a creature of sin. 
The Universality of Sin. Although Jes~s nowhere states his 
belief in tm ~iversality of !in, the intent pervading all his 
teaching indicates that he assamed it. l He excluded no one from 
his message of the need for repentance. He, like the religious 
leaders of his d~, assumed the sinfulness of those who were not 
Jews, but at the same time he indicted the people of Israel. Jesus 
clearly thought of the Pharisees as sinners even though they felt 
themselves to be righteous. 2 At the same time he acknowledged the 
fact thath1lJ purpose was to minister' ','Iio thoso .mo knew and repented 
of their sinfulness. Consequently he spent much of his time with 
persons .mo ~ere designated as sinner6 by the religious leaders. 
From this the conclusion can be drawn that the distinction that Jesus 
makes between the righteous ani the sinner3 is ironical rather than 
factual. Jesus seemed to assume that all men were sinners. The i~ 
portant difference was that some recognized their sin and some did not. 4 
1. Kee and Young, Understanding the New Testament, p. 131. 
28 Matt. 15:1-9; 23:1-36. 
4. Luke 18:9-14. 
3. Matt. 9:10-13. 
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Source of Sin. Tnere are two strains of thought in reference 
to the source of sin. One strain traces sm back to the inward dis-
position of man. The basic center of man has the potential for either 
good or eVil,? yet man brings forth sin. 2 SomehO'ti, the c enter of man 
has ,become corrupt and it is here that t.he source of sin lies.3 Jesus' 
plea for repentance and new life would seem to be based on the assu.mp-
tion that man needed a change in the center of himself. 
The second source of sin ref~rs to forces outside of man. Satan, 
or his agents; come and take over the life of man. Through his domi-
nation or suggestion man does evil.4 By implication, Satan and not 
man becomes responsible for sin. 
The Agent of Sin. The agent of sin is the will of man. Again 
Jesus does not refer specificalJ,y to this. However, his asswnption 
tJ1at t.."1e heart (the seat of the will) needed changingj5 the fact that 
he exhorted. man to be nborn againn J and his pleas directed toward 
changing man's behavior, all make plausible the idea that Jesus thought 
that man sinned through the inclination of the will. 
There is a hint in the Synoptic Gospels that Jesus also desig-
nated the nesh as an agent of sin. For the most part this term refers 
to the weakness of man, his finiteness, in contrast to God. 6 At the 
same time this meaning shades over into another, name~ weakness over 
1. McClurg,!he Doctrine of Sin in the SynoptiC Go~ls, p. 52. 
2. See above, p. 15. 3. Mark 7:21-22; Matt. 12:33. 
4. Luke 8:12; ,Matt. l2:43-45. 
5. Charles T. Fritsch, The Interpreter's Bible, IV, 811. 
6. Mark 13:20; Matt. 16:17. 
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against temptation. The flesh is that part of man which is roost sus-
ceptible to temptation and consequent sin.1 'Ehe flesh is not sin in 
itself, but it is the weaker element in man through which sin works. 
The Form of Sin 
Rejection of God's Message. The basic form of sin in the Synoptic 
Gospels is the rejection of God's message or the rejection of those who 
bring the message.2 McClurg concludes that this sin is the basic sin 
in three out of the four sources from which the Synoptics were composed.3 
However, it is not the rejection itself that is so important. The 
implied. turning away from God in the rejection is the iffiportant factor. 
Man, in rejecting God's message and messengers, rejects his' origins 
ani abandons God. 4 This is why this is the basic form of sin. 
Idolatry. The rejection of the mssage of God leads man to replace 
his need for God with something else. Idolatry is the necessary out-
growth. Man serves maIllllOn rather than God.5 A basic thrust of Jesus' 
gospel was that man could not serve both God and another. He had to 
make a choice. If he chose not to serve God he Hould automatically 
serve another. 
Hardening of the heart seems to be the intermediate term betweSl 
rejection of God' 5 AlB ssage and idolatry. When man rejects God his 
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1. Mark 14: 38. 2. Matt. 23:29-39. Mark 12:1-11; 
Luke 16:19-31. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
McClurg, The Doctrine of Sin in the Synoptic Gospels, p. 36 .. 
Brunner, The Christian Doctrine o:f Gr~~ion and Redemption, p. 91; Quell, et a1, sin, p. 64=65. 
Luke 16:13. 
heart is hardened so that he no longer hears God. At the same time 
he must replace God with an idol in order to fulfill an inner longing. 
This, in turn, further hardens the heart so that God's message is 
further excluded from man's life. l 
Self-Centeredness and Pride. Directly rela ted to idolatry 
and the rejection of God I s message is the sin of self-centeredness 
and pride. Man turns inward and seeks to serve himself and his own 
wishes. In one way or another he puts hiJTlSelf at the center of life 
instead of placing God there. In other words, he replaces God-
centeredness with self-seeking and self-centeredness. This form of 
sin is illustra ted 1.'1 the story of the rich foo12 and by the constant 
struggle between Jesus am the Pharisees in which he continually 
deplored their hypocrisy. It is succinctly stated, If\.Vhoever would 
save his life will lose it, am whoever loses his life for ~ sake 
will find it."3 Self-centeredness and pride is the focus on self 
as the center. 
ii. The Conception of Sin in the Letters of Paul 
Limitations 
As with the Synoptic Gospels it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to enter into historical and textual problems. The 
sources for this section are those New Testament letters that are 
most commonly held to be Pauline in authorship. The Epistle to the 
1. William Barclay, A New Testament Wordbook (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, n.d.), Pp. 100-103. 
2. Luke 12:15-21. 3. Hatt. 16:25. 
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Romans has been used as the basic source since it is in this 1et.ter 
that Paul is most systematic and comprehensive Ll'J. his treatment of 
sin. 
Definition of Sin 
The most common word with which 'Paul designates sin is hamartia 
am its cognates. Originally the verb form meant to aim at and to miss 
a mark. Later on it came to mean t.he seeking after and failing to . 
achieve a purpose. l Sin is not only something negative but also some-
thing positive. It is a positive missing of the mark in the sense 
that the sinner hits the mark of his own making while missing the 
mark of God. 
Kittel gives a comprehensive analysis of Paul's conception of 
sin when he defines it as an offense against God with emphasis upon 
hostility to God as the constitutive element.2 For Paul, man not 
only fails to actualize the standards of God but actively hates God 
and actively pursues his own course in rebellion against God. 3 . This 
definition of sin can be specified more exactly by referral to some 
of the uses of the word, hamartia. Sin is an act of the individual 
person;4 it is the state of human nature;5 it is a pers::>nal power.6 
Sin is a personal force active in the world which enslaves mn. But 
1. C. Ryder Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin (London: The Epworth 
Press, 1953), p. 69. 
2. Quell, et a1, Sin, pp. 75-84. 
4. II Cor. 11:7; Eph. 2:1-3. 
6. liom .. 5-7. 
3. Ibid., p. 76. 
5. Rom. 3:20; 6:1. 
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at the same time, it is a charactp.ristic of man qua man that actu-
alizes itself in sinful deeds. Each of the various ways of defining 
sin point to the essential character of sin as hateful rebellion 
against God on t.he one hand, and purposeful pursuit of a course con-
, 
trary to God on the other.-
The Nature of Sin 
Creaturehood and Corruption. ?aul1s analysis of human nature 
in relation to sin hinges upon his use of the term ~, or flesh. 
One of the usages of this word refers to man :in his humanness, or 
man as he exists in his temporal life. 2 In other words: man is a 
creature of God created as a part of God's creation and consequently 
is subjected to the limitations of creaturely existence. 3 This flesh 
is not necessarily sinful nor is it innately corrupted. Paul often 
speaks of cleansing the body (the material of which is flesh) and 
sanctifying it. He desi~ates Jesus as having been born according 
to the flesh.4 In this sense, all flesh is good just as all creation 
is good. ESE;entially Paul asserts that man, as human, is a creature 
of God who 'is created good within the liraitatiollS of fin it e existence. 
A second usage of ~ denotes the cornlption of man in oppo-
sition to God. In this sense flesh is the antithesis of spirit,,' 
1. Ro~ 1:18-32. 
2. Rudolf Bultman~, Theology of the New Testament, translated by 
Kendrick Grabel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), I, 
233-236. Also, John Knox, The Interpreter1s Bible, IX, 369. 
3. Rom. 6:19; Gal. 2:20; Phil. 1:22. 4. Rom._l:3. 
5. Bultma!1!l., Theology of the New Testament, I, 237-2U9; 33Uo 
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Man serves sin in his flesh;l the man Hho sets his mind on the flesh 
can not be in the spirit;2 those ..mo live in Christ can not make pro-
vision for the lusts of the flesh. 3 when Palll uses flesh within this 
context he is speaking of the corrupt man who has denied his relation-
sh ip to God and seeks to find his life in himself or :in created things. 
The sinful man, or the man of flesh, is one who takes the flesh for 
the norm and seeks life on the h~~n transitory level of existence. 
This is active hostility towards God and active disobedience of Godls 
law. I.! 
Paul envisions man as having been crea "Ged for life with God. 
It is only in relationship wi til God that man can have life. In this 
sense, rna!). is the good creature. J..t the same time, man does not 
acknowledge his dependence upon the Creator. He has turned away 
from God and is a man of flesh instead of a man of spirit. In this 
sense, man is the corrupt creature. 
The Universality of Sin. There is no doubt that Paul insists 
upon the universality of sin.S No one is exempt from the dominion 
of sin. No one is able to escape from the act of sin. The first 
four chapters of Romans can be sununed up in Ghe words, nAIl have 
sinned and fall short of tihe glory of God. 1I6 Paul shows that the 
Gentiles are without excuse because they knOrT God in their hearts 
1. Rom. 7:23-25. 
3. Rom. 12:14. 
2. Rom. 8:1-17. 
4. Rom. 8:3-8. 
5. Jc14~ Knox, ~ Interpreterls Bible, IX, 462-463. 
6. Rom. 3:23a 
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and the Jews cannot escape God's judE;ment because they do not obey 
the law. IIBoth Jews and Greek s are under the power of sin 0 III The 
universality of sin is one of the primary motifs of the fifth chapter 
of Romans. 
The Source of Sin. An analysis of Paul's ~itings leads to 
the conclusion that there are ~ultiple sources of sin. The first 
source of sin has be,-'!n restated in la ter theological history as the 
doctrine of original sin. Paul does not explicitly state this doctrine 
but refers to "the condition of man in relation to salva Lion in Christ. 2 
Man is originally present in Adam in the first sin. 3 Paul does not 
'at"tempt to specify the nature of this identity of 1TBn with Adam, but 
does imply that all DEn somehow begin life in a corrupt state as a 
consequence of AdaM's sin. This identification of man witt Adam 
muld seem to be part of Paul's Judaic heritage in which Adam was 
the representative man or corporate humanity. Accordingly, sin is 
a corporate objective condition of human existence and is part of 
the existential condition of eve~ man.h Sin is a st?te of man 
before it is an act. 
The second source of sin is to be found outside of m:m. Sin 
appears as a personal being that dominates or enslaves man. Sin 
dwells in man or acts in man. l~n is sold under sin or stands as 
1. Rom. 3:10 2. Rom. 5:12-21. 
3a Compare I Cor. 15:21-22 where death for all men is a consequence 
of Adam's transgression. 
4. C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1932), pp. 79-80. 
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a slave to sin. This source of sin has been forcefully stated by 
modern interpreters of Paul. 
Sin for Paul is more than an act or attitude of 
rebellion against God or of a transgression of his 
Law, although it surely involves this meaning and 
the word--especially the verb--is often used simply 
in this sense. In the more characteristic sense, 
however, sin is an outside demonic power, alien to 
man's true (created) nature, mich has gained 
entrance to man's life am has reduced him to 
bondage and made him a transgressor. l 
The third source of sin for Paul is the flesh. It is very 
difficult to differentiate, and find the relationship between, 
Paul's use of the words sarx and soma. Dodd and others2 define 
~ as the physical stUff of human Hf'e while ~ is the or-
ganization of the individual self as person. In this sense, ~, 
at least in ]l3 rt, is identified with the physical stuff or the 
impulses and passions of the body.3 It is true that Paul easily 
passes from one meaning of sarx to another4 but there is a continual 
imo1ication that ~, as physical stuff, has been contaminated by 
sin and thus has become a source of sin. 
1. John Knox, The Interpreter's Bible, IX, 369. 
2. 
3. Body, as used in the text, is only one aspect of what Paul 
means by soma. It can be defined rather loosely as the bio-
physical SUbStance of the person as organism. Rudolf Bultmann, 
Theology of the N~ Testament, I, 193-194. 
4. See above, pp. 22-2~ for other ~anings of sarx. II Cor. 10: 
2-4 gives an example of how Paul can shift from-one meaning to 
another, yet use the same term to convey the various meanings. 
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Biblical scholarsl are quick to point out that Paul does 
not equate the fie sh Hith the physical desires of the body. 2 Thus 
it cannot be categorically ~oncluded that a so~ce of sin is the 
physical impulses and passions. Yet, except for the specific 
passage noted, it is diLicult to escape the impression that Paul 
S"lmetimes identifies the body as a source of sL'1. 3 The physical, 
having been corrupted, is corruptmg. h 
The Agent of Sin. Paradoxically enough, the flesh is not 
only a source of sin but it is also the agent of sin. The sin-
fulness of man manifests it·self primarily through the flesh. The 
flesh is not evil per ~, but it is a bridgehead through which 
sin gains a foothold.5 Davies conclusion, although only partially 
correct, is relevant at this point. In his study of Paul1s use 
of the word ~, the following point is made. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
h. 
One conclusion only emerges: the term sarx de-
noted for Paul the ~terial element in man-~ich 
Fredrick C. Grant, An Introduction to the New Testament (New 
York: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 168. C. H. Dodd, The Meanmg 
of Paul for Toda; (London: The Swathmore Press, Ltd., 1920), 
pp. 55-60. 
Gal. 5:19-21 has a list of the sins of the flesh which go 
beyond the merely bodily impulses and passions. 
Rom. 7:22-23; 13:13-14; I Cor. 7. 
Knox, The InterNreter
' 
S Bible, IX, 369. Dodd, The Epistle 
of PaUl to the omans, pp. 1I2-113. Marvin R. Vincent, Word 
Studies iii the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Michigan: WIn. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 74-77. 
5: William Barclay, The Mind of st. Paul (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1958), pp. 202-203. 
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is moral~ indifferent; it has, however, become the 
basis from which sin attacks man; has, in short, 
passed under the dominion of sin; it was a corrupted. 
not a corrupting element; the involuntarY accomplice 
to the act of sin but not the criminal. l 
The IMterial, corporeal, temporal element of man becorres the agent 
through which sin acts. 
The Law. A "WOrd needs to be s!:3j.d about the law. The law 
is not sinful in itself. Rather, it identifies, clarifies, and 
IMkes manti'est the operation of sin. Before the law there was 
no sin known as sin. Through the law Plan came to recognize his 
attitude and action as sin. 2 Sin was clearly outlined as it worked 
death and destruction in man. The law functioned as a teacher 
to make man aware of his sin and to make man see the hopeless-
ness of trust in works of the law.3 At the same time, the law 
provoked sin. It made the undesirable desirable4 and thus drove 
man deeper into sin. 
So the function of the Law is to actualize the 
sinful propensity as transgression, and unv9il 
the true character of sin as enmity against God; 
to use an illustration, it is to transform the 
potential ene:gy of a state int~ tb,e kinetic 
energy of a nnful act; •••• 
Thus, in a certain specific sense, the law can also be identified 
as an agent of sin. 
1. W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (Londen: Cambridge 
Universi~ Press, 1948), p. 19. 
2. Rom. 3:20. 3. Gal. 3. 
4. Rom. 7:7-11. 
5. Quell" et al" ~, pp. 78-79. 
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The Form of Sin 
Disobedience. Paul's analysis of sin in the first chapters of 
Romans relies heavily upon disobedience to the lalJ aEl a form of sin. 
The r~n who has not been ~iven the law formally has the law written 
on his heart. He knows God's decree but does not heed it. Instead 
he follows his own inclinations. The Jew has been given the law but 
does not ob ey. All are without. excuse because they do not obey the 
law of God. The extent to which Paul focuses on disobedience as sin 
is seen when he refers to the consequences of Adam's disobedience 
and transgression. l 
Rebellione A second form of sin is also elucidated in the first 
chapter of Romans. Sin is a rebellion against God. Man not only dis-
obeys and turns away from God but he actively asserts himself over 
against God. !>'.an is actively hateful towards God. The basic sin ex-
plicated in Romans 1:21 is this actiVf~ rebellion. It is rebellion 
actualized as hostility towards God. 2 
!ride and Idolatry. A corollary of rebellion is that man turns 
from God toward himself and the created. world. He lives in the flesh 
am uses the norms of the fle sh as his way of life.3 Man claims that 
he is wise, i. e. that he can find life for himself, and sets up a 
host of created things to worship.l~ 'rhe Jews are esp'3cially guilty 
of this form of sin since they have a special dispensation from God. 
Yet, in spite of this special f~vor, they make an idol of the law. 
1. Rom. 5:17-20. 
3. Rom. 8:5. 
2. Rom. 8:7. 
4. Rom. 1:22-23. 
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In so doing they make themselves the center of their faith and dis-
1 
regard God. 
Sensuality. Frequently Paul refers to sins of the flesh. ~~n 
allows the desires of his flesh to express themselves in deeds. One 
of the formidable tasks of the man of faith is to restrain the lusts 
of the flesh. Paul does not identify sensuality with sexuality but 
he heavily emphasizes the sinfulness present in sexuality.2 He also 
refers, however, to other sins of the flesh. 3 Sensuality is that form 
of sin in which man attempts to find his life through exploitation of 
the desires of the flesh. 
3. The Patristic Period 
i. The Conception of Sin in the Writings of Irenaeus 
Limitations 
Irenaeus stands on the boundary line between the Eastern and 
Western schools of theology. His ~Titings contain the embryonic forms 
of many of the later theological doctrinal developments in both schools. 
In many ways he was the first ~stematic theologian.. Yet he himself 
was not concerned with a s.ystematic presentation. He wrote his Against 
Heresies because of the dangers inherent in many of the then current 
philosophical speculations. It would seem that most of his writing was 
in response to the dangers that he saw as threatening to the faith of 
his people. A systematic formulation of sin is naturally lacking. 
1. Rom. 2:11-29. 2. Rom. 1:26-27; I Cor. 7. 
30 Romo 1:29; Gale 5:19-21. 
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The primary sources for Irenaeus are two: Against Heresies 
and the Proof of the Apvstolic Preaching. Although there are other 
extant fragments, these two give the most comprehensive coverage of 
his thinking. 
Definition of Sin 
On the whole Irenaeus tends to view sin in a moralistic frame-
work. Sin is disobedience to the Divine Commands for which man is 
ambiguously responsible. "Therefore God removed from his CCIllpany 
him (Satan) ••• who introduced sin; but man he pitied, who had 
thoughtlessly, though wickedly, allowed hL1self to disobey • .,1 In 
spite of the ambiguity, however, the core of sin is disobedience. 2 
Man does not obey when he ought to obey. 
A second discernible trend pertaining to the definition of sin 
is based upon man's a1jtempt "to anticipate the gift which God will 
give to man, but ~ich man himself refuses to wait for, and therefore 
it is an assertion of his independence and his defiance of God. n3 In 
this sense sin is a leap beyond the boundaries ordained by God. It is 
man's attempt to be like God before Jod hcis ordained that he is ready.4 
1. Against Heresies, IV, xl, 3. Quoted from The Early Christian 
Fathers, edited and translated by Henry Bettenson, (London: 
. Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 101. 
2. Against Heresies, V, xvi, 3. Volume I of The Ante-Nicene Fathers: 
The A stone Fathers with Justin Mart and Irenaeus, translated 
exander Roberts and W. H. mbaut, edited by Alexander Roberts 
and James Donaldson, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1956). Unless othel~ise designated this will be the source 
referred too in footnotes. 
3. Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, translated by Ross Mackenzie, 
(Philadelphia: MUhlenberg Press, 1959), p. 54. 
4. Against Heresies, IV, xxxix, 2-3. 
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The Nature of Sin 
Creaturehood and Corruption. The concepts of "child" and "growth" 
are the fundamental bases for rul explanation of both the Creation and 
the Fall. Irenaeus did not conceive of the creation of Adam as a state 
of perfectLon. He characterized Adam's state as a time of childlikeness. 
Adam, and thus all men, since Adam is a representative of all mankind, 
was created in the image and likeness of God. That is, man was made in 
the image of God but he did not yet have the perfected state of being 
1 in the likeness of God. Man still had to grow towards this perfected 
s~ate. He had to be conformed to the likeness of God. He had to 
become the likeness of God in whose image he was created. 2 
Man as created was not weak or sinful. He was childlike. By 
virtue of his imperfect and undeveloped nature he was amenable to the 
craftiness of the Devil) The DeviJ. tricked man into defying God. 
At the same time, manls defiance of God was his own responsibility. 
God had created man free to choose and man had choosen other than God.4 
The results of the Fall are not quite clear. Sometimes it seems 
that the Fall was fficessary in order that man might grow beyond his 
childlikeness. 5 By sin man gained the knowledge of good and evil and 
experienced what it meant to be separated from God. Through the 
1. Against Heresies, IV, xx, 1. Also Proof of the Apostolic PreaChing, 
translated by Joseph P. Smith, (Westminster, Maryland: Newman 
Press, 1952), sections 11, 15, p. 54-55. 
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2. Against Heresies, V, \"iii, 1. Wingren, l'1an and the Incarnation, p. 21. 
3. Irenaeus, Demonstrations, section 12. Quoted in Norman P. \<1illiams, 
The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin (New York: Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1927), p. 194, footnote. 
4. Against Heresies, IV, xxxix, 3. 5.. ~. , IV, xxviii, 4. 
experience of sin man vlOuld become ;,10re willing to obey God. At other 
times it seems that man lost the image and likeness of God that Adam 
possessed. l Man became disobedient, subject to sin, death and the 
Devil. 2 In this sense, man is caught in the web of sin and cannot 
extricate himself. 
In spite of the many possible explanati~ns of the results of the 
Fall, one thing is clear. 'The Fall brought about a disruption between 
man and God so tha~ man was disowned by God and was no longer God's 
son.3 By the order of Creation man was the son of God, but according 
to the Fall man was disinherited. 
The Universality of Sin. The whole of Irenaus' writings imply 
the universality of sin. Adam is the representative man. In him man 
has lost his sonship with God. All men are involved in sin because 
of Adam. n... we had offended (him) in the first Adam~ when he 
did not perform his commandment. nh The facility with Which Irenaeus 
switches from the noun, Adam, to the pronoun, we, and the implicit . 
identification of Adam and mankind point to the fact that, in some way, 
all men are in sin. 
The Necessity of Sin. There are two threads of thought; in 
Irenaeus in regard to the oocessity of sin. Although he does not 
specif,y a~ theor,y of the necessity of sin, the ~npression is strong 
that Irenaeus assumes that man is enslaved to sin due to the dominion 
of the Devil. Yet this cannot be pressed too strong~ since Irenaeus 
1. Ibid., III, xviii, 1. 
3. Ibid., IV, xli, 2-3. 
2. ~., V, i, 1. 
h. Ibid., V, xvi, 3; iii, 1; 
rrr; xviii, 1. 
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has a strong emphasis upon the freedom of man. This, i.n fact, is the 
second thread. Man is free to choose between God and the Devil. Han 
has been given the power of choice and this has not been effaced as 
a result of the Fall. For Irenaeus it was God's design that man should 
be free to choose Him, not from compulsion, but by choice. l This thread 
of thought implies that man need not sin. 
The Preconditions of Sin. Irenaeus discovers a precondition for 
sin in the nature of created man. Because he is weak and infantile man 
is subject to outside temptations. Although man free~ consents to sin, 
he is less responsible because of his innocent nature. 2 Since man is 
created in a state of childlikeness he is not able to discern the right 
and wrong. He is innocent and unfettered. This very condition makes 
him susceptible to external influences and tempta~ions. In short, the 
nature of created man, while not sinful in itself, is weak and gives 
the occasion for evil. 
The Source of Sin. The primary and most basic source of sin is 
external to man. The Devil is envious of God's treatment of man and 
seeks to lead man astray.,3 It is the Devil "Who brings sin into the 
world and it is the Devil who incites man to sin. Man sinned through 
thoughtlessness and was consequently less responsible than the Devil. 
A second source of sin is the ilLll of man. The will of man is 
part of the original creation and it is still operative after the Fall. 
1. Ibid., IV, xxxvii, 1. 
2. Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, section 12, p. ~5. 
3. Ibid., section 12, p. 55. 
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Man can obey the dictates of God if he so chooses. Irenaeus' emphasis 
on free will is so strong that Lawson can Sf!\{ that he "starts from the 
fundamental principle that sin is a matter of moral choioo not of inborn 
nature. ftl The whole of the writings of Irenaeus provide the foundation 
for this statement. He consistently underlines the need to obey the 
commandments of God and consistently states that Adam freely choose 
to disobey rather than obey. 
The Agent of Sin. For the most part Irenaeus does not attempt 
to assign sin to any particular element of man. He conceives of sin 
as organic. The whole man is involved in sin. "./hen speaking of man 
as man he refers to the perfect man as a combination of boqy, soul, 
and spirit. If any of these parts are missing he is not a man but some-
thing less than a man. 2 The agent of sin would be the whole man insis-
ting on disobedience to God. 
Occasional~ however, Irenaeus refers to .. he flesh or body as 
the lower part of man. It is the part of man in which the earthly 
paSSions reign.3 These passages imply that the flesh of man is an 
agent of sin. Through the flesh sin manifested itself. 
The Form of Sin 
Disobedience. The manifestation of sin is almost alweus expli-
cated in terms of obedience or disobedience. God had given command-
ments to man in order that he might know that God was the Lord of his 
1. John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London: 
The Epworth Press, 1956), p. 221. 
2. Against Heresies, V, vi, 1. 3. Ibid., III, xxiii, 5; 
~,1. 
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life. It was man's sin that he disobeyed these commandments. The way 
of life and salvation is obedience. The likeness to God comes about 
when man is obedient to the commandments of God. Irenaeus identifies 
righteousness, life, and salvation with obedience. At the same time 
he identifies sin, death, and condemnation with disob~dience.l 
Limitations 
li. The Conception of Sin in the 
\-Jritings of Aurelius Augustine 
A particular difficulty in the stud,y of St. Augustine nis an 
awareness of the total unity in the vast multiplicity of his works. n2 
It is exceedingly hazardous to extract one part of the total system 
without continual reference to other parts. However, for the ?urposes 
of this dissertation it is ne~essary to qonfine the research as much 
as possible to the doctrine of sin. This limitation will necessitate 
truncation of other equally :iJnportant parts .. since they will be con-
sidered only as they have a bearing upon Augustine' s doctrine of sin. 
Definition of Sin 
Augustine's doctrine of sin begins and ends with original sin. 
Adam's fall has led to a corru.pted nature in all of his descendants. 
All men, therefore, are born with an inclination toward sm that 
amounts to an inability not to sin. From the corrupted root of Adam's 
corrupted nature spr:ings the corrupted nature of all men. Man is under 
1. Ibid., IV, xli, 2-3; v, xxiii, 1. 
2. Whitney J. Oates, Basic lvritings of Saint AUgust:ine, (New York: 
Random House, 1948), I, ti. 
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the necessity of sinning because of this corrupt root. l For Augustine 
the corrupt root is the core of sin. 
Sin is spelled with a capital letter in Augustine!s thought. It 
is an inborn state of man that propels him away from God and toward a 
quest for life oriented in himself or in things. 2 Out of this inborn 
state corne actual sin. Actual sin is an act against the Divine order. 
The Nature of Sill 
Creaturehood and Corruption. All things created by God are good. 
Nothing that is created can be evil.3 Man, as a crea~ed being is good 
in nature.4 The nature of man is good because it comes from God. Man 
as created being, however, is dependent upon God for his life. It is· 
only in God that man can exist. In the original state in paradise, 
Adam had the perfect relationship with God and had a perfectly devel-
oped life. The goodness of his own nature was coextensive with the 
goodness of creation. There lias a harmonious interdependency of man 
and creation and a mutual 4ependeney upon God. Above all, Adam had 
the faculty of being able not to sin.5 
1. Augustine" The City of God, xm, xiv. The sourct? for Augustine l s 
writings is A Select Libra~ of the Nicene and Po!t-Nicene Fathers 
of the Christian Church, f~st series, general editor Philip Schaff, 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956), 
volumes I-VITI. 
2. August:ine, Confessions, I, xviii. 
3. Augustine, Enchiridion" IX" x. 
4. August:ine" Confessions" XIil, xxxii. 
5. Williams, Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin, p. 362. Also 
Daniel Jones" Presuppositions of Augustine's Doctrine of Sin and 
Salvation (UnpUbliShed ThD dissertation, Boston University School 
of Theology, 1959), p. 13. 
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Adam chose to sin and thus condemned the whole race of mankind 
, 
to corruption.~ Man's good nature now becomes defective. There is 
an inherited taint wInch cannot be erased. Now man is QDable not to 
sin. Since Adam chose not to remain in the state of righteousness, 
he lost his ability to be righteous. This ability comes on~ from 
God and cannot be originated by man. Thus Adam's descendants do not 
have the ability to be in rela tion to God but can only originate 
that wb ich Adam originated, and that is the ability to sin. "The 
only self motion ••• is in the direction of sin. 1I2 In essence, 
Augustine says that man's nature, although created good by God, sustained 
by God, and made for relationship with God, is no longer able to par-
take of this goodness. Man is sin. 3 
'The Universality of Sin. Augustin~' s doctrine of the univer-
sal ity of sin is roost clearly seen in the Enchiridion where he says 
that "the whole mass of the human race was under condemnation, was 
lying steeped and wallowing in misery •••• ,,4 Man' 5 sin has con.:. 
demned all mankind to continual disobedience tOl'lard God. No one is 
exemot from this condemnation nor can anyone escape. This is the 
tragic consequences of Adam'S disobedience. The ~ole human race is 
separated from God. 
1. Augustine, Enchiridion, XXVI. 
2. 
3. 
Reginald S. l~xon, The Doctrine of Sin (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1922), p. 82-83. 
Erich Przwara, An Au~ustine Synthesis (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1945), p. 357, No. 6 9. -
4. Augustine, Enchiridion .. XXVII .. 
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The Necessity of Sin. Intrinsic to the universalit,y of sin is 
the necessity of sin. The defect of nature transmitted in the pro-
pagation of the species insures man of the inability to do anything 
but sin. Adam lost his ability not to sin and consequent generations 
of Ad~~ have inherited only the reverse of this, the ability to sin. 
The power of choice which Adam was given was vitiated by the Fall. 
Man, following Adam, was not only unable to rise above his defective 
nature but was unable to avoid sm.! 
The Source of Sin. The basic source of sin in man is the ori-
ginal corruption of man. This innate state of man condemns man to 
sin. For Augustine there is no qualitative difference betwe'en sin and 
original sin. There is only a quantitative difference. Out of the 
original defective nature of man with Which he enters the world spring 
various kinds of actual sins. 2 But these various kinds of sin only 
serve to indicat.e the original innate root sin. There is a difference 
,among actual sins since some are more serious than others and thus 
merit greater intensities of guilt and larger punishments. 3 Never-
the less, all sin separates from God and the root sin is the source 
which completely separates man from God. 
A second source of sin is the will of man. Again and again 
Augustine points back to the will of man as the point of origin of 
sin. In Adam it was the willful disobedience to the command of God 
that brought about condemnation. The cause of this sin did not lie 
1. Ibid., XXX. 
2. Ibid., XLIV; XLV. 
3. Ibid., LXXVIII; LXXIX. 
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outside of Adam but inside. It was a defect in his will. There could 
be no other cause of sin in Adam because he had a "~ettled habit of 
virtue. hl This source of sin, however, also refers back to original 
sin. The defective will is the inheritance of all men. There is no 
possibility that this will can be used for righteousness. In fact, 
it can only will sin. At the same time, however, it is a source of 
sin because it is free. It is fre~ to produce sin.2 Augustine never 
defines this free will in terms of the power of choice between good 
and evil. Free will is always the consenting intention of man. With 
this narrow conception of human freedom Augustine thus upholds both 
the corruption of man and the freedom of man. In practice, however, 
the original corruption in'sures the choice of sin. 
A third source of sin is the love of self. The love of self 
, 
is the concrete form of oI'iginal sin and the freedom to choose sin. 
Mar. "abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes 
a kind of end to itself.") God is the source and principle of man's 
existence. He is the true good ~ich satisfies the inner, i.e. created, 
nature of man. Man turns from God toward himself and seeks to make 
h~nself the source and principle of his own existences He becomes his 
own satisfaction. Consequently, man becomes less of ~at he really 
ought to be. By loving himself as the true good instead of loving 
God, man regresses towards non being. 
1. Williams, Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin, p. 364. 
2. Augustine, Enchiridion, XXX. 
3. Augustine, The City of God, XIV, xiii. 
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But man did not so fall away as to become absolute~ 
nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being 
became more contracted than it was when he clave to 
Him who supremely is. According~, to exist in himself, 
that is, to be his o~ satisfaction atter abandoning 
God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approx-
imate to that. 
The love of self is the root of this degradation. It is the misplaced 
affection of man which turns him away from that which would fulfill 
toward a false fulfi11ment o 
The Agent of Sin. Augustine's doctrine of sin was direct~ 
influenced by his own sexual struggles. Although he would not di-
rectly attribute sin to the flesh of man.l 2 he was unable to keep 
from implying that sin reigned in the flesh of man specifically in 
the form ot sexual lusts. The flesh of man rebels against the- mind 
of man. Original sin is directly connected with sexual procreation 
and sexual concupiscence. In a passage in which Augustine argues 
that sin does not originate from the body, he designates the flesh 
as the agent ot sin. 
It was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul 
Sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh cor-
ruptible. And though from this corruption of flesh 
there arise certain incitements to vicez and indeed 
vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the 
flesh all the vicl3s of a wicked life, in case we 
thereb, clear the devel of all these, for he has no 
flesh. 
The flesh is the agent of sin which wars against the higher 
and more noble attitude of reason and the mind. The corruption of 
1. Ibid., XIV, xiii. 
2. Augustine, The City of GodJ XIV, v. 
30 Ibid .. , XIV, iii. The italics are mine. 
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the body is home to sin and burdensome to the soul. The flesh wars 
against the spirit. 
The ForI!} of Sin 
Pride. Augustine seems to categorize sin in two different but 
continuous forms. The first, which follows upon the turning from 
God as a result of the love of self, is pride. Pride is that defect 
of manls nature which refuses subjection to Jod and seeks to exalt 
man himself. l Han aspires to be self sufficient and t.urns to himself 
as the all in all. The only real self-sufficiency is fowad in God. 
He is the only One who is the true good and has no need within Him-
self. Man lacks fulfillment until he finds his way to God. But man, 
because of his evil will, looks to himself rather than to God. 2 He 
focuses on himself and his own pol-lerS as the objects of his affections 
and "slips onward from the mole which is common, to a part, which 
belongs especially to itself.n3 Because man does not want to be a 
subject of the mole l he attempts to find a greater whole in himself 
and suddenly discovers that he is caring for only a part. This part} 
man himself, is necessarily pushed into setting itself against the 
whole, God. He tries to govern by his own laws and is caught in 
conflict with the absolute laws of God. His body is exalted and the 
corporeal senses hold sway; his soul is exalted above other souls. In 
essence, man becomes curved in upon himself and his finiteness is phan-
~asized as infiniteness. 
1. Augustine, The City of God, XIV, xiii. 
2. Augustine, Confessions, X, xxxviii. 
3. Augustine, On the Trinity, XIII ix. 
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Concupiscence. The first form of sin, pride, leads naturalJ.:y 
to the second form, concupiscence. Man cannot be satisfied in his 
self for he discovers that the self is emptiness. Since he has cut 
himself off from relationship l-Tith God he is driven toward those 
things tha t he finds outside hiIllS elf.l Concupiscence is that ten-
dency in man tD find satisfaction and comfort in anythbg which is 
less than God. It seeks its own good in temporal things. It is 
downward directed love substituted for the love of God. 
In much of Augustine's thou/tl t concupiscence is evon more nar-
rowJ.:y defined. The d01mward directed love results in the disordering 
of the instincts, i.e. sin engenders mar-e sin. The sexual instinct 
is the most violent of the bodily instincts and thus come to be 
almost identified with concupiscence. 2 The lust of the sexual act 
is the epitome of sin as well as the punishment for sin. 
4~ The Reformation Period 
i. The Conception of Sin in the 
Writings of Martin Luther 
Limitations 
A limitation in the study of Hartin Luther's writings lies in 
the fact that he was not a systematic theologian. His writings and 
sermons are filled with paradoxes that seem to def.'y logical systematic 
1. 
2. 
Augustine, Confessions, X, xxxix. 
Augustine, On the Good of Marriase and Of Holy Vir~inity are 
illustrative of both the fa ct am the effect Of thl.s kind of 
identification. 
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presentation. However, he did have a central principle through 
which he interpretoo theology. This principle was justification 
by faith alone. Consequently, the interpretation of Luther's 
doctrine of sin must be guided by the principle of justification 
by faith. 
VeT'J simply, this doctrine states that there is no l·!Ork, 
law, or merit by whi~h man can become a son of God. ffNorl to 
preach of the kingdom of God is nothing else than to preach the 
gospel, in which is taught the faith of Christ by which alone God 
dwells and rules in uS o lI1 God alone performs the justifying act 
through Christ. 2 If:an can apprehend and appropriate t..1-!is act in 
faith. But in no way can man himself do anything to gain justi-
fication. Even faith itself is given by God. God's act in Christ 
works faith in the repentant sinner so tha t he apprehends and appro-
priates t.he forgiveness of God and is declared righteous in the sight 
of God. "It is up to God alone to give faith contrary to nature, 
and ability to be1i~e contrary to reason. • • • But faith is a gift 
of God and on that accoUQt ought not to be called a work. n3 
1. Hartin Luther, "A Reply to the Texts Cited in Defense of the 
Doctrines of Men", Luther's i<lorks, XXZ:V, 147. This is a pro-
jected series of fifty five volumes. Jaros1av Pelikan is 
general editor of volumes I..XXX (St. Louis, 1"10.: Concordia 
~~blishing House) while Helmut T. Lehmann is the general ed-
itor of vo1UllEs XXXI-LV (Philadelphia: Huh1enberg Press). 
2. Martin Luther, Smalkald Articles, The Book of Concord, edited 
and translated by TheOdore G. TaDpert (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg 
Press, 1959), III, 1. 
3. Martin Luther, "The Disputation Concerning Justification", Luther's 
Works, XXXIV, 160.' 
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Luther's thinking on sin is· consistent with thh principle. 
Anything that is not of God is of sin. Aqything that man may do, 
say, or produce without God is necessarily of ~in. 
Definition of Sin 
Luther distinquishes three kinds of sin in his "Sermon on the 
Threefold Righteousness. "I The first of these is sin according to 
the civil laH. This has nqthing ro do with sin as a religious or 
Christian terv. but is related only to the horizontal level of life. 
Man is motivated by a fear of punishment and a love of pleasure. The 
civil law, in order to curb his love of pleasure, invokes obedience 
?y centering on man's fear of punishment. 
The second kind of sin is that which is "essential, inborn, 
original, alien." 'This s in is part of man from birth and refers to 
his rotal being. It has come from Adam ani it causes nan to be 
guilty. At the saIle time this sin belongs to the individual man 
and is his personal sense of shame and guilt. This original or 
hereditary sin ie a deep corruption of human nature. In fact, it 
is so deep that "reaoon cannot understand it. It must be believed 
because of the revelation in the Scriptures • ,,2 • • • In order to 
intensify the depth of this corruption Luther says that those who 
teach that man has natural powers that are incorrupt, that nan has 
a free will to do good or refrain from evil, that man can keep the 
1. 
2. 
Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Goshel (Saint Louis, 
Mo.: Concordia PubliShing House, 1951). T ere is a SUlTIIl1ar-J 
of the relevant portions of this BerlTOn on pages 92-93. 
Luther, SI'laJkald Articles, III, i. 
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conunandments of God by his ~-m power or love and cherish God ani his 
neighbor, or that God will give grace to man if he does the best he 
can, are in error. l l~n cannot do good in the sight of God but can 
only do evil. Even those works that seem to be good are not since 
behind each deed stands the sinful heart of man. 
The third kind of sin is those works that are done without 
faith. These are the actual sins that man connnits in violation of 
the Ten Conunandments. The~r are products of the original sin ani 
have meaning only as they relate back to this inborn sin. Such 
sins as lying, murder, theft, disregard or ignorance of God, and 
disobedience to parents are the fruits of man's evil intentions 
brought about by the original corruption. 2 
The Nature of Sin 
Craature.i.cod and Corruption. Han, as originally created by 
i. 
God, was good and righteous. All functi9ns of man are included in 
this original goed ness. Man, as nan, is not alien to God but belongs 
to God and is constant]y preserved by God) In fact, man is man only 
when he is in relationship to God and depends upon God for his life. 
Luther delights in extolling the virtues of man before the Fall.~ 
This original goodness uas not something added to man's nature as 
1. ~., III, i. 2. Ibid., lIT, i. 
3. 
4. 
Martin Luther, Large Catechism, The Book of Concord, edited 
and translated by Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: l1uhlenberg 
Press, 1959), p. 412. 
~uther, Luther's Works, I, 162. 
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a special gift, but was intri.nsic·to man as one aspect of man's 
relationship with his Creator. 
The Fall destroyed this original goodness of man because 
the relationship·between man and God was broken. Without this 
relationship man could not partake in goodness. Consequently, 
after the Fall man is unable to perceive what he ought to be since 
his centeredness in God is lost. Adam broke the commandment of 
God and plunged himself into an abyfs of corruption. l This deed 
was the a ctualization of the deeper brokennes s of the man-Cod 
relationship. Only through the Word of God is man able to recognize 
the depth of his corruption and the heights from which he has 
? fallen. - Han is totally corrupt. Without a relationship with God, 
man can be nothing but evil. Luther is emphatic in stating that 
there is no good in man before God. He is an abominable creature 
who can do nothL"lg but s in. He is enslaved to sin. Man has 
exchansed the lordship of God for the lordship of the Devil. 3 
For Luther the emphasis is upon totality. Nan is totally a 
creature of God. God in His nercy preserves and supports man. At 
the same tinJ:l, man is ,totally sinful. His every act and intention 
is corrupted by sin. These two conceptions can be separated only for 
analysis sake. In empirical observation they are intertwined. Man is, 
at the sane time, both a creature of God and a sinner. 
1. ~., p. lIb .• 
2. Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans, translated and edited by 
Wilhelm Pauck (Philadelphia: Westwinster Press, 1961), p. 79. 
3e Luther, Luther's Works, I, 162. 
The Universality of Sin. Luther believes that sin is a fact of 
human existence so that none is exempt from the taint of sin. for 
him the universality of sin is sWlll1Bd up in Paul's words, "all have 
sinned and fallen short of the glory of God."1 In The Bondage of the 
Will he delights in expounding on the number of times Paul uses the 
words, "all," "no one," etc, to show that eve~one is under the con-
demnation of sin. 2 
The Necessity of Sin. Luther's dogmatic emphasis upon original 
sin and the bondage of the will3 show how strongly he views the neces-
sity of sin. Man can do nothing but sin. The na tural way for man 
to respond to life is the sinful way. 
The Source of Sin. In order to understand Luther's thinking on 
the source of sin in man, it is necessary to anaiyze the distinction 
he makes between sin and original sin, to show his contrast between 
flesh and spirit, and to give some attention to his view of the law.· 
Luther makes a distinction between sin and original sin but 
this is mere~ a pragmatic device, not an essential division. Man 
¥io1ates the commandments of God in many ways. These violations are 
indicative of the deeper corruption of the total person.4 Although 
sins may have a quantitative difference in the eyes of man they all 
1. Rom. 3:23. 
2. Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, translated by J. I. Packer 
and O. R. Johnston (LOndon: James Clarke and Co., Ltd., 1957) 
pp. 298-299. 
3. ~., This whole work implies and ~olicates the necessity of sin. 
4. Luther, Luther's Works, I, 171-172. 
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spring from the same evil source. Before God there -is no qualitative 
di i_ference in sins because the sinner, with his corrupt and evil will, 
stands behind every sin. Sin and ')riginal sin are actually inter-
changeable concepts for Luthe~ since both of them point to the power 
of the corrupted disposition of man ~ich seeks its own in everything. 
The whole of man has been taken over by sin so that the whole person 
participates in sin. Not only the body, but also the soul and the 
spirit are under the influence of this inherited corruption. l 
Luther traces original sin back to the Fall of Adam but makes 
no attempt to explain how this sin has been transmitted. He focuses 
on the personal nature of this corruption. Original sin is t he sin 
of a particular person. It is the natural or essential way in which 
a man responds. In a sense, Lut.her tends to perceive man as a being 
imbedded in a historical legac.y. Before man ever becomes aware of 
his consciousness he has become involved in turning away from God. 
Just as man's "I-ness" begins before consciousness, so does ~n' s 
sinfullness begin before consciousness.2 Original sin is thus the 
individual man' 5 sin and. also the sin of history. It is the source 
of sin.3 
Luther's contrast of the words flesh ani spirit also poin'\l) to 
a source of sin. Both of these terms refer to mgn in his totality 
1. Luther, "The Magnificat," futher' s Work~, XXI, 303. 
2. Rudolf Hermann, Zu Luthers Lehre von SUnde und Rechtfertigung, 
(Tttbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, i952), p. 18. 
3. Luther, "Defense and Explanation of all the .A-tic1es," Luther's 
Works, XXXII, 19-28. 
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rather than to individual parts or qualities of manol Flesh desig-
nates man as corrupt, evil, under the law, and under the power of the 
devil 0 Spirit encompasses man as incorrupt, sinless, above the law, 
and under the power of God. As flesh, man looks at himself and sub-
ordinates all thinGs to himself, including God. He is the center of 
the universe and seeks to draw all things into himself. As spirit, 
man is in relationship with God as a son in the home. He seeks to 
suboniinate himself to God and fulfill the will of God in the universe • 
.ooili terms attempt to include the total personality as dominated by 
the niH or the center of personality. It is the self that is either 
flesh or spirit. This self, then, is the empirical source of sin. 
It is out of the flesh that arises the sin of man. 
The concept of the law is fundamental to Luther's thought. 
Although it is not a source of sin, it reveals the nature and source 
of sin in man. The chief function of the law is "to make original 
sin manifest am show man to 'What utter depths his nature has fallen 
and how corrupt it has become.n2 In other words, the law reveals 
the utter perversity of man's total self and the impossiblity of 
finding aqything but sin in man. It drives man to despair as he 
sees himself as totally sinfulo 
The law is not able to save man but points up man's condition. 
It demands that man spontaneously Surrender himself to God. But this 
very demand drives man deeper into sin. The desire to be self 
1. Edgar Mo Carlson, The Reinter~retation of Luther (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1948), p. 1. 
2. Luther, Smallcald Article3, III, ti. 
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deteI"Tlining is aroused by the demand for surrender. Man attempts to 
be self-sufficient by open rebellion against God or by doing the works 
of the law. This latter response is even more insidious than open re-
bellion beca'lse it directs llBn' s selfish striving against God. Man 
is deluded into believing that he can manipulate God for his own ends. 
The law, then, drives man to respond to C~d by open rebellion, 
work righteousness, or despair. It cannot overcome the sll"! but l1l9rely, 
by its demands, reveals the source of sin in the total self. 1 In a 
sense the law becomes a source of sin when it holds out the promise 
of salvation through itself. 
'!he comepts of original sin, flesh, and the law come together 
as oources of sin in man. Far Luther, sin was never a deed, an act, 
or an intention alone. It was always a state. This state of man can 
be defined as being out of relationship with Godo Thus man is not only 
a sinner, he is sin. He is sin because his life is not lived L'l the 
context of the created God-man relationship. The later followers of 
Luther were so impressed with his description of the fallen state of 
man that they defined sin as inhering 
in the nature, substan::e and essence of man in such 
a way that even if no evil thought would ever arise 
in the heart of corrupted man, no idle word ever 
spoken, or no wicked act or deed took plac2, never-theless, man's nature is corrupted •••• 
Although this seems to be a subtle perversion of Luther's intention, 
in that it shifts the emphasis from a relational definition of sin to 
1. 
2. 
~., III, ii. 
Epitome, The Book of Concord, edited and translated by Theodore 
Tappert (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959), I, xxi. 
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a substantial definition, it does point out a ftmdamental ernphasis of 
Luther, namely" nothine in man is exempt from sin. Body, soul, deeds, 
thoughts, and intentionB are all encompassed and surrounded b:/ original 
..u.n. H:m recognizes himself as a man of flesh when he is confronted by 
the law. He sees that his total self is the source for sin because he 
is stained and corrupted by original sin, embedded in the flesh, and 
lives his life under the law. 1 
One other source of sin, particularly important to Luther, was 
the devil. The devil is a trans~lUMn source of sin vmo struggles to 
keep man in bondage to Slll. He is in a co nstant warfare with God over 
man and uses all kinds of devices, tricks, and subtleties to keep 
man from entering into a true relationsllip with God. For Luther, the 
devil is the onl3 that leads man into sin, keeps him in sin, and authors 
all the calamities that befall h~2 
The Form of Sin 
Luther seems to formulate the forms of sin under three cat-
egories: unbelief, egocentricity, and concupiscence. Although he no-
where specifically delineates the se three forms of sin, his refer-
ences to sin are amenable to this division. 
Unbelief. Unbelief is the opposite of faith. It develops when 
man removes his trust from God and denies his dependent relationship 
1. 
2. 
Luther, "Defense and Explanation of all the Articles", Luther's 
Works, XXXII, 19-31, 83-86, 91-94. 
Martin Luther, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, translated and 
edited by William Hazilitt (Philadelphia: Lutheran Board of 
Publj~ation, 1868), pp. 301-332. 
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wi th God. Luther sees lll1belief as the essential II source of all sins. IIl 
Han is at oclds with God and no lOI!~er commune s with Him. He loses his 
position as a son of God and removes himself froP'! the supporting and 
protecting love of God. He abandons or doubts the Word of God, and, 
at that moment, thrusts himself out of reJ.::Itionship with God. 
The CO'rollary to unbellef is idolatry.? Immediately after t'1e 
onset of unbelief aI!other god must be invent~d since man ha s a dim 
kI!owledge tha t he belonGs to 'Jod but has now become lmable t::> appre-
hend the true God. In other words, man shifts ~is trust from God to 
another god of his own invention. In a certain sense, 1mbelief and 
idolatry are synonYmous. Selief is a necessary ingredient of human 
nature and unbelief in the true God necessitates idolatry. 
Egocentricity. Thi~ term focuses upon the core of the corrupt 
person. l'{an in unbelief is egocentric.) He attempts to place him-
self in the center of the universe instead of allowing God to hold 
this position. This sets up a struggle between theocentricity and 
egocentricity. Han rebels against Goel. by openly committing himself 
to himself or demanding that God reward him because he has fulfilled 
his perception of the law of God. In either case, man puts ~L~Eelf 
in opposition to God and enthrones himself a~ an autonomous being 
outside of a relationship with God. Man strives to live, and pretends 
to be something, without God. This egocentricity is not just a part 
1. Luther, Luther's Works, I, 147. 
2. Ibid., p. 149. 
3. Carlson, J1le Reinterpretation of Luther, p. 51. 
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of man. It is the total product of the 1 ... hole man: his will, his emo-
tion, and his intellect. Botr. '30111 and body are involved in egocen-
tricity. Luther does not distinguish between higher and lower parts 
of man but maintauls the position that the Whole man is egocentric. 
Concupiscence. This word has a se~sual connotation but for 
Luther it meant more than just sensuality. Concupiscence involves 
the desires of the body and the attempt to satisfy these desires 
without regard to the commands of God. But it also involves spir-
itual sin!!! such as aTJ.ger, pride, and inability to love God. l In 
effect~ concupiscence is man's affection directed toward himself 
in.~t"ad :)f directed to~ .. rard Go:i. Unbelief separated man from Jod; 
egocentricity established man as an autonomous being outside of God; 
concupiscence directs all the energies of man toward himself as the 
only object desirable enough and worthy enough to roorit his affection. 
Han is concupiscent in that he is endowed with a perverted constit1l-
tion which aims only at self-satisfaction and a perverted reason which 
aims only at establishing itself as the pinnacle of the universe. 
ii. The Conception of Sin ir. the 
Writings of John Calvin 
Limitations 
Calvin's most systematic presentation of theology is Institutes 
of the Christian Religiono 2 This is the primary source of this section. 
, 
.... 
2. 
James MacKinnon, Luther and the ReforllBtion (London: 
Green, and Co., 1925), Pp. 104-105. Longmans, 
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated by 
Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1953), two volumes. 
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Definition of Sin 
Calvin defines sin by ana~zing the component parts of the 
first sin. All actual sin springs from the root sin of Adam since 
this sin has to tal~ depraved the na ture of man. Adam's sin is 
defined in terms of pride and ambition. The beginning of sin was 
pride '~ecause had not man's a~bition carried him higher than he was 
permitted, he mi~lt have continued in his first estate."l But these 
are not the deepest elements of sin. Beneath the pride and ambition 
of man is disobedience and infidelity towards God. Man fails to 
believe God and abandons the commands of God by rebelling against 
Him. 2 The essential elements of sin are disobedience, unbelief, and 
pride. 
These elements of the first sin are part of the inheritance of 
every man. All men are under the condemnation and guilt of original 
sin. In his fallen nature, man is totally corrupt. Calvin defines 
original sin as 
A hereditary corruption and depravity of our nature, 
extending to all the parts of the soul, which first 
makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then 
produces in us works which in Scripture are termed 
works of the flesh. 3 
From this definition it is clear that there are two kinds of sin. 
The first is the state of sin derived from man's place as a descen-
dant of Adam. This sin is the natural state of man in his depravity. 
Every part of man is saturated with evil. All sorts of corruption 
1. Ibid., II, 1, iv. 2. Ibid., II, 1, iv. 
3. Ibid., II, 1, viii. 
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and depravity exist in man and it is precise~ the soul that is the 
sink of iniquity.l The second kind of sin is that which springs from 
this utterly and total~ corrupt nature of man. These are the fruits 
of the original sin which are co nstantly produced n just a s a lighted 
furnace sends forth sparks and flames, or a fountain without ceasing 
pours out water. "2 The m ture of man is constantly proli.fic in the 
production of the works of the flesh. Adultery, fornication, hatred, 
and murder are examples of this second kind of sin. 
The Nature of Sin 
Creaturehood and. Corruption. Man is the highest creation aoong 
all the works of God and is placed within the ordered scheme of God1s 
creation. He is created in the image of God so that his whole being 
reflects this glorious image. Specifically, Calvin meant that man was 
a centered being in whom the intellect was clear, the affections subor-
dinated to reason, the senses duly regulated, and all of this excellence 
ascribed to God. 3 This image was manifested in the "light of intellect, 
rectitude of heart, and the soundness of every part ,,4 of the tOJtal 
man.. Man was created a nerfect being dependent upon God for his life. 
Torrance summarizes Calvin1s 'teaching on the image ~f God by saying, 
Being made in the image of God means being brought 
into a holy and sacred bond of order with God, to 
1. Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, translated by Harold 
Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1956), p. 82. 
2. Calvin, Institutes, II, 1, vi. 
3. ~., I, 15, iii. 
4. ~., I, 15, iv. 
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whom we are to submit ourselves obedient~ and thank-
ful~, and in which the whole of our human nature 
receives it~ inner and outer temperature, and recti-
tude, ar~ integrity.l 
At the same time, the creation of man is not a transfusion of the 
substance of God, but it is a creatiou out of nothing. 2 !'f.an is a 
separate being eoo.o'W ... >d with roost excellent faculties and dependent 
upon God for continuance of life.. His nature is good and noble as 
long as the dependent relationship is maintained. 
Adam's decision to remove himself from the dependent relation-
ship has effaced the original image of God. Not on~ were the ori-
ginal gifts of God withdrawn, but evil things were substituted for 
them. 3 There was nothing good left in man. He is totally depraved. 
This original act of Adam is transmitted to all men so that all are 
in a fallen condition. Calvin does not go so far as to deny the fact 
of the good creation. the su~stance of man's body and soul is not 
evil,4 but every part is saturated with evil. The fact of the first 
sin and its effects on all men have resulted in the complete corrup-
tion of man. Man is unable to do aI:ij'thing good. Even those men who 
seem to perform virtuous acts are merely being used by God or are 
hiding the inner vices within their hearts.S 
1. T. F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth 
Press, 1949), p. 44: 
2. Calvin, Institutes, I, 15, v. 
3. Ibid., II, 1, v. 
4. Niese1, The Theology of Calvin, p. 82. 
S. Calvin, Institutes, II, 3, iii, iv. 
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The Universality.of Sin. Calvin holds to the universality of 
sin by virtue of Adam being the pr ogenitor and fountainhead of all 
following generations. No one escapes this inherited corruption. 
Everyone is involved in sin.l 
The Necessitl of Sin. The necessity of sin is also seen in 
the light of Adamls sin. The corruption of AdamI s nature included 
the will of Adam. Adam's corrupted will could no longer seek out 
those things good and pleasing to God. By the same token, the heirs 
of Adam are in the same situation. The will is incauable of doing, 
or even attemuting to do, any good thing. Man is under a condemnation 
in' which he must sin. Sin is natural to him. 
Moreover, when I say that the will, deprived of 
liberty, is led or dragged by necessity to evil, 
it is strange that any should deem the expression 
harsh. • •• Man, since he was corrupted by the 
fall, sins not forced or Wlwillingly, but voluntarily, 
by a most forward bias of the mind; not by violent 
compulsion or external force, but by the movement 
of his own passion; and yet such is the de?ravity 
of his nature, that he ca~not move and act except 
in the direction of evil. 
The Preconditions of Sin. Calvin refers to the preconditions 
of sin when he speaks of Adam's fall from grace. Although he is not 
able effectively to delineate the rearon for this fall, Cal rin infers 
that it came about because man was human and not divine. Man was 
~eak in the sense that he was subject to change and temptation. Although 
God created man with the utmost excellence, He did not create him with 
the capacit,y for perseverance.3 
1. ~., II, 1, v. 2. Ibid., II, 3, v. 
-
3. Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, pp. 89-90. 
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The Source of Sin. As has been made clear by now, the ultimate 
source of all sin is the corrupt nature of man. Sin is the natural 
inclination of man. The center of this corrupt, natural nature of 
man is the evil will. Like Augustine, Calvin traces the source of 
sin back to the will. 
As evidenced by the preceding quotation, Calvin feels that the 
will of man is free in the sense that it is not under any external 
comnulsion to sin. In point of fact, man voluntarily wills to sin. 
This leads Calvin to distinquish bet'Jleen a voluntary will and a com-
pelled will. Man's will is not compelled to incline toward sin but 
it necessarily, voluntarily, chooses this path. l Out of this will 
springs sin. 
Order. There is a heavy emphasis in Calvin's writings on the 
orderedness of creation, man's ordered place in this creation, and 
man' 5 relationship to God within the total order. The principle of 
order that pervades the whole universe is utter dependence upon the 
mercy of God. Man is intended to image the order reflected in cre-
ation. He is to be dependent on, and obedient to, God. Over and 
over again Calvin speaks of the necessity of being obedient to God 
as a reflection of this order. Man's fall has disrupted the Divine 
order. He has brought about disorder by his disobedience. 2 In his 
life man is disordered. In this sense, sin is a disruption of the 
orderedness of God's plan. In fact, Calvin, when speaking of the 
1. Calvin, Institutes, II, 3, v. Also Niesel, The Theology of 
Calvill, p. 86. 
2. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Han, pp. 43-48. 
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Christian way of life, finds the orinciples for this by collecting 
a list of lavlS from scriptural texts. 
The Form of Sin 
Unbelief and Idolatry. Calvin does not attempt to separate 
unbelief am idolatry as forms of sin. Man has within him a sense 
of God that is engraven upon his heart. l Even the most wicked of 
men IlIUst acknowledge this. Yet man seeks to deny the true God and 
put his confidence in himself or in other creaturely things. He 
brings God down to his level by forming images of him in his mind 
and then forming these images with his hands. Because man wills 
to be unfaithful to God and disbelieve His promises, he must then 
turn his need for God toward idols. 
The human mind, stuffed as it is with presump-
tuous rashness, dares to imagine a God suited 
to its own capacity; as it labours under dulness, 
nay, is sunk in the grossest ignorance, it sub-
stitute~ vanity and an empty phantom in the place 
of God. 
The root of sin in Adam was that he despised the word of God. 3 
From this root sin of unbelief has necessarily sprung idolatry in 
which the glo~J of God is exchanged for the infa~ of created 
things. 
Pride and Ambition. Reinhold Niebuhr, at one point, says 
that "Calvin consistently holds to the Pauline definition of sin 
1. Calvin, Institutes, I, 4, iv. 
2. ~., I,ll, viii. 
3. Ibid., II, 1, lv. 
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given in Romans 1. Sin is pride • .,l This form of sin is most clearly 
explicated when Calvin is explainin~ the sin of Adam. Pride and am-
bition are coupled as the results of unbelief. They carried Adam 
be.1ond the limits of his dependent relationship with God. Man longs 
for more than is given to him. He wishes to step out beyond the boun-
daries imposed by his Creator. Consequently, man denies his Creator, 
attempts to set himself up as an equal to God, and remakes the world 
in his own image. 2 
Concupiscence and Disobedience. In spite of his emphasis upon 
sin as pride and unbelief, Calvin also stresses ~he fact that sin is 
seen as concupiscence and disobedience. This is the active principle 
of perversity that lies back of the disorder in man and in creation. 
The mole nature of man is so corrupt that "a perpetual disorder and 
excess are apparent in all our actions.,,3 All the desires of man 
are sinful as th~J strive to break the laws of God. God's ordered 
principle of creation is broken by lTan thro ugh the sensuous, disobe-
dient desires of the flesh. 
There seem to be two sides to consupiscence. The negative 
side is the disruption of the orderedness of creation. This is man-
ifested in disobedience to the laws of God. The positive side is the 
inordinate carnal desire of man which seeks to fulfill itself. In 
short, Calvin frequently defines sin as carnal desire and emphasizes 
the suppression of this desire. Furthermore, his 1dentification of 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949J, P. 181, footnote. 
2. Calvin, Institutes, II, 1, iv. 3. Ibid., III, 3, xii. 
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righteousness with self-discipline, which comes from his passion for 
right doctrine, emphasizes the orderedness and lawfulness Which makes 
sin a disobedience to divine law. l 
5. The Contemporary Period 
i. The Conception of Sin in the 
\irit:i.ngs of Reinhold Niebuhr 
Limitations 
According to Hans Hofmann, Reinhold Niebuhr's theology "finds 
its climax and makes its greatest contribution in his doctrine of 
sin. n2 · This judgment is borne out by many other students of Niebuhr. 
It is to be expected that a detailed and definitive ana]s"sis of sin 
would be found in Niebuhr's writings. This is done roost succinctly 
in the two volum3 work, The Nature and Destiny of Man) This book 
will be our primary source. Although the background of his analysis 
of sin is concerned with the relevancy of the Christian gospel to 
the contemporary situation, his focus is on man in his perverted rela-
tionships to ~od, himself, and society. 
Definition of Sin 
Niebuhr defines sin in two spheres: the religious and the moral. 
The religious definition of sin is primary in that it shapes and 
1. Niebuhr, The Nature and DestinY of }~n, p. 201, footnote. 
2. Hans Hofmann, .The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Charles 
Scribner's SOns, 1956), p. 184. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of I'ian (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1949). Two volumes in one book. 
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directs the definition of sin in the moral realm, and it speaks to 
what is essential in the nature of creaturehood, namely man's rela-
tionship with God. The moral definition of sin seeks to categorize 
the various manifestations of religious sin as it is perceived in 
human and social relationships. These two definitions are bound 
together because they both are concerned with the same phenomenon. 
At the same time, they are separate because they approach this iden-
tical phenomenon from distinctive perspectives. The religious defi-
nition of sin focuses on the vertical relationship of man and God 
while the moral definition centers on the horizontal relationship of 
man and man and/or man and society. 
The religious definition of sin is "man' s rebellion against 
God, his effort to usurp the place of God. nl God, in His creative 
activity, ordained for man a unique place in the historical world. 
Nan was created for conummion with God. This relatedness to Jed is 
the essential nature of created man and it is toward this relation-
ship that man is rootivated. Only in this communion with God is the 
essential selfhood of man fulfilled. Man is thus placed in a position 
above the rest of t.l-!e created world for he has the freedom to tran-
scend the limitations of creation by involving himself in relation-
ship with God. It is here, at the juncture of nature and spirit, 
that man commits what is the essence of sin. He tries to make h~ 
self, instead of God, the center of the universe. As Niebuhr states 
it, "He tries to translate his finite existence into a more permanent 
1. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of }~n, p. 179. 
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and absolute form of existence." l Instead of recognizing the lirni-
tations inherent in his finiteness and the necessity of centering 
his existence in God, he absolutizes his partial perspectives and 
places himself where God belongs. in this act man separates himself 
from God and perverts his freedom into slavery to the Dowers of the 
world. 
The moral defintion of sin is injustice. "The ego which falsely 
makes itself the center of existence in i~s pride and will-to-power 
inevi tably subordinates other life to its Will and thus does injustice 
to other life. n2 Once man has lost his religiously oriented security, 
he seeks to establish his security within himself or within the vi-
~ 
talities o.f the world. This inevitably forces man to pretensions and 
prideful self-assertions that necessarily impel hL~ to treat other 
men as objects or forces him to a denial of his own .freedom and ~kes 
himself an object controlled by external poNers. Man consequently 
exists as an object for the gratification of idealized pretensions 
or uncontrollable desires. 
The Preconditions of Sin 
Sin has both philosophical and psychological precursers in 
Niebuhr's thought. A1 though these ?recursers are not :.:inful in them-
selves, they are the necessa~ soil out of which sin arises. Without 
them the~would be no sin. With them the conditions for sin are present. 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1935). Reprintea as a paperback by 
11eridian Books, New York, 1959, p. 81. 
2. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 179. 
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The philosophical precondition of sin is the stance of man on 
the border between finiteness and freedom. Y~n's involvement in nature 
and the contingencies of finite existence limit his abilities and po-
tentialities. His knowledge is never absolute, only partial; his ex-
istence is never independent, always dependent; his strength is never 
complete, but always undermined Qy weakness. In this sense, man's 
identity is circumscribed so that he is unable to identify with the 
whole but must always be satisfied with partial perspectives and 
limited knowledge. 
Yet man is able to transcend the limitations of nature and involve 
himself in the infinite. He has the ability to envisage the Whole. 
Self-consciously he realizes that his nerspectives are partial and that 
his knowledge is limited. But he can go on from there and formulate 
ideals beyond these circumscribed boundaries even though he is immersed 
within them. This transcendent nature of man, which has the quality of 
freedom from finiteness, allows the possibility of tempta~ion. Man is 
tempted to deny his finiteness and its inherent limitations and proclaim 
a knowledge ltlich is beyond these limits. Niebuhr calls this the "ideo-
logical taint."l Or, conversely, man is tempted to derw his transcen-
dent nature and obscure his freedom in an idolatry of his limitations. 
The psychological concomitant of the position of man between freedom 
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and finiteness is anxiety. Niebuhr defines anxiety as "the internal pre-
condition of sin" and "the internal description of the state of temptation. n2 
1. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 182. 
2. Ibid., p. 182. 
Man is confronted with the relativities of nature and history and 
visualizes the awful possibility of the meaninglessness of life. 
At the same time he is confronted with his own condition of being 
within, yet above, the created world. Both of these confrontations 
predispose him to be anxious and insecure, and, by virtue of his 
freedom, he attempts to find security to overcome his anxiousness. 
Consequent~ man involves himself in both creativity and destruction 
as he reaches out for this security. Anxiety becomes the s?ring-
board for both good and evil as it attempts to use the freedom of 
man to overcome itself. 
Thus the same freedom which gives human~life a 
creative power, not possessed by other creatures, 
also endows it with destructive possibilities not 
known in nature. The twofold possibility of cre-
ativity and destruction in human freedom accounts 
for the growth of both gooq and evil through the 
extension of human powers. 
Within Niebuhr's system anxiety is the psychological keystone 
that undergirds sin. Because of it man is tempted to strive after 
perfection and security. This striving inevitably leads him "either 
to deqy the contingent character of his existence (in pride and self-
love) or to escape from his freedom (in sensuality.),,2 
The Nature of Sin 
The nature of sin does not lie in the freedom of man nor in 
the natural impulses of man. These are both part of the divine gift 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and Historz (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1949), p. 123. 
2. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiqr of Iw1an, p. 185. 
65 
of creation. It lies, rather, in the ability of man to turn his 
creatureliness into a perverted godliness. In short, it is a defect 
of the will which has become a defect through the perversion of the 
will. Niebuhr acknowledges the unfathomable l1\Vstery of sin in that 
it seems to posit itself. The Biblical concept of Satan symbolizes 
the truth that evil is in some sense outside of man, and yet, the 
~h of the Fall seeks to convey the fact that even Satan chose sin 
over the good. Sin is thus both external and internal. But in 
either case it involves the responsibility of man. 
Sin emerges, indeed, out of freedom and is possible 
only because man is free; but it is done in freedom, 
and therefore man and not life bears responsibility 
for it. It does indeed a~company every creative act; 
but the evil is not part of the creativity. It is 
the consequence of man's self-centeredness and ego-
tism by which he destroys the har!ll)ny of existence. 1 
Thelen summarizes this succinctly when she comments that the origin 
of sin in Niebuhr is "not to be sought in man's finiteness, which is 
good, but in the oretension whereby he seeks to overcome his limi-
tation by denying its existence.,,2 Sin lies in the ability of man 
to decide and ma~ is res~onsible for his decision. Niebuhr holds to 
this conception even when he postulates the inevitability of sin. 
The nature of sin can never be fully explicated. It is comprised 
of man's willing decision not to enter into a faithful dopendent rela-
tionship with God, but instead, to center his existence in something 
other than God. Man's egotism, his unbelief, and his untrust of God 
1. Re~~~old Niebuhr, Beyond Tragegy (Charles Scribner's Sons: New 
York, 1951), Pp. 165-166. 
2. Hary F. Thelen, }1an as Sinner (Ne-Ii York: King's Gro .. m Press, 
1946), p. 80. 
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drive him away from the act of faith to't'lard the act of sin. This 
act is done in freedom and freedom connotes responsibility. In 
spite of temptation, and in spite of anxiety, man has the possibil-
ity of choosing to live his life in faith. That he does not do this 
is his sin and no eX91anation of ignorance, human finiteness, or 
natural evil can lift the burden of his responsibility. 
Niebuhr does distinquish between the religiously valid asser-
tion that all men have sinned and the historical judgment of the 
gQilt of sin. He feels that the ultimate proposition that all men 
must s.T.and guilty in the sight of God can not be equated with an 
equality of guilt on the moral level. l There is an inequality of 
guilt while there is an equality of sin. Contingent circumstances 
in a historical period may condition the quantity of guilt. Those 
who have more power will be more guilty when they misuse that power 
than those who have less. Those who have mOre wealth will be judged 
more heavily when they misuse their wealth than those who have few 
riches. At the same time, however, the insight that all human nature 
is sinful allows for the penetration of the pretensions of all classes 
and kinds of men.. 
The above expostion of Niebuhr's conceDtion of the nature of 
sin shows that he conceives of man's craturehood as the good gift 
of God which man has corrupted by willful intention. Implied in this 
is the universality and necessity of sin, although Niebuhr says that 
sin is not necessary, only inevitable. The source of sin lies in the 
will of man. This is the strongest emphasis that Niebuhr makes although 
1. Iiiebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 222. 
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he does refer to the source of sin lying external to man when he makes 
use of the symbol of Satan. 
The FOi~m of Sin 
Niebuhr distfnquishes two basic forms of sin: the sin of pride 
and the sin of sensuality. In an earlier ~rk,l he tends to elevate 
pride as the essential form of sin. Later he seems to see these two 
forms of sin as opposite solutions to the predicament of man. How-
ever, he is prone to give more detailed a ttention to pride and to see 
elements of pride in sensuality. 
Pride. .t.ssentially pride is the attempt of the ego to make 
itself the center of existence. After severing himself from the true 
center of life, namely God, man atLempts to overcome his insecurity 
within the context of his humanity. .J..n order to do this he is forced 
into various forms of pretensions that will· justify his' self-love and 
deny his relationship to God. Dishonesty becomes the concomitant of 
pride in order that the s elf may find peace in its sin. 
In the analysis of pride, 2 Niebuhr identifies three types that 
gradually merge into a fourth and higher form of pride. The first of 
these is the pride of power. The pride of power is the pretension of 
the ego that it is master of its fate in the face of all vicissitudes. 
The contingent chara CT.er of existence is either unrecognized or only 
dimly conscious. If the finiteness of life is unrecognized there is 
an illusion of man l s capacity to shape his destiny based upon a secure 
1. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 87-88. 
2. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of han, pp. 188-203 • 
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place in the h1storical situa~ion. If the dependent character of 
existence is d~ conscious, the pride of power is based upon a 
radical necessity to deny this sense of insecurity. 
The second type of pride is the pride of the intellect. Man 
seeks to comprehend the height, depth, and breadth of existence within 
a partial perspective and then absolutizes the incompleteness. Part 
of this may be ignorance. More basically, however, there is always 
the attempt to obscure the partiality of human limitations and the 
taint of self-interest that infiltrates every human system. The 
temptations of human freedom and human insecurity are basic. In the 
former man finds himself compelled to undersl.and the na tur,e of things 
" 
and attempts to elevat.e his freedom by leaping beyond his possibilities. 
In the latter man finds himself i.dentii'ying his partial truth with ul-
timate truth in order to escape the hint of' scepticism. 
Moral pride is the third type of pride. This is the judgment 
of the righteous who pretend that their virtue is ultimate righteousness 
and that their moral standards are absolute standards. It is a kind of 
subtle self-deification that is hidden behind the facade of righteousnesi. 
This moral pride shades over into the pinnacle of pride, the p:ride of the 
spirit. This kind of pride partakes of all the other forms of pride in 
various ways but seeks to go be.1~nd them and give divine sanction to 
self-centeredness. Basically, it is moral pride raised ~o explicit 
religious proportions. 
Sensuality. The effects of pride are much more destructive than 
-the effects of sensuality because pride allows man to impose his ego-
centricity all aroWld him. Sensuality only results in an enslaving of 
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self. It does not lead Illan to impose himself on others by force. 
Sensuality is the result of man attempting to hide his freedom and 
deifY his finiteness by losing his personal finiteness in larger 
idolatries. Man identifies his self with particular impulses within 
himself. With this identification, he both makes a god of oart of 
himself and seeks to escape himself in idolizing the impulse. Niebuhr 
swmnarizes sensuality by saying that it is always, 
(1) an extension of self-love to the point where 
it defeats its o~ ends; (2) an effort to escape 
the prison house of self by finding a god in a 
process or person outside the self; and (3) finally 
an effort to escape from the confusion 'Which sin has 
created into some form of subconscious eXistence. l 
Limitations 
ii. Th.e Conception of Sin in the 
Writings of Paul Tillich 
Paul Tillich is so comprehensive and inclusive in his phil-
osophical and theological S,1stem that it is very difficult to deal 
with only one small aspect of the system. Inevitably there will be 
some distortion of both the S,1stem and the part under consideration. 
Since this difficulty is more crucial in Tillich's thought than for 
the other men surveyed, a little more space will be used to delineate 
some of the background necessary to understand his concept of sin. 
Although Tillich has been prolific in his writings, the major work, 
and the one which will be used most extensively in this section, is 
his §lstematic Theologr.2 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Han, p. 240. 
Paul Tillich, ~stematic Theology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 951, 1957). TWo of the three volumes are published. 
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Paul Tillichl s Approach 
Ontology. Tillich
' 
s philosophical approach is the meT.hod of 
correlation in Wl ich existential questions are confronted with rev-
elatory answers. The question and the answer comprise a matrix in 
which each shapes the other. The existential queSt.ions are determined 
by an analysis of being, or more specifica~, the structures of 
being. In every encounter with reality the structures of being are 
evident. By ana~zing reality as a whole, the structure of being is 
explicated in terms of categories, structural laws, and universal 
concepts. This onto:ogical analysis is possible because "there are 
concepts which are less universal than being but more universal • • • 
than a~ concept designating a realm of beings."l These structures 
are present in every experience and both determine the nature of the 
experience and constitute its structure. Thus they are the conditions 
of experience and are presuoposed in every experience. 
There are four levels of ontological concepts: 2 (1) the basic 
ontological structure which has a subject-object polarity and pre-
supposes the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being; 
(2) the elements ~ich constitute the ontological structure and share 
the polar character of the basic structure so that one pole expresses 
the self-relatedness of being while the other pole expresses the be-
longingness of being; (3) the characteristics of being which are the 
conditions of existence, or the existential being; and (4) the 
1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 164. 
2. Ibtd., I, 164-166. 
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categories of being and knowing in the structures of finite being 
and thinking •. 
Finitude is the center of Tillich's analysis since it is the 
finitude of man combined with freedom that drives man to the "tran-
s]tion from essence to existence." Finitude is being lirrdted by 
nonbeing. Being-itself transcends nonbeing and has no beginning 
nor end while nonbeing is only in relation to being. Yet everything 
that participates in being has nonbeing as a part of it. 'Ihis "every-
thing" is being L'1 the process of coming from nonbeing and going 
toward nonbeing. In a word, it is finiteness. 
Man as Finite Freedom. Man, as finite man, is able to transcend. 
himself and see the possibilities of infinitude. On the one hand, all 
the structures of finitude force him to transcend himself and to become 
aware of himself as finite. The self faces himself as a finite indi-
vidual in a universal vworld. He is driven to confront his Olm vitality 
in relation to universal structures and universal meanings. He exper-
iences the power of his freedom within the context of destiny. On the 
other hand, man perceives his finitude in a way that allows him to 
transcend it. His ability to conceive of his life as a Whole moving 
toward death places him above time and space. The web of his destiny 
is centered in the expression of his freedom and the universe of 
meanings and structures are dependent upon his vitality. In short, 
the awareness of finitude comes about when man transcends himself. 
But the very act of transcending shows that man belongs to being itself. 
The freedom of man is one of the elements of the basic ontolo-
gical structure that has destiny as its polarity" It is not a function 
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of man, that is, the will, but every function of man participates 
in his freedom. This freedom is experienced as deliberation, deci-
sion, and responsibility. All of these are processes of the centered 
totality of the person's being. Deliberation means that a person is 
above that which is being deliberated. Decision means that the person 
must be be,yond the possibilities that are excluded. Responsibility 
means that the person's acts are determined by his centered self and 
~ot by anything outside the self nor anyone part of the self. Des-
tiny becomes meaningful in the light of the analysis 0: freedom. The 
concrete totality of eve~hing that constitutes an individual's 
being--body structure, psychic strivings, moral and spiritual char-
acter, communal relations, past experiences, environmental impact--
is his destiny. Desti~ is not the o?posite of freedom, for that 
would be fate, but it is the conditions and limits of freedom. l<'ree-
dom is not the opposite of destiny, for that would be necessity, but 
it is the expression of the centered acts that shape life. Freedom 
and destiny are polarities that constitute the whole. 
~~n, as finite freedom, is man eA~eriencing the conditions of 
existence in the con~ext of the structure of being. His freedom gives 
him the possibility of actualizing his potentials but tllis must be 
within the li;nits of his finiteness. At this point, Tillich's concept 
of aIL'Ciety becorre s relevant. 
Anxiety. 'rillich has two conceptions of anxiety. The first 
conception of anxiety is related to finitude. It is the awareness 
of finitude. When man becomes aware of his finite self as finite, 
he is anxious. .l'hus anxiety is a part of finitude. It has an 
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ontological quality. It can never be relIDved from exis"Lence. '.l.'he 
four structures of finite being and thinking, i.e. temporality, space, 
causality, and subsk~~e, express the union of being and nonbeing in 
everything finit,e. 'l'hese make possible the manifestation of the anx-
iety of finitude, )r more specifically, the anxiety of noribeing. 
The second concepti0n of anxiety is related to the ontological 
elements of the structure of being. The polar ontolosical elements 
balance one another and, as a t-1hole, express what man essentially is. 
The anxiety of existentia 1 disruption is the anxiety that man will 
lose one or the oth8r of the Dolar elements, upset the balance, and 
consequently be estranged from the "true self." In the polarity 
between individualization and participation, extreme individuali-
zation leads to loneliness while excessi"re participation leads to the 
threat of complete collectivization. In the polarity of dynamics and 
form, every stablized pattern is a threat to vitalit,y and vitality 
can always threaten to lead to chaos. In the polarity of freedom and 
destiny, freedom can be preserved by the denial of destiny and 1Jhe 
threat of the unlived life while destiny can be assured by surrendering 
freedom and losing the self. 
A Conceptual Model. Within Tillich' s S,Ystem the dialectic of 
essence and existence implies a conceptual model that clarifies the 
position of man. The transition from ontological analysis to the 
human life is mediated by freedom. Within any historical situation 
both essence and existence are given. Both man's relationship to 
essence and his estrangement from it must be seen. Existence embodies 
essence in an imperfect ~~nner and thus it is estranged. Existence 
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receives its power from essence which thus makes existence good. Out 
of this a model can be for.nulated. 
Dreaming Innocence-----Estrangement-----Ideal State 
Dreaming Innocence is the essential nature of man. It is a 
state of potentiality in which there is a lack of reality, a lack of 
actual experience, a lack of personal responsibility, and a lack of 
moral guilt. It is a state that precedes actual existence. In this 
state freedom is potential, but it has the possibility of being actu-
alized in such a way that the essential nature of man is contradicted. 
That is, the polarities of the ontological structure can be unbalanced 
and disrupted. Finiteness is a given, however, and thus there is 
anxiety even in the state of Dreaming Innocence. 
The Ideal State is the state of perfection in which essence and 
existence are in conscious union. The potentials of man have been 
actualized perfect~ within the bounds of finiteness. There is a 
wholesome balance between the polarities so that the whole is ful-
filled. In other ~rds, the anxiety-of nonbeing has been taken up 
in the courage to be and. man has been reunited with the ground of 
being or being-itself. ~he ke,y to this state is s.ymbolized in such 
phrases as: reunion with the ground of being, participation in being-
itself, and the union of essence and existence. 
Estrangement is the state between Dreaming Innocence and the 
Ideal State. It is between being and becoming. Man, in the state of 
Dreaming Innocence, has his finitude united with freedom. The anxiety 
of finitude is combined with freedom todrive him toward the transition 
from essence to existence Q This transition is the product of man caught 
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betlleen two anxieties, the anxiety of losing himself or the anxiety 
of actualizing him; elf. Man chooses the latter and separates himself 
from the ground of being. 
Man is a whole man, whose essential being h3S the 
character of dreaming innocence, whose finite .free-
dom makes possible the transition from essence to 
existence, whose aroused freedom puts him between 
two anxieties .mich threaten the loss of the self, 
whose decision is against the preservation of 
drea~ing innocence and for self actualization. I 
This decision separates him from being-itself and forces him into 
estrangement from the ground of his being. The actualization of 
self brings about estrangement. It is a product of both freedom and 
destiny. It is free in the sense that man chooses; it is destiny 
in the sense that man must choose. 
Derini tion of Sin 
One of Tillichls main goals is the attempt to translate the 
revelatory answer into terms meaningful within the contemporary 
culture. Consequently he does not hes~tate to reinterpret or even 
discard certain traditional 'W) rds. Although he is inclined to keep 
the word, sin, because it points to the personal freedom and guilt 
involved in manls predicament, he p~efers to use the word, estrange-
ment, in order to reinterpret sin from a religious point of view. 
Estrangement, in contrast to sin, focuses on the tragic guilt and the 
universal destiny of man. 
Man as he exists is not what he essentially is 
and ought to be. He is estranged from his true 
being. The profundity of the term 1 estrangement l 
1. Tillich, S.lstenatic Theology:, I, 36. 
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lies in the implication that one belongs essen-
+.:I.a111 to that from which one is estranged. Man 
~s not a stranger to his true being, for he be-
longs to it. He is judged by it but cannot be 
comp1ete~ separated, even if he is hostile to it. 
ManIs hostility tolGod proves indisputably that 
he belongs to Him. 
Estrangement characterizes manls predicament in his state of existence. 
Existence is estrangement. Man is estranged from himself, from others, 
and from the grJund of his being. 
in his book of sermons, The Shaking of the Foundations, Tillich 
uses another v.'Ord t -' interpret sin. This 'I-.'Ord, separation, seems to 
be synonymous with estrangement. Separation is characterized as the 
state of our existence and is a universal phenomenon. 
Separation, which is fate and guilt, constitutes 
the meaning of the word I sin. I It is this which 
is the state of our entire existence, Foiii its 
very begi~g to its very end. Such separation 
is prepared in the motherls womb, and before that 
time, in every preceding generation. It is man-
ifest in the special actions of our conscious 
life. It reaches beyond our graves into all suc-
ceeding generations. It is existence itself. 2 
Separation and estrangement are the products of existence. In 
a sense they are manls ontological fate since he must make the tran-
sit ion from essence to existence. Because he separates himself from 
the divine ground he has the possibility of sinning and yet, because 
he is separated from the divine grouoo., he must sin. By defining 
sin as separation and estrangement, Tillich comes very close to 
envisioning sin as the necessary differentiation man must make from 
1. ~., I, 45. 
2. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: 
Scribnerls Sons, 19GB), p. 155. Charles 
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the undifferentiated state of Draaming Innocence. His use of the 
words: reunion, union, participation, and acceptance as syrrbols for 
the power of overcoming estrangement and separation, lead to a con-
ception of God as the undisrupted unity or the ultimate unity. 
The Precondition of Sin 
In Tillich's thought the preconditions for sin are laid down 
in the basic ontological structure. Man is finite but transcends 
finitude. The limitations inherent in finitude can be seen as limi-
tations and thus produce anxiety. This anxiety based on finitude 
tempts man to overcome his finitude due to the threat of nonbeing 
implied in finitude. Sin is asserted to be a structural necessi tyl 
that is derived from the structure of existence as finite. 
The freedom of man is also an element of the basic ontological 
structure. Unavoidably, however, man l s drive to actualize himself 
separates him from the ground of being and brings about anxiety in 
relation to the ontological elements of the basic structure of being. 
This anxiety tempts man tohold to one pole of the basic polarity 
and thus drives man into estrangement. 
These preconditions of sin are summed U9 in the term finite 
freedom. 'This term characterizes man in his existential condition 
and is the soil from which sin springse Anxious finitude makes sin 
possible. Freedom gives man the potential to actualize the possible 
sin of anxious finitude. 
1. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bratall, The Theol0J: of Paul 
Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), po 34 • 
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The Nature of Sin 
The nature of sin lies in the position of man as created. 'l'he 
state of Dreaming Innocence is inevitably followed by the state of 
Estrangement. l'he rqrth of Creation and the my:th of the Fall coin-
cide at the point where creation becomes actualized. in Tillich1s 
words, "acr.ualized creation and estranged existence are identical."l 
Although man is ai-lara of his responsibility for his situation, 'l'illich 
puts more emphasis upon the tragic necessity and the tragic universal-
ity of this predicament. 
Han is separated from the ground of his being. Man existentially 
is estran~:ed from what he is essentially. Han cannot define this sep-
aration and estrangement in causal terms but he recognizes that this 
is an adequate description of his existential condition. 
In any sinful act there are differences in gLlilt. But this 
guilt can only be seen on the horizontal level. On the vertical 
level there can be no distinctions because there is only total sin 
before God. In the same way, it is difficult to separate the act of 
sin from the fact of sin. These two are so intertwined that they can 
never be successfully separated. Every individual act "actualizes the 
universal fact of estrangement. u2 At the same time, the universal 
fact of estrangement is actualized in every free act. Consequently, 
guilt is always both partial and total, relative and absolute. 
From this description it is evident that Tillich does not sep-
arate the creaturehood and the corruption of man except for analysis 
1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 44. 
2. ~., I, 56. 
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sake. Man is a good creature in that he participates in being-itself. 
He is estranged from being-itself, at the same time, so that he is not 
what he ought to be. All men participate in this estrangement and are 
caught up inthe necessity of estrangement. The source of this estrange-
ment is the position of man as finite freedom. 
The Fom of Sin 
The forms of manls sin are unbelief, hybris, and concupiscen~e. 
All of these are attempts to overcome or deny estrangement by cen-
tering one l s life and meaning in one l s self. Han attempts to reach 
absolute self-sufficiency without recognition of the context of his 
existence and the true center of his existence, namely the ground of 
his being. 
Unbelief. This is aotually unfaith. Unbelief points to the 
essentially religious character of sin because it points out the 
basic disruption between man and God. As man decides to turn against 
God and realize his selfhood through himself, he loses his essential 
unity with the world and. the ground of his being. Unbelief has 
nothing to do with law for law presupposes a separation between law 
giver and law receiver. Instead, it is an act of the total person-
ality responding to the need for self-actualization by rejecting the 
o~ ground upon which it could be actualized. This is a form of sin 
because it points to sin as the disruption of man's relationship to 
God in estrangemen~ and the possible renewal of manls relationship to 
God in union. 
gtbris. Htbris is the other side of unbelief. In unbelief man 
turns away' from the ground of his being. In hybris man is unwilling 
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to recognize his own finitude and attempts to center his world and 
his life in his self. Man, as the only fully centered being, can 
transcend himself and look at both his ~rld and himself and see 
himself as the center of his world. If he is not able to acknow-
ledge his finitude, his recognition of himself as the center of his 
world results in the identifica tion of the partial truth with ulti-
mate truth. Hybris is thus not a soecial quality of moral nature 
but is a total form of sin which springs out of a fully centered 
being. 
Concupiscence. This form of sin comes into being because man 
desires to b~ reunited and reconciled. He longs not to be separated. 
Concupiscence is the perverted form of reunion in which men seeks to 
include within himself the whole of reality. He has an unlimited 
desire that is insatiable. Tillich is not referring to mere seI~ 
suality but to all aspects of man' s re1a~ion to himself and to his 
world. '!'his :would include physical hunger, sex, knowledge, power, 
material wealth, and spiritual health. !Yuan grasps at aburrlance to 
fulfill his need for union. 
6. Swnmary 
This chapter has not attempted to trace the historical devel-
opment of the concept of sin~ Rather, it has delineated fairly 
precisely the concentions of sin held by eight men in four histor-
ical periods. Although the concepts of sin have obvious differences 
and similarities within and between different historical periods, certain 
fundamental components emerge as basic to a Christian conception of sin. 
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The next chapter seeks to forrnula~e a conception of sin that is based 
on the fundamental components that have emerged in this historical 
survey_ 
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CHAPI' ER I II 
A THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF SIN BASED 
ON THE SELEcrED HISTORICAL PERIODS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to bring together some of the common 
elements that run through all or many of the theological conceptions 
of sin surveyed in the previous chapter. The first section attempts 
to formulate a theological conception of sin based upon the histor-
ical research while the last two sections attempt to delineate and 
clarif,y some of the elements of the formulated theological concep-
tion of sin. 
2. A Theological Conception of Sin 
A theological conception of sin based upon the previous research 
must begin with three ru.ppositions. 1) The man-God rela tionship is 
primary in any conception of sin within a theological frane of refer-
ence Q Sin exists only in relation to God. The sins manifested in 
man-man or man-things relationships are only reflections of the pri-
mary sin in the man-God relationship. 2) Sin exists only within the 
comprehendable frame of reference of man's existence. Both man and 
the world in which he lives form the context for the explanation of 
sin. 3) The forms of sin are the recognizable manifestations of the 
disrupted man-God relationship as it is revealed wi thin the context 
of man's existence. 
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The theological conceptions of sin would point to a formulation 
of sin such as the following. Sin is the universal and inevitable 
non.recognition, denial, or defiance by m:m of the life-giving depen-
dent relationship of man upon God. This non-recognition, denial, or 
defiance is predicated in the conditions of existence and brings about 
a disruption of the man-God relationship. In this disruption man 
disobeys God and is unable to become what God intended him to be. 
Unbelief is the core element of the disruption and it eventuates in 
rebellion, pride, and concupiscence. 
3. Basic Elements in the Theological Conception of Sin 
i. The Universality of Sin 
All of the men surveyed are in agreement that sLn is a universal 
phenomenon. No one is exempt from participating in sin. Although 
there is varying emphasis upon this point, and some 0* imply it, it 
is fairly clear that sin is pervasive and includes the totality of 
mankind. 
ii. The Inevitability of Sin 
Sin is not on~ a universal phenomenon, it is an inevitable 
experience in the life of each individual man. All of the theologians, 
in one way or another, maintain the inevitability of sin. "Inevita-
bility" is Reinhold Niebuhr's word but it adequately characterizes 
the intentions of the other theologians. Some emphasize this element 
of sin more heavily than otmrs and consequently sIEak of the neces-
sity of sin. Yet none of the theologians are willing to abandon man's 
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free participation in sino Thus, all, in some degree, would agree 
that sin isn't necessary in the sense that man is compelled to sin 
against his willful intentions, but it is inevitable in the sense 
that each man is involved in the experience of sin. In other wards, 
sin is a basic fact of human existence. 
iii. Man is Dependent upon God for "life". Non-Recognition, 
Denial, or Defiance of this Dependent Relationship is Sin 
This is a fundamental component of the concept of sin for 
every theologian surveyed. Han is part of the general creation of 
God but he stands above this creation. He is the epitome of creation 
and, within God's plan, has been designated to rule over the earth. 
At the same time, he is dependent upon God for the integration, growth, 
and development of himself. It is within this rieht relation with God 
that man is truly man and can truly actualize himself. Calvin's 
concept of order seems most fully to designate these relationships. 
When man moves out of his relationship with God, he loses his 
ability to fulfill himself and to rule creation in an orderly way. 
He is no longer truly man but a caricature of created man. He is no 
longer able to actualize his potentials, obey the will of God, or 
respond to his neighbor with love. He becomes sinful. As sinful 
man, he loses his ability to have life in the full sense. And, at the 
same time, he is unable to have an unperverted relationship with 
other~ or with things. 
iv. The Conclitions of Existence are the Preconditions of Sin 
The conditions of existence are those "givens" that are inherent 
in temporal life. They are powers, forces, and limitations that are 
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intrinsic in existence. Every theologian surveyed points to these, in 
some way, as the preconditions of sin. Jesus and Paul did not hesitate 
to direct man's attention to forces outside himself which forced him 
into sin. True to the culture in which they were embedded, they desir;-
nated these forces as Satan, or demons. But they also pointed to con-
ditions lI.ri thin man which inclined him toward sin. The te'1lptation of 
Jesus and his words about not being anxious for the morrow both specif.y 
this emphasis. Paul's use of the word, flesh, often connoted the 
weakness of man in relation to temptation. Irenaeus followed both of 
them in referring to t.he childlikeness of man and the temptations of 
the Devil. Augustine, Luther, and Calvin were forced into emphasizing 
the corrupt nature of man, but this in itself, pointed to the weakness 
of man. At the same time they did not forget the external forces that 
led man into sin. Niebuhr and Tillich have been more sophisticated in 
their exPlication of the preconditions of sin. Yet each of them points 
essentially to the finiteness of man as that area where man is suscep-
tible to temptations that lead him to sin. 
v. Man Transgresses Certain Absolute Standards 
All of the theologians d.i..d. Hut agree on this point, but the over-
whelming majority testified to the fact that man has certain standards 
to which he is held accountable. Jesus puts a heavy emphasis upon the 
Decalogue; Paul focuses much of his theology of sin around the law of 
God; Irenaeus consistently relates sin to disobedience to the Divine 
Commandments; Luther leans heavily upon the Law; Calvin often speaks of 
disobedience.as the fundamental sin; Niebuhr defines sin in terms of 
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injustice, a legal term, and also refers to "the law of love." In 
some form or other man has absolute standards by which he must abide. 
Disobedience to these standards is sin. Han does disobey. 
vi. Han is not what He ought to Be 
The theologians surveyed had varying ways of saying this. Jesus 
emphasized the perverted motivation; Paul speaks of the striving for 
the wrong ideal or putting faith in the Law; Irenaeus uses the concepts 
of growth and childlikeness; Augustine, Luther, and Calvin detennine 
the corruptness of man by focusing on original sin and thereby point 
up the deficiencies of man; Niebuhr speaks of a defect of the will or 
the inability to accept the limitations o~ finiteness; Tillich is 
concerned with the separation aOO estrangement of man from the ground 
of his being and thus from hims elf. Each of these manifold ways of 
conceptualizing man's condition point to the essential fact that man 
is not what he was created to be, intended to be, and ought to be. In 
some way he is unfulfilled aDd unsatisfied in his essential nature. 
4. Fundamental Forms of Sin 
Although there were numerous ways in which the theologians con-
ceptualized the manifestations of sin, the theological definition of 
sin attempts to reduce the forms of sin to four. These four, unbelief, 
rebellion, pride, and concupiscence, are an attempt to get at the basic 
fonns of sin underlying all the various conceptualizations of the 
surveyed theologians. Naturally there can be no strict correspondence 
between one theologians categorizations and anothers. However there are 
general patterns which will be identified under these four headings. 
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i. Unbelief 
The fundamental form of sin is QDbelief. This can be defined as 
untrust or unfaith. Man does not believe God in the sense that he does 
not trust God to fUlfill His promises. He does not believe God in the 
sense that he does not have faith that God will be faithful. Han does 
not give himself over complete~' to the dependent relationship with 
God because of his doubt and his unwillingness to trust God to fulfill 
his life. Out of this passive kind of sin springs the other three 
active forms of sin. But eaen active form of sin relates back to that 
which is basic, namely, unbelief in God. 
ii. Rebellion 
Rebellion is active opposition to God. It is displayed in many 
ways. Jesus, Paul, and Calvin refer ~ecifically to idolatry as a 
means of rebellion. Irenaeus focuses on disobedience as the method of 
rebellion. Pride certainly has elements of rebellion because it attempts 
to replace God. In any event, rebellion, with its' fundamental component 
of hostility, is the attempt of man to disengage himself from God tb~ough 
the denial of God, the replacement of God, or disobedience to God. 
iii. Pride 
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The form of sm most a greed upon is pride~ All of the theologians 
surveyed except Irenaeus refer to pride as the central core of sin. Pride 
is the attempt of man to set himself in the place of God. God is the 
center of the universe but man attempts to make the universe anthropo-
centric. God is the source of life and being but man attempts to make 
himself the source of life and being. God has formulated the absolute 
laws of the tmiverse but man attempts to make his own laws. In other 
words, man denies his dependency and finiteness and grasps for indepen-
dence am infiniteness. Niebuhr's perceptive CIl alysis of pride points 
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to the various manifestations through which it operates. Each of these 
manifestations po:ints back to the core of pride, namely, that man attempts 
to usurp the place of God. Pride is the love of self on the highest or 
most spiritual level. 
iv. Concupiscence 
This word has had various connotations in the history of the 
doctrine of sin. It has often been interpreted as sexuality and this 
still seems to be one of the core elements. Gradually, however, it has 
come to moon much more than sexuality. ~oncupiscence is man centering 
his life upon part aspects of the created world. Objects that satisfy 
the impulses and desires of the self are deified in the sense that life 
becomes a pursuit of them. In other words, concupiscence is the re-
ligious pursuit of satisfaction of corporea1·or material desires. It 
is self love on the most elementary level. 
CRAPl'ER IV 
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THIDRY OF PEHroNALITY 
1. Limitations 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the 
psychoanalytic theory of perscnality. It is not intended to be com-
prehensive in scope but only to elucidate the psychoanalytic theory 
of personality in so far as it is necessary 1) to establish the 
correlative elements of the theological conception of sin, and 2) to 
establish the context necessary for the discussion of Shame and guilt. 
2. The Structure of Personality 
i. Sigmund Freudl ani the Orthodox Position 
From 1894 until the plblicaticn of the Ego am the Id (1923), 
the structural representation of the mind was in a state of constant 
evolvement. In the earl,y phases of his work Freud did not concern 
himself very much with structural considerations. In the first phase, 
up to 1900, reality was the factor which seemed to interfere with the 
instinctual drives through the ego, i.e. consciousness, and the defenses 
1. The basic oource of Sigmund Freud's ideas and concepts is: The 
Standard Edition of the Complete P!lCho1o~cal Works of SigmwDd 
Freud, translated under the genera edi torahip of James Strachey 
in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and 
Alan T,yson (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1962), 21 volumes. For 
the remainder of this dissertatioh these volumes will be desig-
nated as the Standard Edition. 
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of the ego.l This view was sllperseded in 1900 by the recognition of 
an intrapsychic censorship exerted by the ego, i.e. the self preser-
vative instincts.2 Then, in 1911, Freud returned to the role of re-
ality in restricting the exuression of instinctual drives. 3 Further 
study of repression and the unconscious by Freud IOOved his thinking 
toward a conception of the deployment of permanent c~unter forces in 
1. Sigmund Freud, "The Neuro-P~choses of Defence (1894), Standard 
Edition, III, 45-62. See also, "Further Remarks on the Neuro-
Psychoses ot Defence (1896), Standard Edition, III, 162-185. 
2. 
In these two papers there is the implied consideration that there 
are tw mental states, the conscious and the unconscious. The 
conscious is equated. with the ego and the unconscious is equated 
with the repressed. Reality concerns are enforced upon the ego. 
The ego in turn attempts to repress incompatible feelings and 
ideas arising from the drives by the erection ot defense systems, 
i.e. primar~ dissociation of idea and affect, hysterical s.ymptoms, 
and projecti on. 
Sigmund Freud, The Inte~retation of Dreams (1900), Standard Edition, 
V, 509-622, especially" 7 -568. In this monumental work ~'reud 
points to a fmction of the ego, namely censorship, lihich seeks to 
bar from consciousness and activity certain repressed ideas and/or 
feelings. However, the ego i8 no longer equated with consciousness 
but is now a system of instincts that seeks to preserve the organism. 
Although this conception of the ego is never fully clarified, and 
indeed. is ]a ter abandoned, it is given more explicit attention in 
Freud's paper, -The P~cho-analytic View of P~chogenic Disturbance 
of Vision" (1910), Standard Edition, XI, 211-218. In this paper 
Freud explicitly connects the ego with self preservative instincts 
and repression. The ego instincts and the semal instincts are in 
constant conflict. This Viewpoint later eventuates in the final 
formulation of the dual instinct theory, Eros and Thanatos. See 
Sigmund Freud, New Introducto Lectures 0iiP choana sis (1932), 
translated by W. J. H. Sprott, New York: W. • Norton & Co., 
Inc., 1933), pp. 140-14.3. 
3. Sigmund ~·reud., nFormulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental 
Functioningn (1911), Collected payers, translated by Joan Riviere, 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1925 , IV, 1.3-21. In this paper Freud 
still holds to the concept of ego instincts but turns his attention 
toward the role of reali'\iy in forming the ego. The pleasure ego de-
velops into the reality ego. The reality ego l s task is to restrict 
and to bind the instinctual drives in accordance with the demands of 
external realitr. 
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the mind. These counter forces, called anti-cathexes, prevented the 
repressed from becoming co nscious and alloNed the delay of the dis-
cnarge of instinctual drive forces. l 
In 1923 the structural concepti'Jn of the mind was formulated. 2 
In this formulation Freud attempted to bring together the many dis-
C~veries and insights that had arisen from the various preceding con-
ceptualizations. The increasing importance of ~~e unconscious,3 the 
insight that not only the drives but also ma~ other factors were un-
conscious,4 the new importance of the ego and the formulation of the 
sup€reeo concept,5 and the inadequacy of the dichoto~ between ego 
inst::incts and sexual instincts,6 made the previous topographic and 
economic viewpoints inadequate. The new conception, usually referred 
to as the structural hypothesis, attempted to group together mental 
processes and contem,s lihich are functionally related and to distin-
guish among the various groups on the basis of functional dif.ferences. 
1. Sigmund Freud, "Repression" (1915), Standard Edition, XIV, 146-
158. See also "The Unconscious" (1915), Standard Edition, XIV, 
166-204, especially 172-185. In these two papers Freud attempted 
to formulate some ,of the previous discoveries about repression 
and the unconscious into a systematic conception of the mind. 
In the latter paper he designated two representations of the mind 
as the economic and the topographic conceptions. 
2. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 
l2-68, especially 19=40. 
3. Sigmund Freud" "Some Remarks on the Unconscious" (1922), Inter. 
Jrnl. Psychoanal., IV (July, 1923), 367. 
4. Sigmund Freud, B~ond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Standard 
Edition, XVIII, 9=20. 
5. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: an Introduction" (1914), Standard 
Edition, XIV, 73-102. 
6. Sigmund Freud, New Int~oductory Lectures on Psychoannlysis, (1932~ 
Pp. 14~14.3. 
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Freud distinquished three functionally related structures or groups, 
the id, the ego, aOO the superego. 
The ~ is Freud1s final designation for that part of the person-
ality which contained the instinctual energy that drives the organism. 
Although he nowhere systematically designates the full nature of this 
construct, a descriptive analysis is given in the New Introductory 
Lectures on Ps.ychoanalysis (1932). The aim of the id is to gratifY 
a n the libidinal urges and for this purpose operates on the pleasure 
principle. There is no cognizance by the id of external reality. 
Instead the id is characterized as annral, illogical, unorganized, 
and in a constant flux. Since the homeostatic p~inciple reigns supreme 
in the perronall.ty, the id attempts to keep the personality at a 
level of minimal tensions by iDunediately gratifying all the instinc-
tu.al urge~. The id is unconscious am contains all the phylogenetic 
acquisitions as well as everything that is psychological and present 
at birth. 
The picture of the id is completed with a characterization of 
the two processes by ibich it reduces tensions and brings pleasure.l 
These two processes, the reflex arc and the primary process, operate 
automatically in moment s of tensions. The reflex arc is an automatic 
physiological reaction like swallowing or blinking. The primary 
process operates on the basis of wish fulfillment. That is, a memory 
image of the tension reduc:ing object is cathected. 
1. Signumd Freud, The Interpretation of Drea~ (1900), Standard 
Edition, V, 565-567. See also liFornIiilatiolls Regarding the TWo 
Principles in Mental Functioning" (1911), Collected Papers, IV, 
14-18. 
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Because the id is not, capable of reducing all the tension by 
its two processes, the ego is formed out of the id matrix. Its task 
is to enable the organism to fUlfill the id wishes by appropriate 
interaction with external reality. The ego makes a distinction 
between the processes of the mind and the processes or objects of 
the environment. It attempts to inhibit, or curb, the id impulses 
until appropriate action can be taken consonant with external reality. 
To effect this activity, the ego operates on the basis of the reality 
principle, i.e. realistic thinking, and has control over the cogni-
tive and intellectual functions of the organism. The ego, therefore, 
is the executive of the personality. It decides the aspects of the 
environment to which it will respond; it selects which :instincts it 
will allow expression and what manner of expression is suitable; and 
it controls the processes that lead to action by the organisIllo In 
the performance of these functions the ego attempts to integrate the 
often conflicting demams of the id, external reality> EiIld the superego. 1 
The ego, however, is not entirely conscious as one might infer. 
Although Freud originally seemed to use ego and consciousness synony-
mously,2 he came to understand that the ego processes also operated 
unconsciously. The process of the differentiation of the ego out of 
the id is born from conflict of the id with external reality and the 
process of maturation. Part of the ego remains unconscious, e.g. 
memory traces, while other aspects become unconscious through repression. 
1. 
2. 
Signnmd Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 
19-27. See alS) New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanaljsis, 
pp. 105-111. 
See above, p. 91, footnote 1. 
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Repressed perceptions, unconscious motility, and other stimuli that 
occur balow the conscious threshold are under the control of the ego. 
The third structural differentiation made by Freud was the 
superego or ego ideal. Freud first put forth this possibility in his 
essay on narcissism.l In this essay he connected the ego ideal with 
the conscience and stated that it was the object of narcissistic li-
bido. Later Freud made this structure more explicit by conteuding 
that a lost object nis set up again inside the ego, and the ego makes 
a partial alteration in itself after the model of the love object. n2 
Consequently a differentiation within th e ego is nade and a third 
structure evolves which has the character of a lost love object. 
The superego3 is a precipitate in the ego formed from the 
identifications with the parental figures. It arises at the con-
clusion of, and with the successful repression of, the Oedipus complex. 
It is the moral force of the personality concerned with ideals and 
standards. The main tasks of the superego are to inhibit the id 
impulses, particularly those of a sexual and aggressive nature, to 
force the ego to operate under its own particular brand of morality, 
1. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: an Introduction" (1914), Standard 
ElUtion, IIV, 13-102, especially 93-102. Although this is the 
first explicit n16ntion of a special psychical a gency which judges 
the ego, there were ~ hints in this direction in prior works. 
See for example his references to self reproach and a sense of 
guilt in -The Neuro-Ps.ychoses of Defence" (1896), Standard Edition, 
III, 45-62, and "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907), 
Standard Edition, IX, 123. 
2. 
3. 
Sigmund Freud, GroN P¥.chOlOg.r and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Standard Edition, 1t , 114. 
This descriptive summary of the superego is condensed from many 
references, especially, "On Narcissism: an Introduction" (1914), 
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and to strive for certain ideals. This moral agency also operates 
both conscio~sly and unconsciously. The conscience is usually desig-
nated-as the conscious aspect of the superego. The unconscioQs aspect 
is usually mre harsh and condemning because it incorporates infantile 
prohibitions and aggressive phantasies into its operations. 
ti. Further Developments since Freud 
Much of Freud's pioneer work was concerned with the id processes. 
The revolutionary nature of his discovery of unconscious determinants 
of behavior and the driving nature of the instincts kept his attention 
riveted to these processes. Gradually, however, new discoveriesl 
pressed upon him the need to reformulate some of his earlier theories. 
}mch of his reformulation was based upon the embryonic studies of the 
crucial role of identifications2 am the significance of defense 
mechanisms) For a time psychoanalysis directed itself mainly to the 
Standard Edition, XIV, 93-102; The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard 
Edition, XIX, 2B-39; "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Comp1exn (1924), 
XIX, 113-119; Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Standard 
Edition; XXI, 123-133; and New IDtroductio~ Lectures on P§lcho-
analisi~, pp. 85-98. 
1. See above, p. 92. See also Heinz Hartmann, "The Ego Concept in 
Freud's 'Work" Inter. Jrnl. Psychoana1., XXXVII, No. 6(1956), 425-438. 
2. The most elaborate discussions of identification ara found in Group 
iVtch010i and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Standard Edition, 
II~ i -lio, and The Ego and the Id (1923), §tandard Edition, 
XIX, 28-34. 
3. The word, defense, was first used by Freud in- "The Neuro-Psychoses 
of Defence" (1894), Standard Edition, III, 41, to account for the 
ego's struggle against unbearable impulses. For a time defense and. 
repression were used synonymouslJ'. Then, in Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety (1926), Standard Edition, XX, appendix, Freud recognized 
defense as a word to designate all those techniques used by the ego 
to protect itself against instinctual demands while repression desig-
nates one defensive technique of a particular nature. 
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exploration of the latter. This trend reached its apex with the pub-
lication of Anna Freud's volume, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defenee. l 
Although much work continues to be done on the role, dynamics, 
and structure of the defense mechanisms, a new trend is now discernible 
in the ps,ychoanalytic atmosphere. More and more research is focused on 
the ego as an integrating agent of personality. Hartmann, 2 Erikson, 3 
and Rapaport4 are the JOOst notable exponents of this trend. 
The ego and the id both emerge from a common undifferentiated 
matrix of the first extra-uterine phase of development. The ego is 
not born exclusively out of drive and conflict, but, rather there are 
inborn processes of the ego. Processes that help the child orient 
himself to his environment, help him to organize his experiences, 
and help him actively respond to the environment; have constitutional 
roots and constitutional~ given thresholds.5 Motility, perceptual 
systems, and memory systems are psychologically relevant even though 
they are not products of dYnamic conflict. This reformulation of the 
1. Anna Freud, The 0 and the Mechanisms of Defence, translated by 
Cecil Baines, New York: Internationa Universities Press, Inc., 
1946). 
2. 
3. 
Heinz Hartmann, "The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego 
and Id", The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (New York: Inter-
national Universities Press, Inc., 1952), VII, 9-30; "Comments on 
the Ps.ychoana1ytio Theory of the Ego", The Pgychoanalytic Study of 
the Child, V, (1950), 74-96. 
Erik Erikson, "Identity and the Life Cycle", Psychological Issues, 
I, No.1 (1959); Childhood and Society (New York: w. w. Norton and 
Co., 1950). 
4.. David Rapaport, "'!'he Theory of Ego Autonoll\1", B1.llletin of the 
Menninger Clinicj !!II, ~o. 1 (1958), 13-35. 
5. David Rapaport, "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory", Psycho-
logical Issues, II, No.2 (1960), 54. 
ego has served to make the ego more independent. of the ide It also 
I 
highlights the integrative function of the ego oVer against Freud's 
previous conceptualization of the ego as the "man on horseback, ~o 
has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this 
difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while 
the ego uses oorrawed forces."l 
Not only is the ego somewhat independent of the id by virtue of 
the constitutionally given apparatuses, but further exploration has 
led Hartmann to conceive of a continuing independence of the ego.2 
The ego develops processes which are used by the ego independently of 
their origins. In other words, certain processes of the ego, which 
have been used in the course of gratifYing id wishes, or have been 
used in the ego's struggle against the id drives, or have been used 
by the ego to resolve a conflict between itself and the id or s~per-
ego, gradually change their functions ani become detached from their 
original purposes. At this point they can be used by the ego for its 
own particular purposes apart from the original purpose which initiated 
the rise of the particular process.3 Consequently, the ego has become 
more ani more important in psychoanalytic theory as an integrating set 
of processes which are more or less free, to a greater or less degree, 
of the imperiousness and immutability of the drive processes. 
1. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Li (1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 
25. 
2. Hartman, The psychoansly!.ic Study of the Child, VII, 9-30. 
3. Rapaport, P§ychological Issues, II, 56. 
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A similar development" and more important for our purposes" has 
been taking place in regard to the nature and function of the super-
ego. Freud's original speculation on the nature of the superego dealt 
mainly with the redirection of the organism's narcissism from his own 
omnipotence toward the introjected ideal of his parents. But as Freud 
continued his exploration" he came to direct his attention almost 
exclusively toward the unconscious" punitive, and restrictive com-
ponents of this introjection. The term ego ideal was more or less 
dropped in favor of the term superego. With this shift in terms came 
a shift toward emphasis on the aggressive nature of this structural 
component. 1 
Melanie Klein2 and Edmund Bergler,3 in different ways but with 
equal emphasis, have followed and expanded Freud's speculations about 
the aggressive content of the superego. Bergler divides the superego 
1. This can be clearly seen in the editor s introduction to Sigmund 
Freud" The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 10. 
Freud's original speculations about a special psychical agency at 
first revolved around a set of introjected standards by which the 
ego judged itself. This agency was termed the ego ideal or the 
ideal ego. Later, in the book, The Ego and the Id, the superego 
is introduced as the equivalent of the ago ideal. Finally, except 
for a short reference in the New Introductory Lectures on PsYcho-
analysis (1932), pp. 92-93, the term ego ideal is dropped and the 
term superego becomes the focus. It would seem that Freud mdght 
have had SODe thought that there were two a gencies, the superego 
ani t be ego ideal. However his .-ritings only vaguely hint at this. 
His main concern was the punishing infantUe superego() As will be 
seen above, psychoanalysis has gradually begun to look at the 
problem of two special psychical agencies instead of one. 
2. 
(London: 
3. Edmund Bergler, The Battle of the Conscience (Washington D.C.: 
Institute of MediciIie~ 1948); The Superego {New York: Grune and 
Stratton, 1952)0 
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into the ego ideal am the Daimonion. The ego ideal was originally 
.formed in order to solve the infantile cunflict between its own mego-
lomania and the imposed parental restrictions. It is unconscious and 
contains, from childhood, the verbatim acceptance of the wording of 
the disciplinary rules, their details, the inflexibility with which 
these rules were applied, and the circumstances under which they were 
introjected. This introjection allows the infant to keep his self 
esteem while not losing parental love. The Daimonion, on the other 
hand, is the reservoir of all the infantile aggression which the child 
had original~ projected on the parents and then subsequently intro-
jected. "The Daimonion is the accumulation of cruelty and aggression 
. d nl directed Ul"war • • • • It too is unconscious and, coupled wit.1J 
the ego ideal, makes up the unconscious conscience. The Daimonion 
attempts to use the ego ideal to punish the ego. It holds up the 
ego ideal as a model for the ego. If the ego has not fulfilled the 
demaIXis of the ego ideal to the letter, i.e. according to the infantile 
megolomania, the Daimonion proceeds to punish the ego with guilt 
feelings. 
Klein has gone further than Freud in her explorations of the 
structl'.re of personality. Through analysis of very young children, 
as ear~ as two and one half years of age, she has come to the con-
clusion that there is a well developed ego and superego in the first 
year of life. Because of the ear~ development of the superego, and 
because one of the main components of these early developmemtal phases 
is intense infantile aggression, she tends to place great emphasis 
1. Bergler, The Superego, p. 14. 
101 
upon the aggressive natlre of the superego. l With Bergler, Klein is 
enamored with the severe, sadistic, punitive nature of the superego 
that comes :into being through the turning inward of the overwhelming 
infantile aggressive drive. This punitive superego has a tendency 
to overwhelm the weak ego of the infant. The infantile aggression 
takes on the character of omnipotence and, when introject ed, becomes 
frightening and devastating in its effects. 
Those psychoana~sts who are not quite as extreme as Bergler 
and Klein but yet follow the more orthodox Freudian approach- have 
built their definition of the superego upon both aspects mentioned 
by Freud. They give attention to both the earlier goal directed 
ideal aspects and the later restrictive punishing aspects: However, 
even as Freud tended to do, they emphasize the latter almost to the 
exclusion of the former. 
Feniche13 ilj the most systematic exponent of the orthodox 
Freudian approach although he admits that there are a flood of problems 
surrounding the superego ~oncept. For him the superego is the intro-
jection of the parental persons. Where once the parents weret-he 
sources of threats and punishments as well as the sources of protec-
tion and providers of love, now the superego has become all of these 
things. It decides which needs or drives can be expressed and which 
cannot. It rewards the ego with feelings of self worth and self esteem 
1. Klein, Contributions to Psycllo-analysis: 1921-1945, p. 203. 
Ives Hendrick, Facts and Theories of P choana 
reVised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
sis, third edition, 
, p. 383. 
3. otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Compa~, Inc., 1945). 
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when it is obeyed and punishes the ego with guilt, inferiority feelings, 
and decrease of self esteem when it is not obeyed. The content of the 
superego is primarily the introjected parents. But other aspects are 
also prominent. For instance, Fenichel leaves a place for the inward 
turned aggression of the child, the introjected ideals, and the later 
additions of ideals from other representative persons. 
Although Fenichel does mention the possibility of dividing the 
superego into two aspects, he rejects th is. Franz Alexander origi-
nally attempted a distinction between the unconscious superego and 
the conscious ego ideal but la~er rejected this because he felt that 
this led to an air tight structuralization which would be impossible 
to maintain. l In spite or the rejection of this division on a sche-
matic level, he st.ill seems to operate with it on a practical level. 
He does not speak of a division between conscious and unconscious 
aspects, but he contrasts the wish to grow up and belike the parents-
with certain behavior that breaks prohibited boundaries.2 
Piers3 follcrws Alexamer's original division and maintains the 
bi-partite ncture of the superego. His terms are the superego and the 
ego ideal.4 The superego stems from the introjection of the punitive, 
1. 
3. 
4. 
Franz Alexander, Fundamentals of py-ChoanaJ,ySis, (New York: 
Norton and Co., Inc., 1948), pp. 8 -83. w. w. 
Ibid., PPe 122-127. 
Gerhart Piers and Milton Singers, Shame and Guilt (Springfield, 
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1953). 
The use of these two terms, ego ideal and superego, is somehow 
confusing because of Freud's changing conception of the structural 
differentiation within the ego •. As has been stated on p. 99, foot-
note 1, Freud's original term was ego ideal. Then the term superego 
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restrictive, and harsh aspects of the parental images. These intro-
jected iw~ges may be either copies of the real parent~ or projections 
of the individual'::; own destructiveness. In either case, they function 
as the core of the individual's superegoo l 
The superego operates on the Talion Principle am exacts guilt 
as a punishment for any transgression of its boundaries. On the other 
hand, the ego ideal is an entirely different structure al though it also 
stems from parental images. It contains a core of narcissistic omni-
potence, the sum of the positive identifications with the parental 
images, and layers of later identifications. Like the superego, it 
transacts its busin3sS with the ego. "It is in continuous dynamic 
interfunction ~th the conscious and unconscious awareness of the Ego's 
potentiallties. n2 Its main 9urpose is to maintain the 60als of the 
matura~ion drive or, in other words, to point the organism toward self 
realization. In short, "it would signify a psychic representation of all 
the ~rowth, maturation, and individuation processes in the hwnan beir.g. ii3 
Ma~ attempts have been made to differentiate the superego and 
ego ideal aside from those of Alexan:l.er and Piers. Ernest Jones4 and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
was introduced as a synonym. Finally, the term ego ideal was 
dropped entirely except for one short reference. In Piers' con-
ceptualization this confusion does not exist. Each term desig-
nates specified, distinguishable structures. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
~., p. 14. 
Ibid., p. 15. 
sis, fifth edition, (Baltimore: 
, pp'.' 145-152. 
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Ann Reichl are two of the most prominent pS,Ychoanalysts who have spec-
ulated in this direction. One of the latest attempts has been made 
by Samuel Novey.2 He differentiates the superego and the ego ideal on 
both a functional and genetic levelo The superego is used to describe 
that punishing or loving agency that is the internal representative of 
the parental images as the child perceived them. The ego ideal has to 
do with the "proposed standards of thought, feeling, and conduct ac-
quired later than the Oedipal superego, but having its roots in the 
early pregenital narcissistic operations against anxiety ••• it is 
clearly related to the superego but has different origins and a dif-
ferent function from it. a3 Whereas the superego's task is to punish 
or reward the ego for obedience, the ego ideal serves as a model of 
what one is, as well as what one wuld like to be. The ego ideal is 
not concerned with the infantile restrictions of the superego but is 
concerned with the forward IOOvement of the individual. Three of the 
main points Novey makes in his swnmarization of the article are: (1) 
the ego ideal in the mature individual is dependent on these early 
identifications as well as upon l.a ter significant persons, but not 
on either of these alone, (2) the ego ideal is a distinct psychic 
1. Ann Reich, "Narcissistic Object Choice in Women", J. Am. P~cho­
analy. Assoc., I, No.1 (1954), 22-44;"Early Identifications as 
ArChrlc Elements in the Superego", J. Am. Psychoanaly. Assoc., 
II, No.2 (1954), 218-238. 
2 .. in Character Formation": 
3. Ibid., p. 120. 
105 
institution related to t he ego ani superego, and (3) the ego ideal 
makes essential contributions to the process of sublimation bound by 
an inner reality, making for inspired performance. l 
Nove,yls conceptualizations seem to be supported by Josselyn in 
her study of adolescents. 2 However, she goes on to make an important 
distinction between th e two structures. The superego is the incorpor-
ation of the punitive s:ide of the parents and its min function is to 
prevent the acting out of primary impulses in a destructive fashion. 
The ego ideal is the identification with an adult and forms the nu-
cleus of what one would like to be. The important difference between 
the two structures is that the superego "was an internalization of 
parental prohibition" while the ego ideal was an lIidentification with 
an adult."3 This difference will be clarified in the section of this 
chapter titled, Dynamic lJonsiderations. 
iii. Summary 
The development of the structural schematization of the person-
ality has been a continuous process in psychoana~ic theory. Freud 
himsel:f began with his discoveries of the conscious-unconscious divi-
sion of personality and extended this into his final conception of 
the tri-partite division of id, ego, and superego. The nature of the 
id was explored rather fully by Freud and his followers. The ego has 
1. ~., p. 123. 
2. 
3. Ibid., p. 81. 
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had changing meanings and changing functions within personality or-
ganization. On the basis of Freud's work various speculations have 
been introduced which have, in some instances, been justified in 
clinical work. The superego, although the subject of nany of Freud's 
later works, is just beginning .to be explored in depth by Freud's 
followers. Freud put forth maQY ideas about the superego but various 
lines of thought have been developed from them. Increasingly a con-
ceptualization of the superego as being divided into two distinct 
psychic agencies has come to the fore. 
For the most par-t the superego is considered to be t,he uncon-
scious, primitive, restrictive, punishing agent of the personality. 
It is composed of the introjection of the parental prohibitions and 
is endowed with the terrible intensity of the infantile aggression 
turned inward. It o. perates on the Talion principle and allows little 
room for anything other than strict obedience. Its purpose is to 
impose on the individual the mores and customs of society as these 
are interpreted by the pa rents and perceived by the iufant. 
In Freud's earlier work there was reference to an intra-psychic 
agency called the ego ideal. Although Freud see~d to equate this 
with the superego contempora~ psychoanalysis, influenced by ego psy-
chology and the increasing concern for maturation and maturity, has 
attempted to differentiate this agency in contra-distinction to the 
superego. Although this attempt has been difficult and tedious, there 
is some reason to believe that the ego ideal is a separa te psychic 
structure 'Which differs from the superego in function and genetic roots. 
It seems to be composed of the identifications of the child with respect 
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to values and goals. Its purpose is motivation of the individual 
towards a specific kind of achievement in terms of the potentials and 
abilities of the person in interaction with the possibilities and 
opportunities of the environment. It operates on a narcissistic 
base which supplies the iniividual with self esteem or lack of self 
esteem. 
3. The Development of Personality 
i. Sigmund Freud and the Orthodox Position 
In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,l Freud postu-
lated a developmental approach based on his theory of infantile 
sexuality. This developmental approach is continuous with, and over-
laps, the structural and dynamic considerations. Its purpose is to 
trace the development of personality through succeeding and over-
lapping stages of libido organization which focus around particularly 
sensitive erogenous zones of the organism. According to Freud, this 
developmental seq.lence begins at birth and continues throughout life. 
However, the first five years of life are decisive for personality 
formation. It is upon these years that this summary will most fully 
concentrate.2 
The infantile organism elOOrges at birth from the relative calm 
of instinctual urges characteristic of fetal life to the overwhelming 
1. Sigmund Freud" Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), 
Standard Edition, VII, 130-243. 
2. This descriptive summary is based primarily on the Three Essays 
and the New Introductory Lectures on psychoanaqsis (1932), 
ppo 135-1400 
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flood of int.ernal and external stimuli characteristic of life in the 
l"Jrld. This "birth trauma"l is the prototype of all la ter anxiety 
and brings with it the potential for anxiety. During the initial 
months after birth, the infant is seen as Dure libido. His only 
interest is the satisfaction of his physiological needs and a return 
to the bliss of the womb. He operates on the basis of complete nar-
cissism, instinctual eratification, and a compelling urge to retreat 
from the stimuli of external reality. 
As tre infant begins to develop physiologically, he also de-
velops psychologically, i.e. he enters a psychological developmental 
sequence parallel to the physiological developmental sequence. The 
first year of life brings the oral stage of development in which he 
is dominated by loosely organized, undifferentiated sexuality that 
centers around the mucosae of the mouth. The child becomes "aware" 
that he not only receives food through the mouth, but also that the 
mouth, when stimulated, arouses a tension which is pleasurably sat-
isfied through sucking. The simple aim of this primitive oral ero-
ticism ist.he pleasurable stimulation of the mouth. The object that 
is cathected, i.e. invested with libidinal energy, is the breast. 
The lIEchanisms of this oral period are those of introjection and 
incorporation. Because the infant's needs are those that are gra-
tified more or less complete~, there is a connotation of magical 
omnipotence. The infant behaves psychologically in a narcissistic 
1. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety (1926), translated by 
Henry A. Bunke~, (New York: The Ps,ychoanalytic Quarterly Press 
and W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1936), p. 106. 
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fashion in lolh ich the libido is turned inward towal'd the self and the 
sexual aim is exclusive~ auto-erotic. A little later in this period, 
the infant begins to differentiate between the object of need satis-
faction and the need vithin himself. At this point he aims at union 
with the object b.Y incorporation or swallowing of the object. 
\I}'ith the eruption of teeth, the stage is set for the precursers 
of ambivalence. This second half of the oral stage is the oral-
sadistic stage. In this period, aggressive aims come to the fore with 
biting, chewing, etc. This 1s also the time, because of the results 
of a manifest infantile aggression, that the infant is nunished by 
the mothering person, e.g. biting of the breast brings a slap. Con-
sequently there is the arousal of the mechanism of projection in 
addition to the mechanisms of introjection and inco~poration. 
Beginning with the latter half of the first year, and extending 
into the third year, is the anal stage. The focus of this stage is 
the erogenous zone surrounding the anus. The aim of this stage is 
the pleasurable stimulation of the anus and the anal region. The 
infant, in the earlier phases of this stage, receives pleasurable 
sensations as well as pnysiological tension reduction in the act of 
excretion. The pleasurable sensations are heightened by cultural 
activities that further stimulate the sensitive area, e.g. changing 
diapers. The anal stage of development shows itself in two stages 
also. The first is the anal expulsive s"tage described above. 
The anal retentive stage comes on the scene when the infant 
discovers that the retention of feces also brings pleasurable sen-
sations. At this same time, cultural patterns of toilet training 
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often make the expulsion of feces an opportunity for significant 
interaction with the parents. The infant learns to ase his ability 
to retain or exoel feces as a weapon of hostility or as a fine gift 
of love. Consequently, the anal region becomes a focal point which 
channels the development of interpersonal relationships. Ambivalence 
in interpersonal relationships is manifested in anal activity. Out 
of these activities the complicated personality patt3rns of sadism 
and masochism find their.beginnings. 
The phallic stage is the next step of psycho-sexual develop-
ment. The focus moves from the anus to the penis. The penis has 
high narcissistic value to the infant. lI;lfantile phantasies of 
sexual rela tionships preoccupy the child. The child cathects the 
parent of the opposite sex and has phantasies of destroying the 
parent of the same sex. The narcissistic value of the penis arouses 
castration fears in the infant and thus prevents him from acting out 
his phantasies. As this phase develops, the male child is forced to 
regress from his earlier object choices to identification with the 
powerful father in order to protect his penis. This identification 
allows the child to introject the prohibitions and staniards of the 
parents. His incestuous phantasies are repressed in favor of sub-
limated expressions of affection and his destructive impulses are 
repressed in favor of an imitation behavior. This development, the 
resolution of the Oedipus conflict, brings about the differentiation 
of the superego. 
Intertwined. with the phallic stage, and preceding it to some 
extent, is the stage of urethral preoccupationc Urinating and 
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urinating phantasies as weH as stimulation of the scrotum seem to 
be the characteristics of this sliage. Sandor Ferenczi, a contem.. 
porary of Freud, would lay some emphasis upon a urethral phase char-
acterized by urethral eroticism.1 AlthoQgh anal and urethral eroti-
cisms are closely interwoven, urethral eroticism deserves a special 
place because of specific reaction formations against it, namely 
shame, because of certain character traits associated with it, namely 
ambition, and because of special dynamics connected wit.h it. l"reud 
himself, ho~ever, does not distinguish this stage. 
Following these important pre-genital periods are the stages 
of: 1a tency, in which there is a drop in infantile sexual int erests 
in favor of new interests and new activities; puberty, in which there 
are tremendous physiological and pS,1chological upheavals as well as 
a return of intense instinctual urges, an anti-cathexis of the super-
ego, and a return of Oedipal conflicts; and adulthood, in 1vhich gen-
ital activity has matured and infantile conflicts and repressions 
have been stablized and/or sublimated. 
Fenichel schematizes the p5.1cho-sexua1 developmental stagas in 
the following way:2 
2. 
Stages of Libidinal 
Organization 
1. Early oral (sucking) stage 
Stages in Development 
of Object Love 
1. Autoeroticism (no object, 
prea mb iva lent ) 
Sandor Ferenczi, Final Contributions to the Problems am Methods 
of p~oana;rSiS, translated by Eric Mosbacher, (London: The 
Hoga Press, 1955), p. 33. 
otto Feniche1, The P§1choana1ytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 101. 
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2. Late oral-sadistic stage *2. Narcissism: total incor-
poration of object 
3. Early anal-sadistic stage 3. Partial love with incor-
poration 
4. Late anal-sadistic stage 4. Partial lave 
5. Early genital or phallic stage 5. Object love limited by 
castration complex 
6. Final genital stage 6. Post ambivalent 
* Stages 2, 3, 4, and 5 are ambivalent stages 
This chart sum..'Il8rizes the orthodox psychoanalytic conception 
of the developmental stages. The six stages of development are form-
ulated in terms of libidinal organization, i.e. the organization of 
drives around specific erogenous body zones, and the developmerat of 
object love, i.e o the ability of the child to love another person. 
As the child develops from the ear],y oral stage to the final genital 
stage his ability to love moves from an almost total preoccupation 
wi th his own body and needs, through an ambivalent love which gradually 
focuses more upon the other person than upon himself, and finally to 
an almost complete love of the other person. 
Natural],y this chart is an idealized scheme and. thus is not 
completely trustworthy. No one loves without some ambivalence; no 
oile completely abandons some oral needs; etc. But in the main this 
is the path by which the normal child develops. All of this section 
has been an attempt to deliniate more fully this developmental path. 
ii. Further Developments since Freud 
Most of the work done since the psychoanalytic investigations of 
Freud has been concerned with explicating the existing conceptions. 
Some psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein have gone beyond Freud in empha-
sizing the aggressive components of the first stages of development. 
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She, and others such as Abraham,l have further emphasized the divi-
sion of the oral and anal sta~es into two stages and thus have de-
lineated the strength of the aggressive instinct in the infant. 
The roost comprehensive addition and revision of the psycho-
sexual developmental scheme has been included in the work of Erik 
Erikson. 2 He has not o~ included the psycho-sexual phases but has 
also given more attention to the role of significant persons during 
development,3 the ideological perspectives of each developmental 
phase, and the cultural and social modalities implicit in each phase. 
The main components of Erikson's model are the epigenetic principle 
of ego development, the role of people and society in the develop-
ment o:f the child, the interaction of pa rticular needs of the child 
with particular responses of the environment, and the behavior that 
results from these thingsQ 
Epigenetic ego development is more fully explained below but, 
in essence, it means that the child develops on the basis of a pre-
determined plan of growth. The broad outline of this plan of growth 
is constitutionally given and expresses itsel:f in sequential develop-
mental phases that are both continuous .d.th, and separate from, pre-
ceding and following phases. Each developmental phase is focused 
around a specific developmental crisis a These phase specific crises 
1. Karl Abraham, Selected Papers, translated by Douglas B~an and 
Alix Strachey, (New York: Ba"sic Books, Inc., 1927), pp. 422-433. 
2. Erikson, Pgrchological Issues, I, No.1. 
3. Harry S. Sullivan's conception of "significant other" is a Neo-
Freudian emphasis of this aspect. 
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are universal but ~ach society and each individual within society solves· 
the crises in their own unique way. A reciprocal pattern of interaction 
between the child and the caretaking persons of society (parents, teachers, 
ministers, etc) develops as the phase specific crises of the child elicit 
dovetailing developmental needs in the caretakers. Institutions and tra-
ditions become the formalized means through which society structures the 
reciprocal interaction patterns. The resulting behavior patterns of the 
child are a consequence of this Gestalt. From this the child is insured 
that his behavior is social~ acceptable and that he can have a sense 
of continuity with his surroundings. 
This model makes manifest the previously implied ideas that all 
behavior is the product of an epigenetic course of development regula-
ted both by inherent laws and cumulative experience. Freud's clearest 
expression of this idea came in his A General Introduction to Psycho-
analysis • 
• • gthe function of the libido, does not make 
its appearance as a completed whole, nor does it 
develop in its own image, but goes through a series 
of successive phases which are not similar to each 
other. In fact, it is a developmental sequence 
like that from grub to butterfly.l 
Erikson makes the implied epigenetic principle much more precise with 
the following definition. 
1. 
Somewhat generalized, this principle states that 
anyt,hing that grows has a ground plat' al~1 that 
out of this ground plan the parts ar .. ~e., ~ach 
part having its time of special ascendanc,y, until 
all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole. l 
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Inherent in this principle is the cultural reaction manifested at the 
particular time of any part ascendancy. Inner developmental laws 
create a "succession of potentialities for significant 1nteractionD 
with the culture and, zoore specifically, with those significant 
persons in the eIIVironment 'Who have meaning for the individual. 
With the epigenetic principle as a basic postulate, Erikson 
goes on to create a developmental model of personality growth that 
accounts for the potentialities am abilities of the organism within 
the socio-cultural context in which they are exoressed and fashioned. 
Because this model is the most comprehensive model developed within 
the psychoanalytic framework since the w:>rk of li'reud, it will be 
delioo.ated here.2 
Stage Ie Basic Trust vs Basic Mistrust 
This is the incorporative stage of the child's development in 
which the child's world is circumscribed by his synbiotic relation 
with the maternal person. The physiological component of this stage 
surrounds the oral and sensory apparatuses. The cllild learns to suck 
into himself the food offered by the mother. He learns how to suck: 
efficiently and effectively by controlling mouth and lip movements as 
well as his breathing cycle. At the same time, he is learning to "take 
in" through his sensory apparatus the varieties of stimuli provided by 
1. Erikson, P~chological Issues, I, No.1, 52. 
2. This summary is complicated by its brevity. Further elucidation 
can be found in Erikson" Childhood and Society and Psychological 
Issues, I, No.1. 
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his circwnscribed world. At this stage he is experiencing the bio-
logical urges of hunger, need for oxygen, and for adequate tempera- . 
ture control. All of these drive him to reach out to his environ-
ment for the answering response. Erikson defines this necessary 
mutual interaction between the child and the environment, i.e. the 
maternal person at this stage, as the p~cho-social modality of learning 
nto give and to get." The child learns to receive what is given by 
regulating himself to the rlvthms of the giver. If the environment 
responds to the drives of the infant in some consistent fashion that 
takes account of the insatiable aspects of the child's need, the child 
can learn to regulate himself in accordance with the environment. The 
successful regulation in this stage gives the infant a sense of basic 
trustfulness of the environment and himself. The cosmic order is an 
acceptable order that responds favorably to the necessary demands of 
the individual and thus is trustworthy. lit the same time, the body of 
the child does not instigate unquenchable demams (since the environ-
ment respcn~ which would leave a sense of the mistrust of the body. 
Of course, the opposite sLie of this stage is the infant who is unable 
to nget" from his environment and wo is unable to adjust himself to 
the inconsistencies and anxieties which the environment thrusts upon 
him. This type of experience would evolva a sensa of mistrust of the 
body aM of the cosmic order. 
Stage II. AutC'nomy vs Shame, Doubt 
This stage begins with the maturation of the muscular apparatus 
which allows the psycho-social IIDdalities of holding on and letting go. 
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The focus of this stage is the bowel training of the child in lihich 
he must learn to hold and to let go in accordance with certain basic 
patterns of cultural acceptance. However, the focus is not exclusive 
but spreads to many other levels of the child's physical abilities. 
The psychological crisis is the alternative betlieen "having" in the 
sense of caring for and "having" in the sense of restraining ani tight 
over-control. The second alternative is between "letting go" in a 
cruel and destructive manner and "letting go" in the sense of letting 
be. The reaction of the cultural milieu, e.g. the parental persons, 
will determine whether the child can gain a sense of self control 
wi thout loss of self esteem or whether he will gain the sense of 
shame and self consciousness combined with a sense of doubt about 
himself. Doubt is that secondary mistrust which undermines the child's 
confidence in his ability to control his drives and makes him appre-
hensive about the good intentions of the environment. Shame is the 
feeling of the child that he has been exposed premature~. His ten-
uous autonoI'I\V is revealed as a facade. The ability of the pi rents to 
create an atJ1l)snhere of firnness within which the child has an ever 
expanding area for self decision will determine the successfulness 
of this stage. Finally, this stage will culminate in the future re-
lationship of the child t c law and order. As the child finds a sense 
of pers mal autonoll\V wi thin the benevolent at!TX)sphere of the parents' 
firmness, he gains the ability to relate trustingly and meaningfully 
to the wider spheres of law and order of which he will become a part. 
The degree to which this stage is successfully resolved depends to a 
great extent on the residue of basic trust from the preceding stage. 
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Stage III. Initiative vs Guilt 
As the child gains a sense of autonomy, he is able to move out-
ward into wider and wider areas of exploration and discove~ without 
fear of losing himself. As a sense of coordination, a sense of hearing 
and feeling, and a sense of language begin to develop, he can differ-
entiate mre and more of what i~ hap?ening around him. This is the 
intrusive mooe in which the child is into everything, not only with 
his hams, but alS) with the rest of his body. His eyes intrude into 
previously unobtainable sights; his ears intrude into pr'eviously in-
distinguishable sounds; and his body" intrudes upon others by physical 
attack. The highlight of this stage is the increased interest and 
exploration into the sexual sphere. The psycho-social modalities are 
"to make" and "to make like." rfhe child is "on the make" in the sense 
of exploration, intrusion, competing, ani fighting. He "makes like" 
in terms of his imagination in ibich he plays at being, or phanta-
sizing, in the midst of tremendous adventures. The masculine and 
feminine irrages begin to form in tenns of comparisons wi t.'l mother and 
dad. Ideal prototypes are set up as goals to be obtained. The 
problem at th is stage is the curbing of initiative without incurring 
a sense of guilt. Guilt arises when the child's initiative pushes 
him into forbidden areas. The Wlcontrollable need to explore in reality 
and phantas,y often results in the exploration of things, ideas, and 
relationships t.l-J.at are bouDied by family and cultural taboos. As these 
taboos are pressed upon the child by the parents, they come into conflict 
with the child's initiative. The result is a sense of guilt. A sccial 
milieu ;bich encourages the sense of initiative in an atmosphere which 
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stresses the individual l s equality in worth, although dir'ference in 
kind, function, or age, is the pattern which alleviates the sense of 
guilt that might have arisen as the result of phantasies of taking 
mother1s or father1s .place. 
Stage IV. Industry vs Inferiority 
This is the stage of learning. The child ha s developed int·o a 
be ing who want s to learn how to do things and hOli to do them correctly. 
He wants to develop a sense of mastery over things that will give him 
a sense of acco~plishment and purpose. At the same time, he finds it 
is pleasurable and 'Sood to interact with others in ter-ills of cooper-
ation rather than competition. Erikson calls this the stage of 
"making things and making things together." The child learns the basic 
m~thods of operation which will enable him mhandle and master those 
things which the culture demands of him. The sense of industry :in this 
stage. is that confidence that one can manipuLste and master those things 
which the culture feels is necessary for growth. Cultural demands; 
mostly in the fom of education, are met with industrious activity that 
ccmqu,ers and assimilates the new material. If the child is unable to 
do this, he develops the sense of inferiority and inadequacy which may 
lead to regression to earlier stages or an over compensatory reaction 
of "making people" or "unmaking people". This sense of inferiority is 
the feeling that one camot live up to the cultural demands through one IS 
own industry. The child feels inadequate, put upon, and out of his depth. 
The result is the giving up of industry in favor of over-dependent rela-
tionships or a perversion.of industry into a manipulation of persons. 
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Successful participation in this stage allows the child to learn 
how to relate to the technological elements of his environment in 
terms of the success of previous s~ages and the maturity of those 
significant persons who teach him hali to relate. 
Stage V. Identity vs Identity Diffusion 
This stage is the heart of Erikson's developmental scheme. 
The central crisis is one of differentiating a sense of ego iden-
tity, which will allow the individual to be himself and to share 
being himself with otrers, over against the possibility of identity 
diffusion, rmich will isolate the individual from others and sub-
merge him in constant anxiety. This sense of ego identity is "the 
accrued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness 
and continuity is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's 
meaning for others. it1 There is a growing sense that t.he individual 
is gradually learning how to relate himself to the .future and to 
future goals and that he is developing a unique personality within 
a realistic and understandable social ~ilieu. A lack of this sense 
0'·- ego identity leaves a void of ego diffusion in which the individual 
1. Erikson, Pgrchological Issues, I, No.1, 89. Ego identity and 
ego diffusion are technical terms coined by Erikson to identify 
a particular group of personality variables. As yet, however, 
these terms are fairly vague and have very little specific 
content. At the same time they are very useful because they 
designate such common concerns as : a knowledge or lack of 
knowledge of one's self, a personal sense or lack of sense of 
historical continuity that can be organized in one's past, 
expressed in one's present, and projected into one's future, 
a feeling of acceptable or non acceptable interaction with the 
environment, participation or lack of partiCipation in mean-
ingful relationships with significant persons, etc. 
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has no set frame of reference in which to operate nor does he have a 
sense of who he is or where he ought to go. The peer groups form a 
defensive structure which alloln: him to assume a pseudo identity 
instead of giving him the basic perspective of an integrated person-
ality within a larger group of equals. Erik~on contends that this 
stage involves the adolescent's future relation to various ideolo-
gical perspectives. Identity comes in consonance with a developing 
sense of values in relation to a developing olrer arching philosophy 
of life. Without this interaction between identity and ideology the 
individual is bound to drift into those ideologies that serve either 
to control his anarchic drives or to allow these drives to express 
themselves at will. At the same time, each ideology prevalent in 
any culture has basic presuppositions that either help the adoles-
cent to develop a sense of ego identity or prevent him from the 
necessary exploration that will lead to a sense of ego identity. 
ErL~son has three more stages in his developmental scheme. 
These will be sket~~ed only brief~. Sta~e VI consists of intimacy 
and solidarity VB isolation. In this stage there is a focus upon 
mut.ually satis.f.ying sexual relationships with a loved partner. The 
sexual relationship is the symbol of a shared mutual trust ani a 
complementa~ regulation of mutual marital concerns such as work, 
play, procreat.ion, and raising of children$ Satisfactory growth in 
this-st.age insure the offspring of an acceptable atmosphere in which 
they can proceed in healthy development. 
Stage VII consisteof generativity vs self absorption. This 
stage £ocuses primarily upon the next generation. Healthy development 
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points outvIard to the children, to helping ""hem establish themselves 
in· their unique life patterns, am to guiding them over the rough 
spots they encounter. Naturally, not all persons in this stage have 
this opportunity nor does this opportunity alone encompass all of a 
parent's energies. Thus there spring up other w~s of satisfYing al-
truistic concerns such as writing, the arts, activity in social organ-
izations, and other forms of creativity. 
Stage VIII cons:f..st of integrity vs despair in mich there is an 
integration of the peroonality into a Ullique, unifed whole which is 
consistent in lii'e style yet identified with all mankind and all kinds 
of men. 
This model provides for the unity of organism arrl emrironment 
in a mutually regulating process of development. By recasting the 
psychoanalytic developmental scheme into a more comprehensive model, 
it allovls a fuller understanding of the total growth of the personality 
and, consequent~, enables a more complete Ullderstanding of the speci-
fic ~am1cs of a particular phase. 
iii. Swmnary 
The developmental considerations of the psychoana~ic theor.y 
of personality have not gone through the process of continual change 
as was true in the case of the structural considerations. Instead of 
evolution there has been, for the most part, deepening and clarifi-
cation of basic concepts. Erikson's model is the first attempt at 
development and eApansion of Freud's original speculations. This 
more inclusive schematization not only allows for integration of 
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cultural and social factors, but also pinpoints phase specific crises 
with their accompanying reaction patterns. 
4. The Dynamics of Personality 
i. Sigmund Freud and the orthodox Position 
Freud conceptualized the manifold personality behavior patterns 
as arising ultimately fran the physio-chemical base of biological 
tensions. Energy excitations of the tissues, which arouse energy 
imbalances within the tissues, are brought about by continuous somatic 
urges arising from the anabolic or catabolic processes. These physio-
chemical excitations have the character of insistent pres sure. 1 They 
upset the homeostatic balance of the body. This" in turn" sets in 
motion the craving of the organism to return to a relatively tension-
less state. Upon this tension reduction system" Freud based his spec-
ulations about the dynamics of personality formation and operation. 
The energy excitation was called "~" by Freud. The English 
translation of the Gennan word" namely instinct" carries the unfor-
tunate connotation of unchangeability which the German word does not 
have. As Fenichel points out" " • • • the Triebe obviously are changed 
in aim and object under the influences stemming from the e,vironlIl:lnt. n2 
Consequently it ~uld seem to be more correct to use the EngliSh word" 
drive, to characterize these energy excitations. The rest of the dis-
sertation will follow this usage. 
1. Sigmund Freud" nlnstincts and their Vicissitudes" (1915), Standard 
Edition, XIV, 117-122. 
2. Feniche1" The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 12. 
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The drives have a source, an aim, and an object. l The source 
of a drive is the physio-chemical base. The energy balance within 
the tissue is upset because of some biological need. The aim of the 
engendered tension is to produce rome kind of discharge action that 
will fulfill the need of the body, i.e. the reflex arc is the prirn-
itive type of discharge action. The object of the drive is that 
instrument that will fulfill the biological need and toward which 
the discharge takes place. 
On the basis of this simple conceptual scheme of urge, discharge, 
relaxation, and as a result of his clinical work, Freud classified 
categories of drives. Although the theory and categorization of drives 
went through many stages, it is not necessar,y to delineate here the 
evolution of Freud's thinkingf Instead we will concentrate upon a 
general discussion of his final formulation. 3 
Implicit in Freud's discussion of drives is a general distinction 
between certain physical drives and all others.4 These physical drives 
(hunger, thirst, breathing, etc.) are imperious. Th~ can not be 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Sigmund Freud, New Introducto 
pp. 132-133; "In'=st:';'in::F;;';;t';;'s';;'a';;'n-d~t"':"h.&.e-'-ir~V~i~c-:i"';'s';;'s-'-it~u';;'d~e-s.l!:"..;;.r,1;-;9~l~;&..;;.~~==_ 
Edition, XIV, 122-123. 
Edward Bibring, "The Development and Problems of the Theory of 
Instincts", Inter. Jrnl. Psychoanal., XIII, No.2 (1941), 102-131. 
This article gives a succinct history of the development of Freud's 
thinking on instinct theory-. 
Sigmund Freud, Be~nd the Pleasure PrinCifle (1920), Standard 
Edition, XVIII, 7 4; The Ego ana the Id "923), StaDdard EdItion, 
xn, 40-47; Civilization am its Discontents (1929), Standard 
Edition, XXI, 117-122, 139-140; New IntrOdUctory Lectures on 
PszChoanalysis, pp. 141-152. 
SigmWld Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 134. 
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altered or changed in any fundamental way. They are insistent, in-
flexible, and must be satisfied almost at once. The second category 
of drives became clear to Freud only upon his discovery of the nature 
of sexuality.l These sexual drives have the same character of insis-
tence, but there is a fundamental difference between these drives and 
the first category of drives. The sexual drives can be altered in 
terms of their obj ects. Through displacement of energy, the sexual 
drives can be satisfied by a secondary, or even tertiary object, and 
by means of varying instruments of action. Later Freud made a further 
division when he postulated a differentiation between the sexual drives 
and the aggressive drives. The rexual drives then became all those 
impulses that pertain to life, growth, reproduction, etc., while the 
aggressive drives focus on death, decay, destruction and seek to return 
the organism to its original state of pure inertia. 
Freud's clinical and theoretical work showed him that the sexual 
and aggressive drives are fundamental to the operations of the human 
organism, and, in addition, often operate unknown to the conscious mind. 
With the discovery of the unconscioLis came the need to detail more 
fully the process of energy dynamics, Freud postulated that the sex-
ual and aggressive urges operate on the same principle as the simple 
physical drives but their processes are complicated to a much greater 
extent by the necessities of external reality. As a drive arose, its 
energy is cathected on to a mental representation of the need ful-
filling object (wish fulfillment}. However, since the mental 
1. Sigmund Freud, Three Essa~s on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), 
Standard Edition, VII, 13 -243. 
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representation can not fulfill the need, the ego matches this mental 
representation with its cotlIlterpart in external reality. This process 
of matching is called identifl.cation. The ego, by helping the drives 
to reach their object through identification, is able to capture some 
of the energy for its own use. This captured energy can then be used 
by the ego for its own purposes, i.e. as long as these processes are 
are ultimately concerned with gratif,ying instinctual urgp,s.l 
Since the ego operates on the premise of the reality principle, 
it att.empts to use the captured energy for restraining, detouring, 
or displacing the drives. Eventually the ego evolves a whole network 
of cathected objects and secondar,r aims. Dynamically, however, the 
most important result of the ego's activities is its attempt to set 
up anti-cathexes or restraining forces upon the impulses o This often 
leads to the erection of more or less permanent defense mechanisms. 
As can be seen, the two most important processes to this theor,y 
of personality dynamics are the processes of identification and dis-
placement. Displacement of energy refers t·) the 51 ifting of energy 
from one aim'and/or object to a substitute aim and/or object. Identi-
.fication is the process whereby the natching of a mental representation 
with the corresponding reality allows the ego to capture some of the 
drive energy for its own purposes. This second process also accounts 
£or the superego. The child, by a system of rewards and punishments, 
gradually learns to cope with the external reality of his ~rents. He 
learns to match his behavior with that demanded by his parents and thus 
1. Sigmund Freud, The InteZ6etation of Dreams (1900), Standard 
Edition, V, 564-567, 59 03. 
captures for himself, internally, his own s,rstem of rewards and 
punishments. l 
In the final analysis Freud's theory of the dynamics of per-
sonality can be summarized as c~nsistinJ of the continuous inter-
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action of driving forces and restraining forces or cathexes and anti-
cathexes. 
ii. Further Developments since Freud 
Freud's emphasis on the dual concepts of drive and drive object 
allowed the ps,rchoanalytic theory of personality dynamics to account 
for both the inherent push !'lnd the environmental pull. In spite of 
this, there was a tendency to interpret this system as atomistic or 
to view it as a number of behavior fragments held together by the 
"glue" of the drives. Rapaport, in his systematizing attempt, 2 has 
shown that the -psychoanalytic system of dynamics has an implicit or-
ganismic basis. The integrative role of the seconda~ process and 
the cohesive properties of the structural point of view necessarily 
point to a unified system of dynamics. In its hi~tory, psychoanalysis 
bas gradually moved from an emphasis on the ultimate determination of 
behavior by drives toward an emphasis on defenses and controls and 
the extent to which each of these determined specific behavior, and 
1. This is a very simple summary of the fornation of the superego and 
in no way does justice to the co~lex operations postulated by 
Freud. For a fuller presentation of this see, Sigmund Freud, Group 
P holo and the Ana sis of the E a (1921), Standard Edition, 
XVIII, 1 -110; The Ego and the Id 1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 
28-39, 48-59; CiVilIzation and its Discontents (1929), Standard 
Edition, XXI, 123-145. 
2. Rapaport, Psychological Issues, II, No.2. 
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finally, to the concept of ego autono~ that postulated a condition 
in which drive behavior was in abeyance. In short, psychoanalysis 
is taking on the characteristics of a Gestalt approach. 
The recast:ing of the qrnamics of personality into an organismic 
context makes more meaningful the concept of identification. This 
concept has received a great deal of attention, both inside and out-
side the bounds of psychoanalysis, and, although there is still mch 
confusion about the term and its meaning, continuing research is 
slow~ illuminating its processes. 
Primary identification is the process by which the mental re-
presentative (memory inBge) is matched with the appropriate physical 
reality. By this process, the ego gains control of some of the libid-
inal energy. Hore important, for our purposes, is secondary identi-
fication. In th is process the ego uses some of its energy to cathect, 
i.e. invest its energy, the prohibitions and ideals of significant 
persons in order to gain love and avoid displeasure. These cathected 
objects become a part of the ego and are later differentiated out as 
the superego. Secondary identification, then, is a psychological 
process by which the ego takes into itself certain meaningful love 
objects. 
The objects of this identification are not necessari~ the 
parents in toto. Rather, the ego may identify with part objects, 
with p~sical characterisitics, particular ideals, behavioral man~ 
~erisms, etc. But, in any event, these identifications become a 
permanent part of the personality organization with energy at their 
disposal. 
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The mechanism of identification is a continual operative PS,Y-
chological process in the individual. However, the results of this 
process are not simple exact reproductions of the cathected objects. 
Instead there is a new configuration and integration of all the iden-
tifications. Of course, the basis of th~s configuration is the pri-
mary identification with the parental figures. 1 
The major dynamic change brought about by identification is a 
redistribution of the libidinal energy from the id to the processes 
which are functions of the ego and the superego. This major dynamic 
change has certain subsidiary effects: (1) d.elationships 1<.o"ith others 
are desexualized; (2) There is increased narcissism; (3) There is a 
tendenc.y to withdraw from objects; (4) It limits aggression toward 
those with whom one is closely associated and mobilizes aggression 
and lets it be released toward an outgroup; (5) Self discipline is 
substituted for obedience; (6) The individual is enabled to acquire 
a auperego. 2 
As the infant develops from the original narcissism am attempts 
to incorpora te the need fulfilling objects, the growing ego gains more 
and more strength. The ego represses the narcissism and uses its 
captured energy to cathect the needed objects. Of course, these ca-
thexes are compounded by ambivalence, i.e. a fusion of both sexual 
and aggressive drives. In the emergence of the Oedipal situation, 
1. Erikson, PgrChological Issues, I, No.1, 112-113. 
2. Roy Fairchild, A Critical Evaluation of the Freudian Concept of 
Identification am its Function in the Ana sis of QJ.ristian 
Experience, Th.D. Dissertation, University of Southern CalifOrnia, 
1956), p. 127-137. 
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the child is forced to repress the wish to destroy and is forced to 
desexualize his object cathexis. By redistributing the libidinal 
energy through identification, the child is enabled to have a sense 
of self worth through the cathecting of his own ego ideal (secondar.y 
narcissism), to have an affectionate, but desexualized, relationship 
with his former sexual obj ect choice, and to eliminate the threatening 
relationship by controlling his own behavior according to the intro-
jected model. 
Ident:ification seems to Wldergo four developmental phases ;.fiich 
seem to correlate with the ps,ycho-sexual developmental phases. The 
most primitive identification would be an incorporation of the model 
whereby the individual becomes the model. The second kind of identi-
fication would be introjection, in ltlich the values, the behavior, 
etc., of the object would be adopted uncritically. The third process 
would be much like the identifica I:.ion process at the end of the Oedipal 
period in which the individual, in order to deal with a crisis invol-
ving the seli, would IJ'oduce behavior identical with the behavior of 
the threatening object. The fourth, and highest fo~n of identification, 
would involve a holistic character wherein selected attitudes am 
meanings of the model would be integrated into an individuated ego 
structure. 
If this schema is put into the context of the dynamics of person-
ality, it would seem plausible to say that the successive libidinal 
organizations evolving around specific erogenous zones force certain 
types of identificatory processes. The biological needs am the sen-
sitivity of the oral cavity in the first phase would demand incorporation 
131 
in order to fulfill narcissistic needs. TIle shifting of libidinal 
energy to the anal region and the corresponding focus on the erogenous 
pleasure of retention am elimination would insure conflicts with 
socio-cultural reality. This w:>uld demand introjection of prohibi-
tions and commands. On the emergence of the phallic organization with 
its incipient male-female distinctions, incorporation of the same 
sexed parental person would be demanded in order to model behavior 
toward this parent. Finally, the genital phase would bring the be-
ginnings of an internalization in which pre-genital identificatory 
processes and results would be combined in a loosely c,oherent whole. 
iii. Summary 
Freud's theoretical propositions on the dynamics of personality 
have more or less stood the test of time. Certain focused concerns, 
e.g. the emphasis on the Gestalt and organismic 'basis of pS,Ychoana-
lytic theory, have helped cla rify the dynamics of personality. But 
in the main, Freud's formulations are upheld and affirmed by later 
studies. The increased interest and research on the process of 
identification is relevant to our purpose and this has been the 
primary focus of this section. 
5 • SUD1ITIBry: 
This chapter has attempted to summarize the psychoanalytic 
theory of personality as it has been presented b.Y Sigmund Freud, his 
contemporaries, and present day followers. Although there has been 
little change in the basic postulates over the years, there have been 
significant shifts in the areas of concern. Consequently the revised 
pS,Ychoanalytic theory of personality, as seen in Hartmann and 
Erikson, has more breadth and depth , especially with respect to 
the concepts of the ego and superego and the in~eraction of the 
individual with his environment. This chapter has set the context 
for an investiga~ion of two particular concepts of psychoanalysis, 
the concepts of shame and guilt, which will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTIONS OF SHAME AND GUILT 
1. The Concept of Shame 
i. Introduction 
The concept of shame has a relatively short history in the annals 
of ps,yChology. Social p5.1chologists and anthropologists have for~ 
ulated it as a product of cultural mores. 1 Very little attention has 
been given to shame as an intra-psychic mechanism. Instead, shame has 
been cliaracterized as a reaction to criticism am ridicule from others. 
It is dependent upon external sanctions rather than internal dynamcs. 
For the most part, shame is visualised as operative only in the con~ 
text of a ridiculing force from .outside the shameful person. Even 
Freud seems to lean toward this interpretation in his paper of 1896 
when he says, "Thus self reproach (for having performed a sexual deed 
in ch~hood) can easily transform itself into shame (lest another 
person should hear about it) • • • ,,2 • 
The definitions of shame in dictionaries of ps,ychology and ps,r-
choanalysis seem to move away from an external orientation toward a 
middle position with patterns of interactions between external and 
1. 
2. 
As an examp;te of this see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1934). 
SigIlI1lIld Freud, "Further Remarks on the Neuro-Ps,rchoses of Defence" 
Cl896), Standard Edition, III, 111. 
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internal forces. These definitions of shame focus on the fact that 
it is an emotional attitude aroused by such things as: real or fancied 
defects of the body, lack of proper clothing, realization of a short-
coming or impropriety, and improperly exposing the body. It is ac-
companied by autonomic reactions such as blushing and digestive 
disorders. l In short, shame has come to be neither exclusively 
externally oriented nor exclusively internally oriented. It is a 
mutual pattern involving both a reaction to external forces and 
an internal intra-psychic reaction to drives or needs. 
Psychoanalytic concern with the concept of shame has been slow 
to develop. Erikson feels that it "is an emotion insufficiently 
studied." He has attempted to give it a position in his develop-
mental model of personality growth. Previous psychoanalytic writers 
have connected shame primarily with urethral eroticism. Gerhart Piers 
has attempted to outline the structure and dynamics of shame. With 
the development of psychoanalytic theory, especially in terms of the 
further exploration of the developmental process and the increased 
differentiation of the structure of personality, shame is beginning to 
take on a more important role. 
ii. The Polar Foci of the Shame Concept 
A preliminary survey of the psychoanalytic writings on shame 
reveals a wide variety of conceptions. In various places Freud 
1. 
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ascribes different meanings to shame. In the quotation above there 
is an emphasis upon the external criterion of the shame dynamic; in 
another place he sees shame as a historical precipitate of the psycho-
genesis of the hwnan race;l and in another place he views shame as a 
reaction formation precipitated by the need of the post-oedipal ego 
to insure its defense against certain sexual impulses.2 Othe~ early 
writers have emphasized the connection of shame with urethral eroti-
cismJ and with exhibitionism. Fenichel attempts to combine Freud's 
emphasis into one conception but l~s special emphasis upon shame 
as a defense mechanism.L Contemporar.y psychoana~sts have given 
more attention to the concept of shame but seem to be equal~ confused. 
Some relate it to exhibition,S some to the abstract concept of what 
an individual strives to be,6 and some to early maturational develop-
ments. 7 
An attempt to sift this material and bring it together into 
some kind of meaningful whole can best be done by structuring the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Sigmund Freud, Three ES,s on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), 
Standard Edition, vu, 16 • 
Sigmund Freud, nFive Lectures on Psycho-analysis (1910), Standard 
Edition, XI, 45. 
ue of 
Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 139. 
Margaret E. Fries, "Review of the Literature on the Latency Period 
with Special Emphasis on the So-called Normal Casen , Readings in 
Psychoanalytic Psychology, edited by Morton Levitt, (New York: 
IPPleton-Centur.r-Crofts, Inc., 1959), p. 59. 
Josse~, Readings in psyChoanalytic Psychology, p. 79. 
Erikson, Psychological Issues, I, No.1, 65-74. 
shame concept upon two parallel foci. The first focus would con-
centrate upon the earlier developmental considerations that result 
in an unspecified, all pervasive and global shame that operates, for 
the most part, unconscious~. The second focus considers the later 
developmental process that brings about a more specific and delimited 
sha~ that operates on a conscious level. The first focus will be 
called undifferentiated marne and the second, differentiated shame. 
iii. Origins of Shame 
Undifferentiated Shame 
The deepest stratum of shame arises out of what Freud c111ed a 
historical precipitate nof external inhibitions to which the sexual 
instinct has been subj ected during the psychogenesis of the human 
race. nl Natural~ this observation is speculative and subject to 
criticism because of its reliance upon the Lamarkian concept of in-
heritan:e. Neverthele~s, innate physiological reaction patterns, 
e.g. avoidance, 'WOuld seem to indicate that the shame reect:ion is 
biological~ based. This might indica te the very early psychological 
nature of shame. Fenichel speculates that shame probably originates 
in an archaic physiological reaction pattern which automatically 
equates being looked at with being despised. 2 
In any event, no mtter how many differing opinions there might 
be in conceptualizing the very early origins of shame, most psycho-
analytic writers find the beginnings of shame quite early in the 
1. Sigmund Frelld, .;;T.:;:hr=-=ee~E;;.;s;.;jsi-?l:F-~~~"';;';;';';:';'~~~~~~..;a. 
Standard Edition, VII, , footnote 
2. Fenichel, The P~choanalytic Theory of Neurosis, po 139. 
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developmental process. Erikson places the development of shame in 
the anal-urethral-muscular stage;l Piers thinks that shame beg:Lns when 
the process of ego finding is under way and before the development of 
a superego;2 Fenichel ascribes H. psychologically to the urethral 
phase;3 Alexander says that inferiority feelings (his term for what 
this dissertation calls shame) are presocj~l phenomena and a product 
of an earlier and more global differentiation of the child from his 
parents;4 Goldberger, in his reinterpretation of the struc~ural 
concepts of psychoanalysi~ places the origin of shame in the toilet 
training period.5 Incidental to all of this is the fact that many 
anthropological and non-ps.ychoanalytical psychologies would charac-
terize shame as a more primitive reaction. 
From the above survey it would seem evident that the origin 
of shame is in an early and more undifferentiated period of the 
developmental process. It is more than likely based upon p~siolog-
ical reflex patterns innate at birth but becomes a ps,ychological 
process in the anal stage. It seems to be a product of the early 
beginnings of the differentiation of the i11fant from his environment 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Erikson~ P§[chological Issues, I, No.1, 65-70. 
Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, p. 30. 
Fenichel, The P~choana6Ytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 69. 
Franz Alexander, "Remarks about the Relation of Inferiority 
Feelings to Guilt Feelings", Inter. Jrnl. Pszchoanal., XJX 
(January, 1938), 47. 
Emmanuel Goldberger, "The Id and the Ego", p~choanal. Rev., 
XLIV ( July, 1957) J 262. This particular art cle gives a great 
deal of attention to the shame dynamic. 
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,and consequently is concerned with psychological processes of body 
function, body image, autono~, and the very primitive attempts at 
truly interpersonal relationships. 
Differentiated Shame 
The roore specific am conscious feeling of shame is what Freud 
termed a reaction formation. According to Anna Freud, "reaction for-
mation secures the ego against the return of repressed impulses from 
within • "1 Q1.. • •• ....name is the specific intra-psychic mechanism that 
protects the individual ego from experiencing the overwhelming anxiety 
of a component of the sexual instinct, namely, exhibitionism. It is 
one of the dams set up in latency to help pr'eserve the repression of 
pre-oedipal urges. 
Even though this reaction formation of shame is a particular 
characteristic of the latency period, there would be some justifi-
cation for ascribing its genetic roots to the earlier anal and phallic 
periods. In speaking of the functions of the reaction formations of 
shame, disgust, and morality, as additions to the mechanisms of repres-
8 ion, Freud says, 
It is in particular the coprophilic impulses of child-
hood--that is to say, the desires attached to the ~~­
creta--which are submitted most rigorously to repres-
sion, and the same is true, furthermore, of fixation 
to the figures.to ~ich the child's original object 
choice is attached. 
The differentiated shame reaction would then be bound up with the 
1. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, p. 190. 
2. Signumd Freud, 'Five Lectures on PsychoanalysUf' (1909), Standard 
Edition~ XI, 45. 
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dynamic of undifferentia ted shame as well as another dynamic, that of 
unconscious guilt. l At this point it might be well to separate these 
by calling the former, differentiated shame proper and the latter, 
reaction formation shame, according to their respective genetic roots. 
Differentiated shame proper has its roots in the anal period of devel-
opment, i.e. coprophilic impulses, and is predicated upon the formation 
of undifferentiated shame. Reaction forrl'.ation shame has its roots in 
the Oedipal period of development, i.e. the child's original object 
choice, and is predicated upon the formation of unconscious guilt. 
These more conscious feelings of shame are products of the 
forces of culture. Education, cultural roores, and parental standards 
am ideals combine to characterize certain types of behavior as shameful. 
The child introjects these standards and ideals in the form of a super-
ego and ego ideal and reacw with shame to breaking the standards or 
failing to reach the ideals. Manifestations of shame on the conscious 
level need not refer back to the specific unconscious drive but may 
become generalized to other types of behavior. This shame, although 
always conscious, may be manifest (err~tionally charged depreciation of 
the self), be hidden (extreme rationalization of behavior), or denied 
(flouting an apparent enjoyment of failure). 2 
iv. The Development of Shame 
Undifferentiated Shame 
Th8 cTuci81 tLm.e for the beginning of the development of shame 
takes place When the infantile ego begins to use its processes to 
1. Unconscious guilt will be explored :in the next section, subheading 20 
2. Josselyn, Readings in P§Ychoana~ic P~chology, p. 79. 
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differentiate itself from the mothering person. This process has 
its emb~onic forms in the 18st few months of the first year of post 
fetal life when the infant dimly perceives that the satisfaction of 
his biological needs come from outside himself and that he must adjust 
himself to the rhythms of the giver. With the onset of the anal per-
iod of development in which the musculature cones under s.ome degree 
of voluntary control, i.e. walking, talking, control of elimination, 
the ability to become a separate person comes into being. At this 
point self consciousness, the power to control instinctual urges, the 
ability to interact with others in the environment as an equal person, 
and the need to establish one's self as an indiVidual, bring the con-
ditions for the development of shame. 
The infantile ego is still very weak and immature at this stage. 
It has to cope with both the overpowering urges of the drives and the 
demands of the environment. The ego has only a limited ability to 
cope with these forces without submitting itself to complete anarchy 
of the drives or ()j mplete subordination to external authorities. In 
this conflict between the earlier regressive forces that push the child 
tow~rd the prior dependent forms of existence and the wish to become 
autonomous and grow up and be like the parents, the child has to main-
tain his own self esteem. The budding sense of self esteem allows the 
infant to test out the extent of his separateness and to put into action 
his growing sense of willing. Out of this atmosphere, a growing sense 
of self cont·rol and self consciousness increases the feeling of self 
worth and self esteem. The enduring qualities that emanate from the 
solution of the conflict are those that contribute to a global feeling 
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of autono~ and pride, or the opposite global feeling of shame and 
doubt. 
From the sense of inner goodness emanates autono~ 
and pride; from the sense of badness, doubt and 
shame • • 8. The infant must come to feel that 
his basic faith in himself and in the world (which 
is the lasting treasure saved from the conflicts of 
the oral stage) will not be jeopordized by this 
sudden violent wish to have a choice, to appropriate 
demandingly am to eliminate stubbornly. Firnmess 
must protect him against the potential anarchy of 
his as yet Wltrained judgment, his inability to hold 
on and to let go with discrimL~tion. His environ-
ment must back him up in his wish Uto stand on his 
own feet" lest he be overcome by that sense of 
having exposed himself prematurely and foolishly 
which we call shame, or that secondary mistrust, 
that looking back ~ich we call doubt. l 
The anal period of development is the focal point for the con-
ditions that lead to the grotfth of shame. This erotogenic zone is 
the point of conflict that reflects the more generalized conflict of 
the differentiation of the infant from his environment. As the child 
works out his autononw in relation to his toilet training, he expreses 
his maturational need to become a separate person. The core of nar-
.cissistic omnipotence left over from the struggles of the oral period 
is delimited by the more powerful and stronger parental figures, but, 
with a fair~ adequate solution of the previous period of development, 
there is enough narcissistic libido to give the infant a sense of self 
esteem. If the parental figures forbid the infant a~ expression of 
his own autononv" do not trust him to begin control of his own urges, 
and cut him off from an external supply of narcissism, the child's self 
esteem will be negated and shame will result. 
1. Erikson" ghildhood and Society, pp. 80-81. 
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An essential feature in the development of shame is the outcome 
of comparisons with the parental persuns. Necessari~ there is a quan-
titative difference between the infant and his parents. The develop-
ment of shame takes place, however, when this quantitative difference 
is interpreted by the child as a qualitative distinction. The child 
feels weak, inferior, inade~ate, and exposed. There is a sense of 
condemnation of the self, not as a "result of wrong doing ••• (but) 
based on a comparison, on the simple fact that one feels weaker than 
another person."l In other words, the child feels that he has fallen 
short of the mark, that he has failed to attain something that he 
could not. possibly; have attained due to his physiological irnIIIaturity. 
The movement of the infant i'rom this anal stage of development 
into the phallic stage is predicated upon the successful resolution 
of the autononv VB shame crisis. If the pervading sense of marne is 
dominant, the later need to develop mature identifications becomes 
the core of the unconscious aspects of the ego ideal and reinforces 
the overwhel.ming sense of shame. 
Differentiated Shame 
Conscious shame develops only after the resolution of the 
Oedipus conflict.2 As has been indicated, the repression that is 
set up to keep the pre-genital urges unconscious needs bolstering 
by other defense mechanisms. One of these mechanisms is ilie reaction 
1. Alexander, Inter. Jrnl. Psychoanal~, XIX, 44. 
2. Signund Freud, "Character and Anal Eroticismll (1908), Standard 
Edition, IX, 111. 
• 
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formation that exhibits itself as a sense of shame. The infantile 
roots of reaction formations are various depending upon the specific 
instinctual component that is being defended against. For the shame 
reaction formation the instinctual dangers are scotophilia and exhi-
bition.l Shame reaction formation seeks to channel these instinctual 
components into cultural~ acceptable channels.2 
Differentiated shame proper also comes about after the resolu-
tion of the Oedipus complex. However, this is shame in relation to 
the ego ideal. On the basis of the Oedipal situation, the mild has 
restructlU'ed his personality to include the ego ideal. He has intern-
alized within himself an ideal that is based upon identification with 
the parent of the same sex and the acceptance of the conceptualization 
of an adequate person given by the parent of the opposite sex. Later 
this ideal will include aspects from identifications with other signi-
ficant persons. The child measures his self image by the goals and 
standards of the ego ideal and, if the ideal is fulfilled, he is rewarded 
with self esteem and satisfaction, but if the ideal is unfulfilled, he 
is given a deep and conscious shame. 
Both of these differentiated shame reactions are the same in 
respect to the psychological content of ,the experience and the pbysi-
ologiesl manifestations, but they are different in regard to their 
genetic roots and effect upon the individual. The reaction formation 
shame is hig~ specialized and refer~ to the unconscious urge to 
1. Feniche1, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 139. 
2. SigIllllIld Freud, "Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis' (1909), Standard 
Edition, XI, 44a 
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exhibit or look at the genital organs. The second type of sham is 
usually generalized in effect upon the person and refers back to the 
unconscious undifferentiated Shame of the anal period. 
v. The Structure of Shame 
Undifferentiated Shame 
Undifferentiated shame a rises out of the comparison of the 
infant (ani the subsequent feeling of inferiority and weakness due 
to this comparison) with a roore powerful significant person. The 
infantile ego is overwhelmed in its autonomous striving. It finds 
that it can neither control its own instinctt¥ll impulses as signi-
ficant persons request. nor can it establish its own individuality 
outside of the powerful person's jurisdiction. In every respect 
the infantile ego finds that it is inferior to the task at hand. 
But not o~ is it inferior, it is exposed to others ani to itself 
as weak and inadequate. This helplessness is reinforced by the sig-
nificant persons as they force submission upon the child through the 
use of the child's fear of the withdrawal of love and support. At 
the same time, seemingly impossible tasks, e.g. control of s9hincter 
and bladder, are pushed upon the infant (as if the child could accom-
plish these tasks) and held up as the necessary prerequisite of the 
reception of love. 
This is a descriptive summary of the structure of shame as it 
occurs in the individual person. The tension between the ego and 
the external ego ideal, i.e. the ideals of the parents, gives rise to 
shame 0 ·As Piers L~dicates, shame arises when a goal is not being 
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reached and when this is seen as failure. l The perceived shortcoming 
in the individual's life floods the whole person with feelings of 
inadequacy, weakness, and exposure. Jnconscious~ the irrational 
threat is abaIXionment. 
Shame is the form of anxiety that erupts from the tension 
between the ego and the ego ideal. The ego ideal measures the ego 
by its values, standards, and ideals and withdraws its support from 
the ego when ~hese goals are not met. The character of the content 
of the ego ideal may be the rigid, compulsive, over tight ideals of 
the infant or the flexible, realistic ideals of the mature person. 
But in either case, aharne is the result of non-fulfillment of ideals 
and unconsciously s,ymbolizes the withdrawal of narcissistic libido, 
i.e. self esteem and self worth, and abandonment. 
Differentiated Shame 
The' reaction formation shame is structur~~ unrelated to undif-
ferentiated shame. Whereas urrlifferentiated. shame is the result of a 
tension between the ego and the ego ideal, reaction formation shame is 
the result of a tension between the ego and the superego. The uncon-
scious urge to exhibit infringes upon the superego's command against 
sensual pleasure and arouses an unconscious sense of guilt in the ego. 
This unconscious guilt becomes manifest behaviorally in the shame 
reaction. In this sense, shame becomes the conscious aspect of the 
superego's punishment of the ego because of the ego's failure to keep 
the instinctual urges in check. Although there are other dynamic 
1. Piers and Singer, Shame and Guibi, p. 11. 
factors involved in exhibition, e.g. aggression, the shame reaction 
formation accounts for the retaliatory punishment delll<3nded by the 
superego. 
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Differentiated shame proper is more difficult to def:ine. Like 
undifferentiated shame it is the result of a tension between the ego 
and the ego ideal. However, the ego ideal of the conflict represents 
the conscious a spects of the idealized image of ,.mat the individual 
would like to be. At the same time, there is a continuity between 
this conscious ego ideal am the unconscious aspects of the ego ideal 
i.e. from which undifferentiated marne arises. The great difference 
between the unconscious ego ideal and the conscious ego ideal is that 
the former relies much more heavily upon the infantile parental models 
whereas the latter relies much more upon ideals introjected in post-
oedipal development. Thus differentiated shame proper is much more 
of a conscious phenomenon. It arises ~en there is a conscious 
failure to reach a conscious goal. 
In swnmary, difi'erentiated mame can be categorized into two 
parts according to its genetic roots. Some conscious shame is a result 
of an unconscious sense of guilt. l The superego punishes the ego for 
allow:ing certain unconscious impulses to break through by engendering 
conscious shame. Other conscious Shame feeling is a result of a tension 
between the conscious ego ani the conscious ego ideal. The individual 
fails to reach a goal set by the consciqus ege ideal and is engulfed 
with shame, i.e. differentiated shame proper. The difference between 
1. See Chapter V, subheading 3, section iii. 
conscious shame as a result of the tension between the ego and the 
ego ideal, i.e. differentiated shame proper, and conscious shame as 
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a result of unconscious guilt, i.e. reaction formation shame, is that 
the former is felt as exposure and abandonment while the latter is 
felt as puniShment. 
vi. The Dynamics of Shame 
Undifferentiated. Shane 
The sensual pleasure of retaining andeocpelling the feces, the 
stimulation of the erotogenic anal zone, the external rewards and 
punishments .given by the parental persons, and the developing ability. 
to control the instinctual urges, serve to bring about a crisis in 
the second developmental stage. The resolution of this crisis depends-
upon the physiological development of the organism, the degree of 
successful resolution of the oral crisis, the intensity of the instinc-
tual urges, the ego l s ability to introject controls from the parental 
persons, and the pS,YChological atmosphere created by the parental 
persons. 
The physiological development of the organism in this period 
focuses on the duality of rigidity and relaxation, of flexion and 
extension. The muscular system gains the ability to contract and 
expand lobich allows a certain amount of control over the movements 
of the body. The all important sphincter area is now ready to hold 
on or to expell. The IlIUscles of the legs,_ arms, am back are able 
to ~oordinate more effectiveJ,y to produce sitting, walking, etc. The 
musCles in the neck, chest, and the larynx work together to regulate 
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the flow of air in order that meaningful sounds may be produced. 
'1llese biological maturational developments combine to give the infant 
a psychological sense of libeing in control. n 
The previous psychological crisis of the oral period leaves 
the infant with a basic sense of trust or mistrust. A fairly con-
sistent meeting of th e physiological needs in that period leaves him 
with a feeling of being able to trust his ow needs and the ability 
to satisf'y those needs. There is a basic trust in the world, and in 
the self, so that expectations will be met and ins~inctual urges will 
not become overwhelming. An unsatisfactory resolution of the oral 
crisis conditions the infant for undifferentiated sharne experiences. 
EKpectations that are not met lead to a shattering of trust in the 
self and in the world. The body becomes something shameful and full 
of unexpected demands that expose the individual to terri.t'ying exper-
iences. The quantity of.narcissism so necessary to feelings of self 
worth and self esteem is dissipated as the demands of the world and 
the insistence of the urges fragment the organism. 
A crucial aspect of the anal period is the insistency of the 
drives as they confront the external demands of the world. Part of 
the instinctual energy of the drives ha s been captured by the ego 
through primary identification. At the anal level of development 
some of the energy is used for object cathexes, i.e. investment of 
energy in the parental persons, in order to replace the method of 
ful.iilling needs predominant in the oral period, i.e. magical omni-
potence. The child has become aware of the significance of the 
parental persons for his survival. He surrenders his complete 
narcissistic orientation for partial love relationships in order 
that he will not be denrived. However, these object cathexes demarrl 
certain standards before needs are fulfilled. The infantile ego 
learns to control the instinctual urges by rudimentary defense mech-
anisms so that he will not be abandoned. One of the most i-nportant 
of these defense mechanisms is the primitive form of identification. 
The child introjects the commands of the objects as well as some of 
the qualities of the objects. These introjects are the pre-oedipal 
representatives of the later superego and ego ideal. Dynamically, 
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the intra-psychic tensions that arise between the ego and the primitive 
ego ideal give rise to shame. The narcissistic libido cathects its 
own body and its body image. At the same time, the introjection of 
qualities of the parental persons lead to an ego ideal in which the 
body image, body parts, and body functions are qualitatively ani 
quantitatively larger, stronger, and more powerful. Thus, the meas-
urement of the ego's body against the ego ideal1s body image results 
in a sense of inferiority, weakness, inadequacy, or, in a word, shame. 
This residue of undifferentiated shame becomes the motivating 
force that drives the individual toward compensatory behavior. In 
order to overcome the unconscious feelings of inferiority and aban-
donment, the ego strives to prove to itself that it is just the op-
posite. It needs to feel that it is independent, worthwhile, loved, 
powerful and autonomous. Consequently shame is hidden beneath ambi-
tious striving, denial of feelings, aggressive behavior, and seeking 
control or power over others. Through this the ego vainly attempts 
to prove that it is not shameful. 
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Differentiated Shame 
Reaction formation shame is the result of identifications with 
the strict prohibitive aspects of the parental persons. In its roots 
it is an expression of unconscious guilt. Dynamically this neans that 
the 5lpeI'ego ha s teen invested. with aggressive energy. The superego 
uses this aggressive energy to PQllish the ego for transgressions of 
introjected standards. Reaction formation shame is one form of pun-
ishment. It is aggression turned inward upon the ego with the result 
that the ego must put forth some form of reparation. 
Differentiated shame proper is a result of Oedipal identifications 
with the goals, values, and images of an adequate person held by the 
parental persons as well as identifications with part aspects of later 
significant persons. These are internalized as a conscious ego ideal. 
This ego ideal is then invested with desexualized narcissistic libido. 
The conscious ideals are cathectedas the proper goals for life. When 
these goals are not met, the ego ideal withdraws its narcissistic energy, 
i.e. its affection, from the ego. Differentiated shame proper is"the 
result of this withdrawal. 
The dynamics of differentiated shame·proper and undifferentiated 
shame are the same except that the former occurs on the conscious 
level While the latter operates unconsciously. Differentiated shame 
possesses the potential of participating in the energy of undiffer-
entiated shame, however, and thus can make its effects more intense. 
vii. Swrunary 
The classification of shame in t'WO categories: undilferentiated 
shame and differentiated shame, serves to clarify the confusing discord 
surrounding the discussions of the concept of shame. Undifferen-
tiated shame is a basic derivative of intra-psychic tension between 
the ego and ego ideal and has its origns in the early develop-
mental period which ps,ychoanalysis has labeled the anal period. l 
It is a result of the child's struggle for differentiation from 
the world and comes about in response to the interaction of the 
child's ego with the parental egos'. It has the characteristics 
of pervasiveness and unconsciousness, and is manifested in feelings 
of exposure, inadequacy, weakness, inferiority, failure, and aban-
donment. 
Differentiated marne has two aspects. 2 The first, reaction 
formation shame, has. little qynamic connection with undifferentiated 
shame. Fundamentally it is a product of the intra-psychic tension 
1. It is necessa~ to 'recall two things at this point. First, 
psychoanalysis has begun to divide the third psychic structure, 
the superego or ego kieal, into two fairly distinct structures, 
the superego and the ego ideal. Necessarily, as with all 
. psychic structures, there is overlap and interchange between 
these two, but there is a fundamental distinction in regard to 
function and genetic development. See pages 94-99 of Chapter 
IV. Second, neither of these structures has anything rese~ 
bling complete form until after the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex. The ego ideal, in particular,continues to elaborate 
;itself through the latency, adolescent, and even the young 
adult stages of development. However, there are precursers of 
both these structures in the earlier stages. Thus the origins 
of undifferentiated shame are in the anal period, but the ela-
boration of it is not seen clear~ until much later. One ela-
boration is differentiated shame proper. 
2. This ra.ther fine analysis of differentiated shame is necessa~ 
for one reason. What this dissertation calls differentiated 
shame is conscious shame. However all conscious shame does not 
have the same root, the same function in the psychic econonv, 
or the same meaning. Reaction formation shame is connected with 
guilt rather than undifferentiated shame, ~ile differentiated 
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between the e~o and Stlperego and has its origins in the develop-
mental period just following the resolution of the Oedipus complex. 
It is a result of repression and reaction formation instigated by 
castration anxiety. It has the characteristics of consciousness 
and specificity. Its aim is to punish. 
The second aspect of dii'i'erenLiated shame, differentiated 
shame proper, ha s its un.conscious roots err.bedded in undif'feren-
tiated shame. It is the conscious extension of that dynamic process 
although it is not manifested until latency and becomes fully de-
vel oped during adolescence. The latency and adolescent stages of 
development add new dimensions to the primitive ego ideal begun in 
the anal period. These new dimensions are fairly specific in nature, 
e.g. the need to succeed in school, but receive their energy pri-
marily from unconscious sources, e.g. the need to be autonomous or 
the fear of abandonment. The ,content of the cons~ious feelings are 
the same as undifferentiated shame; the dynarrics of differentiated 
shame proper are the sarr~ as undifferentiated shame although the 
former operates on the conscious level while the latter operates 
on the unconscious level and supplies the energy for the former; the 
structural organization of the two are the same. However, differentiated 
shame proper is connected with ~~differentiated shame. For 
example, an individual might feel shame over a sexual trans-
gression. In the p~choana~ic frame of reference explica-
ted qy this dissertation, this shame would be a manifestation 
of guilt. In another case, where an individual might feel 
shame over rome failure to perform adequately, shame would 
be a manifestation of undifferentiated shame. For further 
clarification of this distinction see pp. 174-175 of this 
dissertation and Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, pp. 32-
37. 
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shame proper is specific in its effect while undifferentiated shame 
is generalized; undifferentiated shame ~ervades the total character 
structure of the person while differentiated shame proper may be an 
isolated res~onse. 
2. The Concept of Guilt 
i. Introduction 
Although the concept of guilt did not playa prominent part in 
the early formulations of psychoanalysis, it increasingly became more 
important as Freud speculated on the tripartite division of the person-
ality. The discovery of the silperego led to the conceptualization of 
guilt as the derivative anxiety of this mental construct. Earlier in 
psychoanalytic history there is little mention of guilt per ~, but 
there is occasional refere~e to self-reproach. When the sense of 
guilt is mentioned, it is connected with unconscious contents. l 
In 1912-1913 Freud gave a finer delineation of guilt when he 
connected it with incest and parricide.2 Here he emphasized the phe-
nomenon of antlivalence and saw guilt as anxiety directed against the 
unconscious wish to have sexual union with the opposite sexed parent, 
and the concomitant wish to kill the same sexed p~ento This concep-
tualization incorporated both the sexual and ag;ressive nature of the 
unconscious wish and the consequent formulation of guilt as a protection 
against both of these instinctual components. Freud expanded, revised, 
1. Sigmund Freud, "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909) 
Standard Edition, X, 175-176. 
2. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913), Standard Edition, XIII: 143ff. 
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and clarified this themein later works, but always pointed to the 
conflict of ambivalence as the decisive factor in guilt. However, 
he did come to give the aggressive component the larger share in 
the development of guilt. The libidinal (sexual) component of the 
instinctual drive was turned into symptoms while the aggressive com-
ponent became the core of the guilt. l This is made abundantly clear 
in Freud's analysis of Doestoevsky, "It (parricide) is in .any case 
the main source of the sense of guilt, though we do not know if it 
is the only one ,,2 
• • • • 
The concern with aggression has been extended by later pS,1cho-
analytic writers and has become the central focus of Bergler,3 Reik,4 
and Klein,5 as they speculate on the nature of guilt. However, the 
dominance of aggression in recent psychoanalytic theory does not 
totally replace the concern about other aspects of the guilt concept. 
Psychoanalytic definitions of guilt refer to the underlying inces-
tuous fantasies,6 the structure of guilt,7 and the psycho-sexual-
1. SigmUnd Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Standard 
Edition, XXI, 139. 
2. Sigmund Freud, '!)oestoevsky and Parricide" (1928), Standard Edition, 
XXI, 183. 
3. Berg1er, The Superego; The Battle of the Conscience. 
4. Theodore Reik, "tth and Guilt (New York: George Brazidler, Inc., 
1957). 
5. Klein, Contributions to P cho-ana sis: 1921-1945; also Klein 
and Joan iv~ere, Love, Hate, and ReEBrat~on London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1953). 
6. English and English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological 
and Psychoanaqtica1 Terms, p. 234. 
7. Piers and Singer, Shame and Guil~, p. 11. 
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social developmental context of guilt. l As can be readily seen, there 
are ~ facets to the concept of guilt and each has its proponents. 
Because of the continuing interest in guilt there is an abuIXiance 
of literature on the subject. The task of this section is to' bring 
some of the psychoanalytic material together into a meaningful whole 
so that the concept of guilt can be compalred and contrasted with the 
concept of shame. 
ii. The Unity of the Guilt Concept 
Psychoana ~sis .has been more concerned with the unconscious 
aspects of guilt than with the conscious aspects. Freud first referred 
to an uncons~::'ous sense of guilt 1.i1 19072 and further expanded this '. 
concept in 19233 and 1930.4 This final concept has been followed 
consistently by la tar p'sychoanalysts and has been related to the need 
for punishment and masochism. Although Freud had dealt with a conscious 
sense of guilt .in his earlier wrks, he almost always related it to 
unconscious aspects. Later psychoanalytic investigation has followed 
in this pathway. 
Freud, especially in his earlier works, spoke of shame, disgust, 
and morali'tiY as the internal psychic formations that worked to repress 
the infantile instinctual strivings. Morality seems to be guilt on a 
1. Erikson, P;rchological Issues, I, 14-82. 
2. Sigmund Freud, nObsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907), 
Standard Edition, IX, 123. 
3. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard Edition, XIX. 
4. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Standard 
Edition, XXIo 
conscious level. This concept, however, did not hold his attention 
since it seemed to be simply explained. 
An interpretation of the normal, conscious sense 
of guilt (conscience) presents no difficulties; it 
is based on the tension between the ego and the 
ego ideal and is the expression of a condemnation 
of the ego by its critical agency.l 
Consequent~, he expended his efforts toward showing the outlines 
of the unconscious sense of guilt. 
According to Freud and his followers, then, conscious guilt 
may take varying forms and be directed at varying contents but it 
is always based on unconscious guilt and can be explained by an 
analysis of its unconscious roots. In contrast to shame, there is 
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onq a differentiated guilt which operates on a continuum from uncon-
scious to conscious. In the following pages the word guilt will 
always refer to unconscious guilt whereas guilt on a conscious level 
will be designated by the term conscious guilt. 
iii. Origins of Guilt 
In the ontogenesis of man, th e sense of gllUt was born in a 
dim pre-historic epoch.2 As Freud saw it, the murder of the primal 
father by an association of brothers led to remorse and fear. Remorse 
came into being because the l~ed father was dead; fear because the 
hated father might retaliate. This reaction to the primal deed. grad-
ual~ evolved into the totem taboos and the totem meal which overcame 
1. SigmWld Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard Edition, XIX, 
50-51. 
2. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913), Standard Edition, XIII, 
140-:1,.61. 
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the feeling of remorse and propitiated the now deified father. Out 
of this historical development was laid down a historical precipitate 
that served to structure the developmental process of every individual. 
This historical precipitate functions as the pre-disposition to the 
sense of guilt which originates, in a specific individual, in the ambi-
valent feelings toward parental authorities. 
Developmentally the sense of guilt has its origns in the oral 
and anal stages, but this can not be properly called a sense of guilt. 
It is, rather, the fear of the loss of love and the fear of puniBh-
ment engendered by the activities and atmosphere created by the parents. 
Deeds and intentions of the infant in these stages are perceived as 
threats to loss of love as well as threats of retaliation. When this 
phenomenon is internalized, the sense of guilt arises. l 
Fenichel says that the precursor to the sense of guilt origi-
nates in the qyna~ic intermin~ling of the bio-physiological need for 
nouriShment and the equation of narcissistic. supplies, i.e. feelings 
of being loved, with nouriShment. 2 Feelings of hunger are equated 
with lack of affection and both of these intimate annihilation. How-
ever, the feeling of guilt as a specified internal reaction, without 
an outside source, comes about only after the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex. 
}nst p~choanalysts follow this scheme. Guilt feelings have pre-
cursors in the oral and anal aggressive stages. These feelings are in 
1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Standard 
Edition, XXI, 136-137. 
20 Fenichel, The P§1choanalytic Theory of Neurosis: pp. 134-138. 
153 
relation to an external authority and arise out of the amivalence 
of hate and love. This ambivalence is negatively evaluated as even-
tuating in annihilation and positively evaluated as increasing narcis-
sism. The conflicts of the Oedipal period structure ambivalence more 
specifica~ in relation to the parental models in terms of both ag-
gressiveness and evil death wishes toward the same seKed parent and 
libidinous and good birth ",fishes tcward the opposite sexed parent. 
The resolution of this conflict allmls for the desexualization of 
the relationships and the repression of the aggressive wishes through 
identifications with the parental models. 'rhese identifications 
internalize in the child imperatives for activity and wish behavior. 
At this point, true guilt feelings arise. 
This broad schematic outline allows the research of the London 
school, Melanie nein et !!!, which postulates guilt feelings very 
early in the developmental scheme, 1 to be placed. in perspective as 
developmental forerunners of true guilt feelings. The II sphincter 
morality" of Ferenzi2 and the oral aggressiveness of Abraham3 are 
dynamic patterns that lay down guide lines for future development 
of guilt feelings. But in themselves, they are not able to bring 
about true guilt feelings. At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that infantile manii'estaticns of s.ymptoms and actions 
1. 
2. Ferenzi, Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of 
Psycho-analysis, p. 267. 
3e Abraham, Selected Pae;rs, pe 432. 
in behavior are indicative of guilt feelings in terms of the future 
development aln differentiation of the personality. Ultimately they 
are the guide lines upon which the conscience will be built. 
159 
Basically the source of guilt lies in two places ot,her than the 
ontogenetic precipitate postulated by Freud: 1) Before the internali-
zation of the parental models, the fear of authority generated a sense 
of anxiety aver fear of withdrawal of love and fear of retaliation, 
and 2) after the internalization of the parental models and the con-
comita'nt differentiation of the superego, the fear of the superego 
generated a sense of guilt.1 The true sense of guilt originates in 
the conflict betwl3en the ego and the superego as the introjected 
parental models combine with the person's own internalized aggres-
siveness and act as a watchdog over the real or imagined. activities 
of the ego. 
iv. The Development of Guilt 
'ilie origin of guilt feelings in the anDivalence of hate and 
love exists in the oral phase of development in the alternating cycles 
of hUnger and satiety. Both of these cycles bring about undifferen-
tiated. reactions to the inadequate or adequate satisfaction of needs. 
The whole body is involved as the infant behaviorally manifests pleasure 
in tensionless sleep or unpleasure in gesticulating and screaming. As 
the oral stage of development progresses, the physiological satisfaction 
or unsatisfaction is connected with ps,ychological concomitants. Primi-
tive feelings of hate and love are directed in a pri.nitive way toward 
1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents .(1930), Standard 
Edition, XII, 121-133. 
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the external mother,l but at the same time, because of the undiffer-
entiated state of development, these primitive feelings are directed 
at the self so that phantasies of omnipotence and annihjlation are 
aroused. Although there is no superego and no true guilt feelings 
at this stage, th e psychological core of guilt is establiS:le:l. The 
L'1fant feels ih e possibility of annihilation as his aggressiveness 
grows and he slOlo1~ learns, in a limited way, to acconndate his needs 
to the responses of the mothering persons .. 
Erikson calls this the stage of getting and taking. The infant 
learns to respond to his needs in a way that will gain a response from 
the environment. If either his own needs or the response of the envi-
ronment are perceived as frustrating, the infant gains a sense of mis-
trust both of himself and of the world. He will exhaust himself in 
futile attempts at satisfying his needs and will eventually learn the 
lesson either of repression of needs for fear of annihilating himself 
or will find his thumb and damn the world in a despera te effort to 
preserve himself at the cost of withdrawing from others. In either 
event, the foundations of guilt are established as an undifferentia,ted 
ap..x:iety a bout the continuance of ex:istence. 
The anal stage of development brings with it the differentiation 
of the "In from the parental persons so that the ambivalence of hate 
and love are more focalized. At the same time, the child has lost his 
feeling of omnipotence and has cast this role upon his parents. The 
need for love and the fear of retaliation becomes greater as the child 
1. Klein and Riviere, Love, Hate, and Reparation, p. 61. 
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perceives that he is almost totally dependent upon the parental persons 
for slls-cenance. The child tries to keep his selfhood by participating 
in the parental omnipotence. His need for his participation is as 
great as his previous need for mill. It gives him the feeling of being 
loved. 
It is on this background of ambivalence, the need for love, and 
the need of the child to differentiate himself from the parents, that 
the restrictions and prohibitions of the parents are enforced. Sphincter 
morality comes into being as the c.ltild attempts to live up to the demands 
of the parents in order that he might feel loved. 
Now the succession of hunger and satiet,y is replaced 
by the succession of states in which the child feels 
alone and therefore experiences a kind of self depre-
ciation--we call it annihilation--and states in whic~ 
he feels loved and his self esteem is reestablished. 
The focus of this stage is on the necessity of abiding by restrictions 
and prohibitions lest the child feel annihilation. The anxiety reaction 
becomes specific. It is anxiety over the non-conformity to parental 
regulations. 
In Erikson's scheme J the child is learning the social modalities 
of holding on and letting go. If the parental control is too rigid 
(or seems to be too strict due to projected aggression), or if control 
comes before the child can cope with it, the infant is faced with defeat 
bot-lot from within and from without. His instinctual strivings will drive 
him to break the fixed boundaries and/or the restrictions from outside 
will become more and more fixed and aggressive. 
1. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p. 388. 
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Where the oral stage laid down the foundations of the later 
guilt feelings, this stage gives the direction. Guilt is connected 
with the need for narcissistic supplies, i.e. being loved, which are 
gained only by conformity to the rules coming from outside. Trans-
grassion of these rQles leads ta withdrawal of love, a depreciation 
in self esteem~ am a feeling of annihilation. However, the instincts 
themselves are not in question. It is on~ the wrong expression of 
these instincts that is being dealt with. 
The phallic stage ushers in the period of infant genitality" 
In this phase, the infant begins to differentiate the sex roles and 
his place in the econo~ of sex. His activities are aggressive as he 
• begins to intrude and penetrate into the world around him. Increased 
locomotor mastery and increased pride in his growth and development 
allow phantasies of competition ~th the father and phantasies of con-
quering and possessing the zoother. At the same time, the ego has grown 
strong enough to judge situations that are dangerous, to anticipate the 
future, and to control the expression of instincts. 
These potentialities, abilities, and activities are sexualized 
so that the mole phallic stage is dominated by the relationship of 
the child to the two parental figures o The child wishes to replace 
(and thus be like) the same sexed parent so that he imitates this 
parent in aggressive activity and phantas,y. Concurrently, his rela-
tionslup with the opposite sexed parent takes on the characteristics 
of intimacy and sensuousness. The' child's feelings and phantasies 
about the parents and his relationships to them have the qualit,y of 
destructiveness and aggressiveness. 
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This whole stage of development is characterized. by an intru-
sive mode. It lays the groundwork for the develop~nt of initiative 
in the child. 
At once however, this general readiness for ini-
tiative meets its arch-ene~ in the necessity of 
delaying and displacing its sexual core: for this 
sexual core is both biological~ inc~mplete and 
culturally opposed by incest taboos. 
The biological capacities of the child are not nature enough to par-
ticipate in actual sexual activities and, in addition, the parental 
figures communicate the wrongness of Lexual feelings and phantasies. 
In order to cope with these restrictions, the child is forced to de-
sexualize his relationships wi. th his parents and, in the process, not 
only cease to act out the feelings, but also repress the feelings from 
awareness. In order to retain the feeling of being loved, the child 
must give up his sensuous and aggressive impulses toward his parents. 
This stage adds another dimension to the shape of future guilt 
feelings. From the oral stage came the core of guilt, namely, anni-
hilation; from the anal stage came the necessit,r of conforming to the 
prohibitions and restrictions of the ?arental figures; from the phallic 
stage comes the command to repress the actualinstinc·~ual strivings 
themselves, and to conform one' B self to the image circwnscribed by 
parental norms. 
The resolution of the Oedipal complex is the beginning of true 
guilt feelings. The direction of the Slperego has been formulated in 
the phallic stage and, at this point, comes to fruition. The child's 
instinctual components are now split between the "set which perpetuates 
1. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 86. 
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the exuberance of growth potentials, and a parental set which supports 
and increases self-obervation, self-guidance, and self-punishment."l 
This parental set is the incorporation of the parental restrictions 
and prohibitions as a structured part of personality forn~tion. Now 
there is an inner regulation of the child which takes over the previous 
function of the external parents. Guilt is th.e punishment neted out 
by this superego when the boundaries are transgressed. 
Further elaboration and revision of the superego takes place 
as the child matures and makes new identifications with other s~­
nificant persons. Conscious guilt is felt as a result of the new 
restrictions brought on by these identifications. At the same time, 
some of the infantile restrictions are extinquished. Yet, the core 
of the superego remains of an infantile nature and continues to punish 
the ego on the basis of infantile restrictionsr All conscious guilt 
feeling, in some way, can trace its effect back to the infantile super-
ego and the concomitant infant guilt. 
v. The Structure of Guilt 
Within the psychoanalytic context, guilt comes about when the 
personality has been differentiated into the structural components of 
id, ego, and superego. This differentiation is defined at the close 
of the phallic stage of development when the child introjects the par-
ental models and is consequent~ guided by this introjected model. 
These internaliz ed standards result in self-judgment rather than judg-
ment by others. The previous judgment by others had been enforced by 
1. Ibid., p. 225. 
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threats ani punishments while self-judgment is enforced by guilt. 
Thus, the guilt feelings are internal and personal. The introjected 
roles of the parents toward the child bring mental suffering am 
guilt when the forbidden and limited impulses act as if they were 
not forbidden and limited. 
A structural description of guilt must focus on the fact that 
guilt is a result of a tension between the ego and the superego. l 
The ego perceives that it is being watched over by the superego and 
that the superego is assessing the discrepancy between its own demands 
and the strivings of the ego. The superego has set up boundaries or 
standards lihich the ego must not resist or transgress. lrJhen the ego 
allows itself to touch these bo~daries or disregard the standards, 
the superego punishes it with withdrawal of love or guilt feelings. 
The unconscious, irrational threat implied in the withdrawal of love 
is mutilation. 
In the phallic stage, the infant: according to psychoanalytic 
theory, felt that his desire for the opposite sexed pa rent and his 
aggression toward the same sexed parent would result in castration. 
This phantasied threat is at the core of guilt feelings. However, 
beyond this, and at a more primitive level, is the feeling that anni-
hilation of self will be the result of transgression of laws. The 
superego operates on the basis of the primitive principle of Talion, 
namely the lIeye for an eye" principle. Consequ6ntl,y, guilt implies 
1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Standard 
Edi tion, XXI, 136; Piers aDd Singer, Shame and Guilt, p. 11; 
Alexander, Inter. Jrnl. Psychoana1., III, 41. 
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that this principle is operative and effective within the personality. 
The ego is punished with guilt in proportion to the degree of its 
transgression. 
Alexander, in his article on inferiority and guilt, summarizes 
this structural representation of guilt as 
The intra-psychic reduplication of the fear of an 
external danger, the fear of retaliation on the 
part of those persons whom one has attacked, is 
attacking, or wants to attack. l 
The superego, the agent of guilt, is infantile in nature. It contains: 
1) the omnipotent aggression of the oral period which the child origi-
nally possessed, then projected upon the parents, and now has returned 
as the weapon of the superego to be directed against the ego, 2) the 
literal restrictions of the anal period which were originally directed 
against the child by the parents and pertained to circumstances unique 
to that early period of development, and 3) the over strict prohibitions 
of the phallic period regarding the relationship of the child to the 
mother and father. Compliance with the superego's demands, both as to 
activity and to instinctual awareness, is necessary to the child's 
feeling of well being, even though the demands may not be relevant to 
the reality situation. The threat of the loss of the narcissistic 
supplies, i.e. the feeling of well being or satisfaction that one is 
living up to expectations, and the threat of mutilation and annihilation 
is encountered when there is a transgression of the superego command 
regardless of the objective validity of the command. This threat is 
the feeling of guilt operating on an unconscious level. 
1. Alexander, 'Inter. Jrnl. Psychoanal., XIX, 42. 
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Conscious guilt arises out of the tension between the conscious 
superego in relation t.o the conscious ego. However, conscious guilt 
is fundamentally based upon the tension between the unconscious ego 
and the unconscious superego~ Freud felt that the self reproaches of 
obsessional neurosis or the conscious guilt of criminals was often 
just a screen to hide the m:>re fundamental unconscious guilt arising 
out of the jnstinctual urges to incest and parricide. l Conscious 
guilt might have its own content, but it relies on the underlying 
lll1consciou .... reservoir of Oedipal guilt for its power. 
vi. The Dynamics of Guilt 
The evolving process of cathexes, i.e. a movement of energy 
toward the object that ~ll gratify a drive, in response to instinctual 
urges and anti-cathexes, i.e. a movement of psychical energy against 
a drive, in response to the demams of external reality is the funda-
mental components out of which guilt is formed. As the ego gains an 
increasing amount of energy, it is able to use Borne of this energy 
for diverting, hold~,g, or repressing the instinctual urges. At the 
same time, it becomes more capable of using secondary processes, eg •. 
things such as thinking, realistic perception, for coping with external 
reality. The parental perrons become increasingly important as the 
sour~es of gratification of the drives, but concomitantly, they become 
increasingly demanding in the restrictions they lay upon the ego as 
conditions for the gratifications of needs. The cathecting of the 
1. Sigmund Freud, "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909), 
StamaN Edition, X, 115-116; "Some Character-Types met with in 
PsyCho-analytic Work" (1916), Standard Edition, XIV, 332-333. 
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parental persons by the ego results in an increased demand that the 
ego erect anti-cathexes against certain instinctual urges, especially 
the aggressive components. The ego then takes on the task of chan-
neling this aggression into acceptable modes of expression rahile not 
allowing the id to express its destruction against the original objects, 
i.e. the parental persons. The highly narcissistic orientation of the 
-infant is given up in return for narcissistic supplies or love from 
the parental persons. This necessarily involves a repudiation of the 
behavioral manifestation of aggression toward the source of love. 
This process comes to a peak when the libidinous components 
of the cathexes of the parental persons ~ increased in intensity 
due to the maturational development of the genitals and the surge 
of focused sexual energy. At this point, the incestuous tendencies 
are met with rigid and uncompromising restrictions that lilnit the 
nature of the infant's relationships with the parents. This conflict 
brings on the castration complex. The erotogenic significance of the 
genitals and the symbolic significance of the genitals for sex role 
identification, lead the infant to cathect them as objects of high 
narcissistic value. The Oedipal situation pinpoints the genitals as 
both an instrument of libidinous satisfaction and an object of destruc-
tive aggression. In order to avoid the possible mutilation or destruc-
tion of the genitals by the same sexed parent, the ego interna llzes 
the parental persons.. In this way, the ego minimizes the danger of 
castration from the external source by taking over the role of pun-
ishing itself. The introject" however, is more harsh than the external 
representative since it acts as if the impulses were the same as the 
behavioral manifestations of the impulses. Moreover, the real or 
projected aggression possessed by the parent is now possessed by 
the superego. It is this combination that accounts for the over~ 
harsh, restrictive, prohibitive, and punitive nature of the"super-
ego. 
Guilt, feelings as the response of the ego -when a boundary of 
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the superego is trans~ressed are a form of topical~ defined anxiety 
that arises because of the highly differentiated nature of the superego. 
The psychological content of this anxiety is, "I deserve punishment 
for what I did or want to do o " It arises in anticipation of punish-
ment and results in feelings of annihilation and depression. The 
superego, which now has the energy at its disposal which was previ-
ously directed tOi·;ard the parental persons, uses this psychic energy 
to guide the ego. \¥hen the ego responds to its demands, the superego 
gives the ego a sense of well being and self satisfaction. When the 
ego violates its commands, the superego unleashes its aggression 
toward the ego which results :in depression am Wlconscious guilt. 
Conscious guilt is the dynamic elaboration of llI!conscious guilt. 
The conscious aspect of the superego partakes of the psychic energy 
of the unconscious superego and uses this energy in the same way as 
the unconscious superego. The prohibitions and commands of the con-
scious superego are the internalizations of the restrictive aspects 
of later post-oedipal identifications. However, these later restric-
tions are operative because of the original base in the unconscious 
conflicts of the Oedipal situation. Often, conscious guilt is only a 
screen that hides the deeper conflicts and the deeper guilt. The flow 
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of psychic energy in the econo~ of the personality is dependent 
upon the basic resolutions and final differentiations Ghat have taken 
place in the earlier infantile stages. This is not to say that con-
scious guilt is merely a manifestation of unconscious :~uilt, but 
rather, that the new energy used in the manifestation of conscious 
guilt is dependent upon the basic reservoir of unconscious energy 
that is responsible for unconscious guilt. 
vii. Swnmary 
Guilt is a result of the resolution of the Oedipal conflict 
at the close of the phallic stClge of development but it has fore-
runners in each of the preceding stages which lay down the guide-
lines for the final delineation of guilt formation. It is a deri-
vati-ve of the intra-psychic tension between the ego and the super-
ego and focuses around the transgressions of th e colTillands of the su-
perego. The main characteristic of guilt is its specificity. On 
both the conscious and unconscious level guilt is a form of anxiety 
direct~ at some particular disapproved feeling and/or behavior. 
Guilt is manifested psychologically in feelings of armihilation, 
mutilation, depression, and fear of punishment. 
uuilt opc.:rates on both the conscious and unconscious J'3Vels 
of personality. There is a dynamic inter-connection between these 
two levels of guilt but unconscious guilt is the source from which 
conscio~s guilt springs. The content of conscious guilt may be radi-
cal~ different from the content of unconscious guilt, however, on 
the basis of later identification processes. 
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3. The Comparison of Shame and. Guilt 
i. An Overview 
The psychoanalytic theory portrayst.he development of person-
ality as a continuum mich begins with the prL'1litive stage of birth 
and ends wi. th the utopia of g,nitality. Within this continuum are 
certain levels of development that are pinpointed by specific crises. 
Each level is dependent upon preceding levels for the extent, breadth, 
and depth of growth possib le. The resolution of a particular crisis 
at any particular level is based. upon the resolcltions of the previous 
crises and casts the outline for the crisis of the next developmental 
level. It is in this context that shame and guilt can be placed in 
perspective. 
~ame is a more primitive reaction than guilt. Its focus in 
the anal stage and its undifferentiated nature places it before guilt 
in the total econonu of the personality. The specific .crisis at this 
level of development is the concern for a utononv. This means that 
the primary task is the differentia tion of the whole self from the 
previous unit.y of self-envirolli~nt. The mode of differentiation, 
namely comparison, is related to the total organism so that any part 
comparisons would merely be te:nporary figures arising out of the 
Gestalt. Shame is the negative result of this comparison. But it 
must be emphasized that shame is a total shame that includes the whole 
organism and consequently is an all pervasive dynamic wi thin the total 
psychic scheme. 
Guilt cores about only after the resoltltion of the autonoll\Y 
crisis. The differentiation of the person from his environment sets 
the sta,~e upon which more specific differentiations can be made. 
Consequently, guilt has its focus in the phallic sta'~e am has a 
differentiated nature. The specific crisis at this level of devel-
opIll:lnt is concerned with discovering the proper role within the 
environmental context. The primary task is a set of complex dif-
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ferentiations with a bio-social context. The mode of this task, 
namely initiatory activity (on either a behavioral or phantas.r level), 
is related to specific prohibitions and restrictions demanded by 
external reality. Guilt is the negative result of this I1Dde. In 
spite of a pervasive quality that might seem to be attached to guilt, 
it is rela ted to specific differentiat ions within the intra-psychic 
and interpersonal context. 
ii. The Developmental Continuity of Shame and Guilt 
Shame and guilt are successive negative aspects of the anal 
and phallic levels of personality growth. Shame arises in response 
to the inherent need to differentiate the organism from the previous 
undifferentiated and amalgamated mole of organism-environment. This 
need focuses specifical~ on dividing one part of the whole from an-
other part. Thus, in the anal period, there is a primitive integra-
\ 
tion of the organism in distinction to the envirorunent. ShallB is 
the result of a premature or inadequate differentiation of the organ-
ism from the environment. 
~uilt, on the other hand, is dependent upon the primitive inte-
gration that takes place in the anal phase. It arises in response to 
differentiations wi thin the primit ive integration. This integration 
of the anal period diffuses in the phallic phase due to expanding ego 
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strength, physiological surges, and incredibly increased demands from 
the environment. As the organism attempts to delineate its place within 
this new context of broadened powers, imperative urges, and restrictive 
forces, guilt is the result of premature integration around environ-
mentally disapproved differentiations. 
In short, shame arises when the organism focuses on distinquishing 
the self from the environment whereas guilt arises when the organism 
focuses on integrating the self around environmentally disapproved part 
aspects of the self. Thus guilt can come aboQt only after the self has 
been differentiated from the environment. 
In addition to the dependence of each stage upon the previous 
developmental stage in· terms of the whole growth process, there is also 
the fact that "each item exists in some form before lits' decisive and 
critical time norllBlly arrives."l The outlines of shame are developed 
in the oral period when the infant, under the domination of his impulses, 
feels abandoned to their ragings. The precursers of guilt begin with 
seeming annihilation of the infant in the oral period due to unful-
fillment of instinctual urges, is further developed by the,punishment: 
meted out by the parental persons for failure satisfactorily to carry 
out commands during the anal period, and is completed by the threat of 
mutilation inheren't in the incestuous relationship of the phallic phase. 
In swnmary~ there is both an independent and a depeIrlent develop-
mental continuity of shame ani guilt. Both aspects are :interrelated 
but can be identified for analytic purposes. On the one hand, the 
1. Erikson, P~chological Issues, I, 53. 
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development of shame and the development of guilt are separate processes. 
On the other hand, the development of guilt is dependent upon a previous 
stage of ~rowth in which shame arose as a dynamic factor. 
iii. The Interaction of Shame and Guilt 
Alexander states that shame and guilt are fundamentally different 
psychological phenomena in that they are "dynamic antagonists, compar-
able in physiology with the S,YrnPathetic and parasympathetic ~stems or 
with extensor muscles and contractors. III Even his analogy, however, 
suggests tha t the two phenomena are cormected in some way and are not 
completely separate. This connection is evident in the therapeutic 
situatiotl.2 
The moral masochist is beset by an overpowering load of unconscious 
guilt which demands that punishment be laid upon him. In order to get 
this punishment he may enter into situations that· will bring him shameful' 
humiliation. In this case, shame is a screen for guilt. ~other exam-
pIe of this would be pathological male e;hibitionism in which shameful 
,; 
behavior is a screen for gigantic guilt over aggressive wishes. 
Guilt can alro be a co'rer for deeper shame feelings. Hasturbation 
guilt often hides a deeper shame anxiety over sexual inadequacy and pas-
sive homosexuali~. By exhibiting his guilt, the person does not have 
to confront the mor.e basic fact of his lack of sexual identity. ~al-
ysis of frigidity in women may bring forth incestuous impulses and phan-
tasies and an overwhelming amount of material designed to prove the 
1. Alexander, Inter. Jrnl. Psychoanal., XIX, 41. 
2. Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, pp. 32-37. 
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"badness" of the person. However, beneath this is the more basic 
inadequacy, the lack of feminine identification. Confession of guilt 
over being a "bad" girl allows the woman to evade recognition of the 
fact that she can not accept herself as a woman. 
Shame and guilt can interact with each other, blend into one 
another, or be separate. The possibilities are so manifold that it 
is difficult to distinquish the two, yet, they are different pheno-
mena and recpire different approaches. 
iv. Comparative Summary of Shame and Guilt 
Comparative Factor 
1. Onset 
2. Development 
. 3. Topography 
4. Structure 
5. fundamental psychic 
configuration 
6. Psychological threat 
7. Ps,ychological need 
8. Psychological goal 
9. Psychological 
content 
10. Fundamental dYnamic 
component 
Shame 
The close of the anal 
period 
Pre-social phenomenon 
Primarily unconscious 
but with conscious 
manifestations 
Tension bet,leen ego 
and ego ideal 
Gestalt with body 
image as the focus 
Aba ndoneme nt-humili-
ation 
Assertion 
AutonoIqf 
Failure 
Contemptibleness 
Being abandoned 
Narcissism 
Guilt 
The close of the phallic 
period 
Result of social adjust-
lI'.ent 
Primarily unconscious 
but with conscious 
manifestations 
Tension between ego 
and superego 
Discrete with relation-
ship as the focus 
Annihilation-punishment 
Reparation 
Righteousness 
Badness of deed 
Being hated 
Deserving of punishment 
Hostility 
11. Behavioral Results Ambition 
Striving 
Seeking confirmation 
of self wrth 
Inhibition 
Depression 
Withdrawal 
Seeking punishment 
This comparative summary necessarily leaves aside some of the 
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subtleties of both conceptions but it does point to a fundamental and 
decisive difference. The ps,ychological conception of shame focuses 
upon -che individual and his autonomy. It points t.oward such existen-
tial questions as : Who am I1 How much self-striving is good? How 
much self-esteem or self-worth do I have? How do I become an indivi-
dual? Guilt, on the other hand, focuses upon the ll1dividual in his 
relationships with other per-sons. It points to such existential 
questions a s: How do I get along with other persons? wbat are the 
rules for social and interpersonal relations? How worthy am I to 
belong to a group? Natura~ neither conception focuses exclusive~ 
on one thing, but the primary direction stanis out. 
The next chapter uses the data derived fram the psychoana~tic 
theory of personality to illuminate the theological definition of sin. 
'!be meaning of the fonns of sin are reconsidered by correlating them 
with the :insights derived from this analysis of shame and guilt. 
CHAPTER VI 
THEORETICAL CORRELATION 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is an attempt to bring together, on a theoretical 
level, the statement s about man from the disciplines of theology and 
psychology. Each of the theological statements has as its referent 
the theology of sin loihile each of the psychological statements has its 
referent in the psychoanalytic psychology of man. At the same time, 
however, each theological statement bas a relationsh~p with each ps.y-
chological statement and vice versa since both statements interpret 
one common factor observed about man. ~ setting the statements side 
by side, the correlativeness of the statements becomes clearer and the 
importance of each in illuminating the other is more clear~ seen. 
2. P 
i. The Universality of Sin: The Universality 
of the Developmental Pattern 
The psychoana~ic rodel of personality begins with the explicit 
assumption that the fundaroontal model of developnent is the same for 
all men. Although each individual person may vary from other persons 
because of different pqysiological and cultural factors, the fundamental 
personality structure, the operations and the dynamics of personality, 
and the course of developmenT. must follow a similar general pattern and 
outline. This is a universal phenomenon which is explicated most 
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c~refully in Erikson's formulation of the epigenetic principle. Each 
man's developmental pa ttern is a specific example of the developmental 
pattern of all men. 
ii. The Inevitability of Sin: The Inevitability 
of Negative Solutions to Developmental Crises 
The psychoanalytic model of personality states that each indi-
vidual must pass through specific crises in each phase of development 
and that the solutions of these crises determine the future growth of 
the individual. Implied in this is the assertion that no person can 
solve these crises in a complete~ positive and wholesome way. The 
residue of negative meanings remaining from the inadequate solutions 
is carried on to the next steps of development. 
The whole psychoana~ic model of personality asswnes that each 
person carries with him a complex of repressions, defenses l and other-
wise unresolved problems which act negatively in regard to the complete 
fulfillment of his potentials. Like Niebuhr's statement about sinl it 
could be said that these are not necessary, but the,y are inevitable. 
iii. Man is Dependent upon God for niife": 
The Importance of Dependent Relationships 
with Significant Persons 
The whole ps.ychoanalytic 5.1stem emphasizes that selfhood is 
given to a person as he dependently interacts with significant persons 
within his life space. Its heavy reliance upon the first years of a 
child's development puts the emphasis upon those years when a child is 
dependent upon another person. Even later developments in psychoana-
lytic thought, which place the later years of a person's life in clearer 
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perspective, have either emphasized along with other variables, the 
dependent relationships of the individual in regard to educators, 
authorities, institu~ional struc~ures, and older persons, or have 
continued to pay homage to the overwhelming influence of the early 
years of life. Thus, wi thin the psychoanalytic system, the depen-
dent relationships of the person are an important, if not the most 
important, conveyors of selfhood in its structure and development. 
Disruption of these dependent relationships in any w~ is detri-
mental to the growth of the individual. Lack of response to the depen-
dent needs of the neonate, premature bids for autonomy by the infant, 
imposed standards of independence by the parents, harsh restrictions 
as a basis for fulfilling dependent needs, etc., are all perversions 
of the necessar,y and basic dependent relationship of the child upon 
significant persons. These perversions eventuate in restrictive, 
hindering, and crippling personality defects. But basica~, they 
destroy the "life" giving potential of the healthy dependency of the 
child upon significant persons. 
iv. The Conditions of Existence are the Preconditions 
of Sin: The Dialectics of Growth 
The ps.ychoana~ic approach to development is based upon the 
philosophy of growth spelled out most comprehensive~ by Erikson. l 
He attempts to show that an individual's growth is determined both 
by factors outside the individual, namely the caretaking persons and 
their corresponding institutions; and factors within the individual, 
1. Erikson, P~chologica1 Issues, I, 18-49, 110-121, 139-156. 
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namely the specific crises met in each phase of developIl2nt. It is 
these basic conditions, or in other words, these basic "givens" of 
life, that are soil from which the selfhood of the individual is 
formed. These are the preconditions for the development of personality. 
The religious statement concerning the conditions of existence seem 
to correlate with these psychoanalytic statements concerning the envi-
ronmental and ground plan assumptions. 
v. Man Transgresses Certain Absolute Standards: 
The Tension between the Ego and Superego 
The religious judgment about man concerning his transgression of 
absolute standards correlates with the development !)f the structure of 
the superego and the resultant tension between this structure and the 
ego. The superego is the embodiment of all the rules and regulations 
that guide a person's behavior. These rules and regulations, be they 
conscious or unconscious, outline the person's proper life space. For 
the individual, these standards are absolute and must not be transgressed. 
The penalty of transgression is ps,ychic pain. 
According to the psychoana~ic theory, all men transgress the 
boundaries of the superego. This may be done either in fact or phantasy, 
but in any e~ent the boundaries are crossed. The rigid and uncompro-
mising nature of the infantile roots of this structure make transgres-
sion inevitable. 
vi. Man is not ~at He ought to Be: The Tension 
between the Ego and the Ego Ideal 
The psychological correla te for the religious statement concerning 
the discrepancy between ~hat man is and. what man ought to be is found in 
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the psychoanalytic conception of the tension between the ego and the 
ego ideal. The ego ideal encompasses all of the goals and values 
toward which the individual strives. It embodies the person's per-
ceptions of the kind of person he ought to be. It measures the person 
in terms of his fulfillment or unfulfillment of these goals and values. 
By way of the ego ideal the individual realizes ilie discrepancy between 
what he is in any given situation and what he ought to be in regard to 
that situation. Within the person's p5,1chological field, the ego ideal 
has all the characteristics of the ideal person toward which he strives, 
but it also shows him his failures in relation to that ideal. 
3. Psychological Correlates of the 
Fundamental Forms of. slil 
i. Sin as Unbelief 
Analysis of Unbelief 
Unbelief is untrust or unfaith. It is an attitude of apprehen-
sion as to the trustfullness of the person on whom one is depezrlent. 
The person wonders if the individual upon whom he is dependent will 
really care for him, will real~ succor and feed him, will really 
respond to him. 
Unbelief in Terms of Shame 
The beginnings of shame in the earliest oral period of develop-
ment are dependent upon just such doubts. The infant is confronted 
with the insistent instinctual demands and the insistent need for ful-
fillment of these demands. Since there is no way that the individual 
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can satis£y himself, he cries out to the environment for this care. If 
the environment does not respond, he begins to mistrust the milieu in 
which he exists. He develops an attitude of distrust and a negative 
conception of his life space. Since the environment does not care for 
him and does not meet his needs, he disbelieves that the world outside 
of himself can give him anything and consequently develops a premature 
reliance upon himself. 
The core element in this primitive psychological phenomenon is 
abandonment. The person feels cut off, adriit$ having no anchor. 
Because he does not experience the benefits of a dependent relation-
ship, yet feels the need for these benefits, he concurrently feels 
abandoned and mistrustful of anyone or anything that would satiate 
his needs. He is not able to believe yet he feels the need to believe. 
Unbelief in Terms of Guilt 
The ps,rchoanalytic phenomenon of guilt has i~s rudimentar,y pre-
cursers in the earliest oral stages of development. The lack of 
response from the environment allows the insistent urges of the child 
to rise to painful and overwhelming heights. Psychologically the 
child feels that he is standing on the verge of annihilation. 
This is one aspect of the dynamics of unbelief. The mistrust 
of the environment. is intertwined with the feeli.ngs of annihilation. 
The person feels that he must search out an ordered and regulated 
environment in "Which he will not be annihilated. He turns from a 
responsive mutual relationship with the enviroIllllent am structures 
a relationship based on rules and regulations, either phantasized or· 
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real. He distrusts the environment so he reconstructs it and perverts 
it into a legal relationship. He builds up the form of relationship 
but does not include the undergirding substance. 
ii. Sin as Rebellion 
Analysis of Rebellion 
Rebellion is active opposition to one who is in control or one 
who has significant meaning for the individual. It is an activity 
that has separation from another as its aim. It is an attempt to cut 
one's self off from mutual intercourse in favor of isolating autono~. 
At the same time, rebellion seeks to force another person to recognize 
the independent status of the one who rebels. 
Rebellion in Terms of Shame 
The psychoana~ic configuration of ps.ychic processes conceptua-
lized in the development of shame correlates with this analysis of 
rebellion. As the infant moves out of the oral stage of development, 
he is confronted with the fact of separation between the parental 
persons and himself. The need arises in him to differentiate himself 
from the previous undifferentiated state of organism-environment. He 
begins to assert hin5elf as an individual person over against the par-
ental persons and the environment. He seeks out autonolV through hol-
istic striving and ambition. Desperately he seeks out confirrr~tion of 
his own individual status and self-worth. He fears feelings of con-
temptibleness, failure, and abandonment. 
There is both a necessary and realistic search for autononw and 
a perverted and unrealistic striv"ing. Shame is the la tter. In order 
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to submerge the feelings he fears, the individual not only asserts his 
autono~ but attempts to cut himself off from relationships 'With sig-
nificant per 00 ns. His disregard of others and his attempts at separ-
ation take on the characteristics of a desperate attempt to confirm 
his own self-worth, to cover up his own self-humiliation am need for 
dependency, and to hide his feelings of failure and abandonment. His 
striv:ings force other persons to recognize his autonomy even though 
this recognition is gained at the expense of a responsive and satis-
fYing set of relationships. This rebellion in search of autonomy 
re~lts in alienation from others. 
Rebellion in Terms of Guilt 
Elements of the ps,ychoanalytic conception of guilt also correlate 
with the analysis of rebellion, though the shame configuration is more 
applicable. In the child I s search for autonomy and selfhood, he inevi-
tably incurs the wrath of the parents as he disobeys their directions. 
'ibis is especially true in regard to toilet training. In the parents 
attempt to socialize the child, they impose certain demands and restric-
tions that are alien to the child's previous behavior patterns. These 
demands and restrictions attempt to force the child into a structured 
response pattern that is socially acceptable to the parents. These 
attempts may occur before the child is able to fulfill the demands or 
they may come at a time when the child must disobey in order to esta-
blish his own sense of selfhood. In either case, the infant is forced 
into a situation in lffiich a residue of hostility and guilt is built up . 
within him. 
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Rebellion in terms of guilt focuses upon the coping patterns 
of the person in respect to this residue of guilt and hostility. The 
individual, in order to cope with this residue, develops his own rules 
and regulations over against authorities, or he conforms to their demands 
and restrictions in a manner that emphasizes the literal rendering of 
the rules. He focuses his autono~ either around a sense of righteousness 
that emanates from the punisbment received for disobedience to the norrr~, 
or around a.sense of.righteousness that comes from literal obedience to 
the norms. In the former case there is actual rebellion against standards 
that are normative in interpersonal or communal relations in order to gain 
internal,righteousness. In the latter case, there is covert rebellion by 
perversion of the intent of the norms in order to gain a sense of "legal" 
righteousness. 
iii. Sin as Pride 
Analysis of Pride 
Pride is the assertion of the self as an absolute autonomous 
being dependent upon nothing and no one. Pride demands the SUbjection 
of everything and everyone outside the self to the self. In pride the 
self structures its o~ existence. It reconstructs the past to give 
the advantage to the self. It constructs the future in terms of the 
same advantages. Pride elevates the self as the acme of existence. It 
formulates its own laws, determines its own criteria for the life of 
the self, and subjugates all other things to the self. In short, pride 
admits of nothing that could possibly be of assistance to the self and 
it admits of nothing that could possibly be better than the selfG 
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Pride in Terms of Shame 
The fundamental dynamic component of shame is narcissism wherein 
the ego attempts to win the love and appreciation of the ego ideal. The 
intent of this attempt is the exaltation of the ego and the avoidance 
of self-humiliation. In order to do this, the ego drives the self into 
behavioral activity of ambition and striving. It seeks to push the self 
into positions where the seli stands above other persons or where the 
self manipulates things in the environment into self-rewarding configur-
ations. The ego neoos to prove to the ego ideal the self-worth of the 
person. In its striving for this proof, it drives the person to assert 
himself as the center of the interpersonal and group worlds. 'llie 
threatened abandonment of the ego by the ego ideal, which is the core 
element of the conception of shame, fills the self with fear of humili-
ation, failure, and contempt. This drives the ego to ever increasing 
attempts at assertion of the self. 
This activity is seen quite clearly in the young child. He asserts 
himself in response to his parents in the various ways that enhance his 
own feelings of self-worth and self-esteem. These assertions may be the 
natural and necessar,y outgrowth of the child's need for a sense of self-
worth within the context of the necessar,y dependent relationships or the.y 
may be perverted attempts to gain self-worth. in the latter case, the 
child defies the parents and places himself outside of the dependent 
relationships. The child seeks to become his own center and drarl all 
things into himself in the service of the self. 
Shame is one of the elements at the core of pride. In order to 
deny the shame, the person asserts himself as above everything else. 
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Pride in Terms of Guilt 
Once again the concept of shame is more applicable as a correlate. 
However, there are certain elements of guilt that also apply. The 
conflict with the parents in the socialization process instills in the 
child a rudimentary superego whose content consists of rules and regu-
lations that govern the behavior and. feelings of the child. The ego 
needs to stay within the boundaries prescribed by the superego in order 
to escape punishment and retaliation. This drives the ego toward with-
drawal into the confines of the superego's demands. 
A person in this condition abso1utizes rules and regulations. 
They become the norm for his behavior and the reward for this correct 
behavior is a sense of righteousness. By the same token, transgressions 
of these norms bring hatred for the self, the need for punishment, and 
the need for reparation. But at the same time, these very things are 
the retributions Which restore the person to his place of exaltation. 
No other criterion, no other set of rules and regulations, and no other 
approach to life can be substituted. The self identifies itself with 
these laws and judges the quality of its existence in terms of the ful-
fillment of them or the retribution for transgressing them. An inverse 
humility is the result. The person is humble in deed and action in 
order to exalt the self. 
iv. Sin as Concupiscence 
Analysis of Concupiscence 
Concupiscence is the exaltation of one aspect of man's life. It 
organizes life around this part aspect and subordinates all other aspects 
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to this one. Most specifically, it focuses on the material aspects of 
life as they are related to the desires and impulses of the person. The 
characteristic example, and the usual focus of concupiscence, is the 
sexual impulse. However, other oart aspects have also been designated, 
e.g. the desire for material possessions, the insatiable nature of 
hunger, etc. 
Concupiscence in Terms of Shame 
The psychoanalytic conception of guilt is the fundamental cor-
relate of concupiscence, but shame also has correlative elements. lhe 
Shame configuration comes into being at the close of the anal period of 
developIOOnt arrl is cormected with the individual's search for autononw. 
'!'he child rray prematurely isolate one aspect of his personality structure 
as the central core of his autononw. ~nsequent1y, the underlying shame 
configuration will drive him to a continual pursuit of this one aspect. 
The person's sense of selfhood stands or falls with the fulfillment of 
this aspect so that all of his ambition and striving is channelled into 
the attempt to fulfill this part aspect. 
Concupiscence in Terms of Guilt 
Guilt is the more important correlative of concupiscence. Guilt 
arises in the context of the recognition of the manifold aspects of the 
personality. These aspects are differentiated out of the previous inte-
grated whole of the anal period of development. The imperative urges of 
these part aspects and the increase in restrictions from the environ-
ment give an urgency to the need for some structure that will contain and 
subdue the various aspects. This integration is often premature and 
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revolves itself around some important part differentiation instead of 
the important part aspects. Thus, one of the urges of the personality 
is lifted out as the central focus and all other part aspects are 
structured in terms of it. The most frequent part aspect so desig-
nated is the sexual urge. 
The organization of the personality around one differentiated 
aspect is usual~ structured by the relationships of the person with 
his parents. Since it takes place at the end of the ~hallic period 
of development, the sexual aspect. of relationships is often chosen as 
the focus. 'rhe parental attitude constructs the limits within which 
the differentiated aspect can operate and it often inflicts over-
burdening restrictions and regulations in regard to this aspect. ibis 
engenders the fundamental dynamic component of guilt, hostility. This 
hostility is directed inward upon the person am results in feelings 
of the need for punishment, the need for reparation, feelings of hatred 
for self, and feelings of the fear of annihilation. Yet the very en-
geDderir~ of these feelings moves toward the centralization of the 
personality around the differentiated aspect. By means of various 
defense mechanisms, the whol~ personality is infiltrated with the need 
to contribute toward the fulfillment of the central differentiated 
aspect. 
3. Summary 
This chapter has attempted to sharply focus the correlati~e 
elements of theology and psychology in ord.er to clarify anu ueepen the 
theological conception of sin. In so doing the fundamental components 
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of the theological conception of sin are Biven psychological founda-
tions in the development of man. This ailol,5 a description of the 
operations of sin in the life of man, an explication of the dynamics 
of a particular element of sin in terms of psychological processes, 
and insight into the particular psychological concepts that are rele-
vant to an understanding of sin. The next chapter will attempt to 
apply the theoretical insights gained from this correlation in the 
life of particular persons. 
CHA?TER VII 
n·J() ILLUSTRATIVE CASE S'NDIES 
1. Intro duction 
The heart of a correlative study such as th is one is found 
in its application to the unique individual. It is the specific, 
uni~ue individual that is the object of correlation. In him, the 
two separate disciplines of theology and psychology become one. 
His life and actin ty bear out the validity and usefubless of the 
correlationo Thus, vhile the last chapter was theoretical 1.'1 its 
orientation, this chanter is eminent~ practical. It is an atta~pt 
to a~p~ the foregoing theoretical analysis to the concrete situation. 
The lives of two persons will be examined in some detail. The 
first will be a historical figure, Martin Luther. The second will 
be a person with whom the writer has had a somewhat extended COlL"l-
selLTlg rehtionship. On t..~e basis of their lives, a psychological 
analysis is offered which is then used to illuminate the operations 
of a particular form of sin. 
2. Martin Luther: A Case Study 
It is almost impossible to enter into Luther's life during his 
early years. As is the case with most of the giants of history, 
Luther's biography has been araended and embellished by both friend 
ani foe. Luther hims elf never 'Irote a.'1 a utobiography and his followers' 
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attempts at delineating his life concentrate mostly upon those years 
following the posting of the ninety five theses. The most ,,,e have 
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is a few glimpses scattered among his many books, pamphlets, and 
serllDns. But even these must be looked at carefully as they often 
reflect the zeal of a mature Luther gazing back at his own experience. 
Hore often than not, these statements are colored by his new orien-
tation and do not actually testify to hi~ original state of mind. 
As far a s can be ascertained, J'iartin Luther's boyhood was 
little different from any other youth of his age. His 8arents were 
both of peasant stock who moved from Eisleben to Iviansfield soon after 
his birth. His father was a farmer by trade but became a miner after 
t.l1e move. By diligence, hard wrk, and thrift he became a small 
businessman, owning and operating a number of mines. His t~ 
perament seemed to have been that of the typical German father of 
that day-_~ard working, thrifty, authoritative, and a strict disci-
plinarian. These rather harsh, somber traits were mitigated to some 
extent by joviality created by the beer stein. From 7arious historians 
it is rather well documented that Luth.er's father hoped that his son 
would enter the law profession, make an agreeable marriage; and support 
his r:arents in their old age. 
Very little is said about Luther's mother although it is usually 
assLllTled that she too was a strict disciplinarian. However, from Luther 
and Melanchthon, we can say that her discipline was tempered with love 
and feminine devotion. Little is mentioned of the other children in 
the family though we know that Martin was the eldest of 5 even. We 
might assume that his position in the fctnily would make hLrn more 
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conscious of his resoonsibility and more aware of the family traditions 
and expectations. 
Lut!1er's home was probably typical of the homes of that region. 
His parents were pious people schooled in the ways of the Church and 
the temptations of the "Devil." They realized the necessity of raising 
their children to fear God and parents and thus did not spare the rod. 
;Jndoubtedly his p:irents taught him the prayers of. their faith as well 
as allowing, him to accompany them to i''iass. Life vias hard and they 
needed to struggle w make things balance. YO'J.Ilg l'lartin certainly 
sensed this and participated in this stru~gle for survival himself. 
He could probably best sUT1llffirize the atmoS:.Jhere. of the Luther family 
by quoting 3ainton, "The ati'losphere of the family was that af the 
peasantry: rugged, rough, a t times coarse, credulous, and devout. 
ald Hans prayed at the bedside of his son, and Margaretta was a woman 
of prayer."l 
From this we can probably infer that Mar&ln's childhood was 
like all other children of his cOni'l,mity. He was beaten well and 
often for disobedience and sometiroos just for the principle of child-
hood submission. ErJ osmossis he learned the strange superstitions 
current L.'1 the family and becarre very conscious of the work of evil 
through the various agents of the "Devil." 'Ihe Church, throilgh the 
family, made its impress upon him. He knew of the 1-Irath of 'Jad, the 
terror of purgato~J, the fires of hell, and the roamings of t.~e 
"Devil." Hore than likely he was impressed with the pagentry of the 
1. Roland Bainton, Here I Stand (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury 
Press, 1950), p. -26. 
holy processions, the ~iraculous powers of relics, and the efficacy 
of the sacraments ani the sign of the cross. He heard of the pure 
love of Jesus and the atonement of the Cross, but was more frightened 
by Christ as Judge than comforted by Christ 3 s Redeemer o But all in 
all, he probably led ih e normal life of a child who spent little 
time dwelling on these events and instead looked for pleasure. 
His education continued and reinforced his home learning. Ed-
ucational standards were strict and monotonous. Hotivation for 
learning con sisted of shame and punishment. Thus Luther co uld have 
received fifteen beatings on one day, but this would have been the 
same for every other pupil. In fact, we might infer from some of 
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the reports on Luther that he received less than his share of beatings 
because of h is diligence and intelligence. The instruction Luther 
received consisted of those disciplines compatible to the study of 
theology--Latin, the Mass, the sacred songs, Logic, Rhetoric, the 
Gospels, the Epistles, and the Prayers. The school opened and closed 
with prayer and religion was implicit in all the teachings. Thus$ 
Luther's early schooling was inextricably intertwined with the Church 
and its message. Aside from this, we cannot infer that his school 
days had any great influence on his inner being beyond that which 
other student 5 would gain. 
When Luther was fourteen, he was sent to Hagdeburg to continue 
his scl"looling. There is ver-<J little about this part of his life 
except that it was here that he was so illl'Jressed with the sight of 
Prince William of Anhalt who walked through the streets barefooted, 
begging alms for the Franciscan monastery. 
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After a year at Magdeburg, Luther went to the school in Eisenach. 
This seemed to be one of the most pleasant times in Luther's life. The 
school had excellent !:.eachers and Luther had lIE ny stimulat:ing friends. 
It was here that Luther probably begged for bread in the streets, but 
this seemed to be more of a custom than necessity since Luther's father 
nO'I1 had the money to send his.son to school. Tradition has it that 
the young Luther lived in the horne of a bus messman} Kunz Cotta, and 
ate his meals with another family, the Henry Schables. Both of these 
families were congenial to Luther. In an atmosphere dominated by 
strong religious convictions and often sup:)lemented by fa.11ily friends, 
Luther lived his school days at "Beloved Eisenach." 
At the age of ei~hteen, l'iartin matriculated at the University of 
Erfurt. In about a year and one half he completed his A.B. degree and 
a little O'ler two years later had received his M.A. in Liberal Arts. 
There is good reason to believe that Luther lived in a strict suoer-
vised environment during th is time which precluded any radical sinful 
deviations. He studied Aristotelian physics, mathematics, m9taphysics, 
and. ethics; was given a grounding in "modern" scientific viewpoints; 
and was probably influenced by the philosophy of Occam, who said that 
reason was irrelevant to faith, revelation was the only ccnsistent and 
real truth, and that reason should be a?plied to matters of every day 
life. Some have contended that Luther probably participated in the 
immrality and vice that was flourishing in Erfurt at this tiTre, but 
the rate of his educational progress and the rules of the university 
leading to a degree, would seem to contradict this. 
Latourette probably s\l1lll1arizes Luther's school days accurately 
when he says, 
In his student days Luther was comoanionable and 
enjoyerl singing am playing the lute, but seems 
not to have sha red in the vices which were connnon 
in student circles. All of his education was in 
towns where ecclesiastical influences were strong, 
attendance at mass am. other services of the Church 
was customa~, and religious processions, festivals, 
pilgrimages, relics, and the other outward expres-
sions of Catholic life were part of the accepted 
environment. After completing his Master of Arts, 
to his father's satisfaction in ~~y, 1505, when he 
was twenty-one, Luther began the study of law and 
was presumably headed for a successful career in that 
profession. 1 
Up to this time, then, we have little out of the ordinary for 
a young man headed out into the world. His home and educational 
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environment have been on a continuum with both emphasizing the author-
ity of the Church, the prevalent superstitions of the age, the minute 
place of sinful man, the wrath of God, am the joy of fellowship wi th 
friends and fellows. There is little indication of an internal struggle 
of tremendous proportions or of an abnormal guilt or fear complex, It 
is true that Luther was subjected tofits of deep de~ression during his 
college days. However, we have no way of !mowing what caused these 
depressive states. They might have had a biological, physiological, or 
psychological cause. Then again, they might ha\Te been caused by the 
rigor of his study. It seems too far afield to derive some abnormality 
from this. Luther seems to have been a normal youth in terms of his age. 
How then is the subsequent event of his entrance into the mona-
stery to be explained? His father had wanted him to study law, and 
1. Kenneth Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper 
& Bro~~ers, 1953), p. 704. 
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like a dutti'ul son, Luther had begun to pursue thi~ course. Suddenly, 
while on his way back to school from a visit at horre, a sudden bolt of 
lightning felled him and he was in mortal terror for his life. Stricken 
with fear, he called out to his patron saint, Saint Ann, to help him 
and he would becoroo a monk. On July 17, 1505, he applied for admis-
sion to the Augustinian monastery in Erfurt. 
It is difficult, from a twentieth century viewpoint, to say with 
Luther that his decision came immediately out of his experience with 
the ~~underbolt. 3ut this is What he claims in his Table Talks. 
"Today is the very date on which I entered the convent 
at Erfurt", and he began to tell the story of condi-
tions under which he had taken the vow: how nearly 
fourteen days before, on the road near Stotterheim 
not far from Erfurt he was so frightened by a thunder-
bolt that in terror he shouted: "Help, dear Ann, I 
will become a nnnk." But God unierstood II\Y vow even in 
Hebrew, Anne, under Grace, it is no longer binding. 
Afterwards I regretted my vow, and many of my friends 
tried to persuade me not to enter the monastery. I, 
however, was determined to go through with it •••• 1 
Thus, in.Luther's own words, if they were accurately recorded, he 
tells how fear for his life drove him into the monastery. He did 
not really want to go, but he felt compelled to continue his VO'ol. 
The entreaties of his friends and the anger of his father in no way 
deterred him. 
Of course, there are other event s in his life tha t may have con-
tributed to his decision. In a sermon in 1534 Luther recounts certain 
1. E. G. Schweibert, Luther and His Times (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950), pp. 137-138. Quoted from Tischreden, 
D. Martin Luthers Werke kritische Gesammstaus abe, edited by 
Karl Drescher, six volumeD, Weimar, 1912ff ,IV, 40, note 
4707. 
thoughts that drove him to the monastery. Naturally these are sub-
jective ideas projected backward by a mature Lut~er. However, they 
are no less valuable for that. 
I was nvself a monk for fifteen years and dili-
gent~ all through these years read and did every-
thing I could. Yet I was never able to console 
nvself regarding ~ baptism, but always thought: 
nOh, when ~~ll you once become pious enough and 
do enough to obtain a gracio~s God?" Such thought.s 
drove l1E into the monastery. 
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During his college days there was an incident in which he slashed 
his leg while traveling and called upon the Virgin for help. During 
t..l}istil1l3, too, he felt in dan:ser for his life. Another experience 
is ~hat of the death of a college friend. Melanchthon says that' this 
filled him with great terror. 
In any event, from these, statements it can be assul1l3d that, for 
Luther himself, entrance into the monastery was on the basis of fear. 
He was afraid for his life, and in the context of his ti~es, this would 
mean that he was afraid of dying without sufficiently paving the way. 
11ith the concept of a wrathful God, the purgatorial cleansing, am t~e 
fires of hell in the background, we see Luther, like maQY other men of 
his day, coming to the conclusion that it was tiITIe to propitiate this 
, 
angry God. T:-1e decision came in a flash, but the subconscious patterns 
leading to this decision stretched back into his childhood. His age 
was an age of fear. The thunderbolt became the symbolic culmination 
which brought these fears to maturity in the consciousness of Luther. 
The ways of redemption were open. rnese he had learned in his 
1. ~., p. 142. Quoted from D. Martin Luthers vlerke, kritische -
Gesammstausgabe, edited by J. K. F. Knaake et aI, (Weimar, 1883ff); 
llXVII, 661. 
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childhood and had been iJ"pressed with them every day of his life. The 
.. lay of the monk was the holy ,lay; this was the one sure way of becoming 
holy enough through acts of righteousness to becone acceptable to God. 
It would be unfair to Luther to ask why he chose this ,lay when 
others did not. The fact was that r"any did choose this way. For Luther 
it was the ene way of overcoming the terrible burden of fear which had 
finally thrust itself upon him. The thunderbolt hastened tte deci"ion 
that rlas probably inevitable. 
Luther's immediatei:npetus to enter the monastery came fron: his 
fear of death. The after life held him terror struck and it was this 
terror that induced him to make the vow to become a monk. Thus we 
would expect him to begin his monastic career with high hopes and a 
general peace of soul. Everything he had been tauf:i1t led him to 
believe that the way of the Church would. prepare him for the after life. 
Consequently his fear would be relieved within the safe confines of the 
monastery walls. 
Apparently this was the :i.nJrediate oonsequence. Anyone entering 
the monastery 'Has placed under a period of probation in ill ich he was to 
examine himself and be examined by others. At the same time, the novice 
began to acquaint hDnself with his future life as a monk. Luther entered 
this novitiate period with all the intenseness and diligence so charac-
teristic of his temperament. There is little evidence on this period 
but we can readi~ assume that it was a time of quiet and rest for the 
young Luther. While ;p eaking to his father on the day of his first 
mass, :~rtin calls it a peaceable and God-like life. He speaks of his 
Prior with reverence and affection, and later, as a District Vicar, 
20{) 
prides himseU' on his energetic enforcerrent of discipline. These are 
not the words or activities of a man who is beset with tremendous fear. 
The engulfing' fear that engendered his vow to become a monk seemed 
to have passed away under the regimented life of the novitiate. The 
ini tiation into the holy :nysteries of the IlB ss, the passing away of the 
temptations of the world under the constant preoccupation with holJ-
things, and the attention that had to be given to learning a new way of 
life, all worked to loose the fear that had Leer> Luther's prine concern 
on entrance. The very fact that Luther was deemed vlOrthy to move forward 
from a position as a novice to the status of a monk implicitly speaks of 
both Luther's and -\ ~ monastery's satisfact ion. 
Following his initiation into the priesthood came the joy of ce1-
ebrating his first nass. To this joyous occasion were invited Luther's 
friends and family. We have no reason to believe that Luther approached 
this first celebration with other than normal trepidation. In his letter 
of invitation to John Braun, Vicar of Eisenach, he speaks of God calling 
a "wretched and unworthy sinner,. • • into his rn:i.nistry" and that he 
ought "to fulfill the duty laid upon h:iJnself."1 But 10Je do not find any 
evidence of unspeakable terror. Further:'1ore, as Bainton points out, the 
Church had carefully safeguarded the first celebration of ~~ss by covering 
every point in mich there might be anxiety. If Luther had been unduly 
terrorized, he would have been able to find solace and comfort in this 
careful preparation. 
In spite of all this, Luther later recounts his a1nmst unspeakable 
fright mich came Llpon him during the celebration. In his words, 
1. Preserved Smith, The Llfe and Letters of Martin Luther (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), p. 10. 
With what tongue shall I address such Hajesty, 
seeing that all men ought to tremble in the 
presence of even an earthJs- prince? Who am I, 
that I should lift up mine fJY'es or raise my 
hands to the divine l1aj esty? The an gels surro und 
hilll. At his nod the earth trembles. And shall 
Ii a miserable little pygmy, say "I want this, 
I ask for that"? For I am dust and ashes ani 
full of sin and I am speaking to the living, 
eternal and the true God.1 
This is not the terror of death nor the terror of the after 
life. This is terror at addressing the Host Holy, Righteous, and 
Just God. It is a terror of tmworthiness and unacceptableness. 
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Before this God Luther experienced himself as "dust and ashes and full 
of sin." It was not that Luther sa\-] himself as having been so sinful 
in comparison with others that he could not address God. In fact, 
Luther later speaks of having been worthy of this or that post by 
virtue of his study. !mat it does 1TEan is that before complete and 
perfect righteousness anything less than perfection is nothing. This 
is what Luther felt. He was nothing am thus could not possibly approach 
Goo. 
This overwhelming feeling was ..nat Luther 13 ter called his An-
fechtung. It was all of his unworthiness, turmoil, doubt, terror, and 
guilt combined. From this point on, Luther I s monastic obligations take 
on a new seriousness and a new meaning. He pursues the paths of right-
eousness constructed by the Church with a vigor and intensity that astonish 
and confound his superiors. Even tho~gh he kept his confidence in the 
superiority of the monastic way of life as the most acceptable to God 
1. Bainton, Here I Stand, p. 41. Quoted from Dokumente zu Luthers 
Entwicklung, edited by Otto Scheel, (Tubingen, 1929): under 
Primitiz, p. 162. 
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and the niost assured vlay of salva tion, he still felt uneasy and unworthy. 
His later COlTlJTlents testify to this. 
1 was a good !Tonk, and I kept the rule of 1TlY order 
so strictly that I may say that if ever a monk got 
to heaven by his monkery it was I. ••• if I had 
kept on any longer, I should have killed ~self with 
vigils, lJrayers, reading, and ot.her work. 
I kept vigil night by night, fasted, prayed, chas-
tised and mortified 1TlY body, kept obedience and 
lived chastely. • •• for almost fifteen years I 
wore 1TlYself out in self sacrifice, tormenting myself 
with fastings, vigils, prayers, ann other very bur-
densome tasks, wi tb the idea of attaining to right-
eousness by works. 2 
Luther's concern was to make himself righteous before Gcd, to make 
himself acceptable in Jod's sight. To this end he dilieently practiced, 
and even increased, the various disciplines of his Order. Yet none of 
these seemed to bring him a lasting sense of worthiness. 
i'he worst failure of all was the failure of the system of peni-
, tence and confession. According to Catholic theology, a man had on~ 
to confess his sins, do 'WOrks of penance, and receive absolution, to 
be assured of the grace of God. Luther entered into this like a man 
possessed. He confessed daily and incessantly. He tired confessors 
and made them angry. His whole life revolved before him as he attempted 
to recall and confess every sin that he had ever committed. Yet there 
was always something that he had forgotten, so~ething that would rise 
and torment hill1 until he would confess once more. 
It was in this struggle for confession that the sense of guilt. 
emerges in Luther. The background is his sense of unwortbL~ess. In 
1. ~., p. 450 Quoted from D. Martin Luther Werke, XXXVIII, 143. 
2. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation, p. 93. 
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an atte~r,pt tc overcome this cU1worthiness, Luther turns "tJ the tradi-
tional solution of confession. But confession revolves around acts 
of the individual. In order to be coni' essed, they must be remembered 
and ~oken. Acts are the originators of guilt. As Luther confessed, 
he became guilty. As Luther strove to extricate all the acts of sin 
that he had ever committed from the depths of his soul, he found that 
it was an impossible task. The confession and introspection ~~de 
him become guilty as he was more and more impressed with the deptts 
of sin within himself. Absolution may have mitic;ated or nartly relieved 
this guilt. Yet it never touched the hard core at the bottom of Luther's 
strivings. There was always one more sin that aroduced IIDre guilt and 
demanded more absolution. ThE'lre ,las never any release, never any moment 
when the sinner could say that he was worthy before Jod. The system 
within which Luther was operating did not recognize the cause of his 
guiltofhus one confessor could say, "God is not angry with you, you 
are angry with Goo."1 And another expressed hinseli, "If you expect 
Christ to forgive you, corne in with something to forgive--parricide, 
blasphenw, adultery, instead of all these peccadilloes.,,2 In exas-
peration they confessed that they did not understand him. 
Luther did not immediately break i-lith the system set up by the 
Church. Instead he tested all the means available for salvation. He 
tried the rigors of monastic discipline, the efficacy of the sacraments 
and relics, the probing of confession, and·the way of nwsticism. Though 
1. Bainton, Here I Stand, p. 54. Quoted fron: Tischreden~ Hartin 
Luthers Werke, No. 199. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. ~uoted from Tischreden, D. Martin Luthers Werke, 
NO":487. 
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he found relief, it was only te:l;porary. Inevitably he was led to the 
greatest sin of all. He hated God and he abhorred the very mention of 
Christ. 
It l-1as Staupitz, a leader of the Augustinian order am a friend 
of Luther, who finally heloed him towards a final resolution of the 
inner conflict. Staupitz despaired of ever convincing Luther of the 
mercy and lave of Christ. Thus he finally decided to enGage Luther 
in preaching and teaching. This I,auld shift his attention from constant 
introspection to the needs of others. Luther did not want to take on 
the additional responsibilities both because he felt that it was physi-
cally impossible and because he felt unworthy for the task. Neverthe-
less, Staupitz prevailed and Luther began his study for a Doctorate in 
Theology. Hore and more he returned to the Bible and criticised the 
Fathers and t ~ interpreters of Church ways. It was this study that 
finally led Luther to the solution for his internal struggles. But it 
took him outside the structure of the Church. 
ii. A Psychological Interpretation: Shame 
The age in which Hartin Luther lived was predominantly an age 
of guilt. The horrors of hell, the fires of purgatory, etc., symbo-
lized the punishment that WDuld be merited because man did not abide 
by the laws of the Church. The redemptive processes of the Church, 
such as indulgences, saint war ship, and the sacraments, were spoken 
of in terms of propitiation or atonement for sins committed. Confes-
sion was the epitome of atonement since the confessions recited the 
sins committed and the confessors could then mete out propituous acts 
that would balance the ledger. In other words, the evil COllUlutted 
had to be balanced off over against the amount of good works that 
were accomplished. 
All of the common elements of that day worked on and through 
Luther. His home life, education, and church life Here probably no 
different from any other child of that age. Consequently he too 
"I . 
should have been existing in a psychological context of guilt. Yet 
this does not seem to be the case. He does attempt to Hork within 
this frantework as evidenced by his early days in the m:mastery. At 
the sarre time it becomes increasingly clear to him and to his fel101-lS 
that the ordinary redemptive processes offered by the Church did not 
satisf,y him. In Luther there was another, and more basic, Qynamic 
that separated him from his ccntenporaries. His psychological rest-
lessness could not be stilled by resort to methods of propitiation 
and atonement. His final resolution of guilt came only as he found 
a basic sense of worth and self respect. 
Luther was not looking for forgiveness or absoluiion. He was 
striving for worthiness. Before God Luther felt that he WC1S nothing .. 
His inner being was filled with a deep sense of failure, an inability 
to ever be able to lido enough" to be worthy ofvod! s love am grace. 
He saw God as Holy and Righteous, one who would abandon him to ever-
lasting hell. Thus the resolution of his guilt had to be in terms 
of being ~ worthy and righteous. The possibility of this 'WJ uld 
COIlB only if he could identify hLnself with the righteous God. The 
figure of Christ, who was both sinful and righteous, allowed Luther 
to identify himself with God without losing his o'lm identity. Chr ist 
beca!'l1e him and he became Christ. - Until Luther could overcome his 
205 
fear of abandonment and sense of sharr.e throuGh this identification 
with Christ he was trapped in a guilt system that had no outlet. 
The operation of the ffi arne dyna:rtic can be seen in an evaluation 
of Luther's early home life. His horne was the horre of a peasant in 
that his father came from peasant stock~ But there was an added 
element here that might clash with the peasant at~osphere. Luther's 
father became a minor city official and member of the middle class. 
By hard work and personal drive, he lifted his farnily out of the 
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peasant status. In other Hords, there was an aspect of competition, 
getting ahead by har,} 'Work, and personal resDonsibility in the home 
atmosphere. While Lut'1er's father was nrobably a peasant, he Nas also 
a middle class businessman. It seems that he h3d typical middle class 
aspirations for his son. He saw Hartin's life as one step above his 
own. He hoped that Hartin might become a lawyer and rrarry into a 
good fa'nily. It can be assumed that L.lther introjected some of these 
values as well as the peasant value's. By .the veFlJ fact that he followed 
his fat.l1erl s wishes up to a certa i_n point, 3eld even had tJ1e intention 
of studying law, we can see that :-!artin's conscious intentio:1 -':vas to 
live up to the ideals presented to him. 
A closer look at Hartin's relationship wit.h his father S8twiS to 
show that he had a great need for his father's acceptance. Luther was 
deeply hurt that his father ID "tId not give his consent for him to enter 
the monastery. Even after the consent Has forthcoming, Luther felt 
that it was only a grudging consent, given against the deeper wishes of 
the father. At the tine of first celebration of mass Luther once 
agai:1 tried to force his father to accept the 1-la:'J of life that he had 
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chosen. .4.ngrily ;-rans question':rl his s un if he knew Hhether or not 
this call to the Joonastery mi:;ht not be frol:1 the Devil. This plagued 
:l'Jarti!1 constantly. He la ter said tha t th is statement had cut him to 
the quick. Hany years later, when l1artin "laS about to take Katherina 
for his i-Jife, he said that he was doing it prim.grily to make his father 
happy. In other "I-.'Drds, the .mole hearted acceptance of the bioloE;icctl 
father was necessary for Luther L~ order that the discrepancy between 
what he was and Hhat he ought might be reconciled. l 
Ltl ther' s relationship vrith the monastery also show s the operation 
of the shame dyna~Tlic. The traditional means of purifying himself and 
the traditional means of doing good works did nothing to still the 
inner storm. The more Luther a tte:npted to Clur:Lf-",f himself by the method 
of confession, the deeper became the sorro ... and the recognition that 
he could not be pure. He felt himself to be sinful to the core. The 
Hords that he ut-ters in terror when he is sayint; his first lUass are the 
words of a person who feels himself unworthy and UIl<:!cceptable. Luther 
felt that he could not possibly a(~dress the i-lost :1oly God in his wretched 
condition. God must have only conte~pt for him. The ways of the mon-
Clster-,f gave Luther no l"ay to make hi1lself acceptable to :Jod. 2 
Another indication of the operation of the shame dynamic is evi-
dent in Luther's theological formulations. One who i~ driven by shame 
1. 
2. 
Erik Erikson, Youn cr Han Luther (Nelv York: W. W. Norton and Co., 
Inc., 1958), pp. 6~-67, 77, 94-95. In these pages Erikson attempts 
to analyze the complex relationship between Luther and his father. 
For a more sophisticated analysis of Luther's relationship to the 
m:mastery, Ibid., pp. 154-156. 
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tends to compensate for this in a variety of .laYs. Firs t there migh t 
be the emphasis on "making so;n.ething of one l s self. 1I This becomes 
evident in Luther: s insistence upon a direct relat :iJ:>nship between man 
and God. The individual man is responsible to God en d can cling to no 
other avenue of approach. Neither the Church, nor the Pope, nor indul-
gences, nor anything else, can be of any avail. The individual person 
must stand before God in all his nakedness and give an a ccountine; of 
his life. Luther did not need anyone or anything else. He would stand 
before God on his o.m. l 
Second there might be the drive tL1 make one I s self Slperior to 
others. Theologically this was expounded in the doctrire of the freedom 
of the Christian man. The Christian is free and subject to no one. He 
is the recipient of God's grace ani tl.lis is superior to all who put their 
trust in other things. Nothing can break down the rock like fortress of 
the Christian man. He need have no fear of anyone or anything. Through 
this doctrine Luther beca;re one Hho stood abov"e the Church, the priests, 
and the doctrines of the Church. 2 
A third motive miGht be the inner feeling of "gersonal unworthiness. 
Those 1..mO are plagued mth shame anxiety ha'le a deep sense of being a 
failure, of being worthless, of b~ing nothing. There is an inner inade-
quacy that is permanent and consistent. For Lut!1er this Has formulated 
in his doctrine of original sin. Not only Has the blatant sinner full 
of corruption, but even the acts of the saints were tainted. Man is 
1. ~., pp. 71-72. 
2. Ibid., pp. 230-231. 
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born in corruption. He li-,res his life steeDed in corruption. For 
Luther th is was an adequate statement concerning his ovm inner being.1 
By combining tHO aspects of the shame dynamic, we can attempt to 
e.xpla in many of the events :in Luther I s life. On a depth level of the 
unconscious, shame brings a terri~Jing fear of abandonment. It is as 
if the loved object wo~d withdraw all his affection and support. In 
Luther this operates in three spheres: in his relationship with his 
father, with his God, and ,-lith his Church. 
Until Luther made his decision to enter the J;iOnasl..ery, he was 
an obedient son. On the advice of his father he entered into the study 
of law. His school record indkated that he 1-1a s industrious and reli-
able. There is no :indication that he at. te:npted to rebel a gainst his 
father in any way. Quite the contrary, he seemed especially interested 
:in continuin'3: in the steps orescribed for him by his father. Then, 
even after entering the monastery, Luther was especially anxious to 
obtain the good graces of Hans. In this re~ard it is interesting that 
Luther did not choose to tell his father about this decision until he 
had already applied for admission. After his defecti~~ from the ChurQh, 
Luther st.ill attem~ ad to win t.'1e love of his father by dedicating a 
book and his marriage to him. 2 Hartin feared the reaction of his father. 
He feared that his father would abandon him complete~. Thus his actions 
1. Hartin Luther, The Table Talk of Hartin Luther, translated by William 
Hazilitt (Phil.: Lutheran Board of Publication, 1868), pp. 135-151. 
2. Hartin Luther, Luther's Corres ondence and other Contem ora Letters, 
edited and translated by Preserved Smith and Charles Jacobs Phil.: 
The Lutheran Publication Society, 1918), II, 65-71, 323. 
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before bec;)ming a monk were attelpts at forestalling any indications 
that his father misht abandan him. 
Luther's relati onship with the Church paralleled his reactions 
toward his father. Luther submitted hLlself to the Church and had no 
intention of abandoning it. In fact, he felt that the Church was his 
cmly hope. During his monastic days he was c:ompletely obedient to the 
orders of the monastery. He neither q:.lestioned t!1e ways of the mon-
astery nor the ways of the whole Catholic hierarchical system. Luther 
was a devoted son. His ever)- action was in line with the traditional 
practices of the C~!urch.l i'J'hen he found it impossible to satisfy his 
conscience within the framework of the Church, he blamed hinself, not 
~~e system. Even after his defection from the Church Luther continued 
to wear the traditional cowl of the mon.1{. Some of his works were dedi-
cated to the Pope~2 Luther had no intention of leaving the Church. He 
did not even recognize that he had left the Church until he was forced 
into thi:..; by the presentation of the Bull of Excor:nnunication) 
It would see:n that Luther's actions toward the Chufch can be best 
eX?lained in terms of the shame dynamic. L>~ther feared that the Church 
wouJrl abandon him. The Church was a symbol of love and security. In 
1. Gordon Rupp, Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms 1521 (London: 
SCH Press, Ltd., 1951), pp. 26:27. 
2. A Treatise on Christian Liberty. 
3. The progress of Luther's alienation from the Roman Church is 
outlined by his personal letters, Luther, Luther's Correspondence 
and other Contem ora Letters, I, 87-89, 97, 108-109, 170, 246, 
O. See a so, Peter G. Sandstrom, Luther's Sense of Himself as 
an Interpret-er of the Word to the World (Amherst, Mass.: Amherst 
College Press, 1961), pp. 35-40. 
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every- way possible, he attenpted to avoid an open clas.l-j with the Church 
and even atteMpted to avoid recognition of the fact that the Church had 
abandoned him. Either Luther was very naive or his unconscious fear of 
abandonment was overburdening. To have ~~e C~urch abandon him must have 
been a signal of conte~pt and an increase in his burden of shame. l 
Before Luther's final resolutbn of his internal conflict, he i'l'as 
in mortal fear that God might abandon him. We can assume this fact from 
the series of events that began wi th the th underbolt. The vow to enter 
the Monaste~ was in part this fear of abandonment. It would seem, 
according to Luther's reactions, that the sudden flash of lightning 
symbolized the impending rejection of ,Jod. Luther s ou~ht to forestall 
this· abandonment by becor:ling a monk. It may even be possible that Luther 
1. This of course is not the total story. Luther's movement away 
from the Roman Catholic Church was a gradual evolvement, both 
externally and in his own conscious mini. It was t he product of 
many things: his tb eological discoveries, the rigidity of the 
Roman Church, the political-economic state of Europe, etc. See 
Albert Hyma, New Light on Martin Luther (Grand Rapids, }uch.: 
W. B. Eerdmans Publishing, Co., 1958), pp. 86-107; Rupp, Luther's 
Progress to the Diet of Worms 1521, pp. 26-58; Warren Quanbeck, 
~Luther's Ear~ Exegesis", Luther Today (Decorah, Iowa: Luther 
College Press, 1957), pp. 37-103. However, in terms of a ps,y-
chological explanation, interpretation via the shame ~amic is 
borne out by Luther's experience at WartbUrg. Luther's isolation 
at Wartburg followed the burning of the Bull and the Diet of Worms. 
In these two events Luther irrevocably set himself over against 
the Roman Church. At Wartburg Luther was on:e again beset by 
all the old doubts and fears. His physical illnesses returned in 
increased intensity. And, appro~iate~ enough, the Devil became 
more vivid and real. Luther's shame anxiety, which had been 
successfully hidden by furions writing and verbal conflict, now 
returned to haunt him once again. See Erikson, Young Man Luther, 
p. 232. Out of all this, and the succeeding conflict with the 
iconoclasts, emerged a new conception of the Church. Now Luther 
was in the Church and the ?ope was not. In a very real sense to 
Luther, the Church had not abandoned Luther. He had carried it 
with him. 
212 
did alleviate his sense of shame in the first years of mmastery life. 
Yet this fear came back more <md rr.ore s Lro:-:~l~,' ,s Luther's increased 
scrupulous seli searchL"l2: lJOuld testify. He felt hirr,self unclean and 
evil. This fe8lin:; surely meritr::d}od' s abandonment of him. Pis con-
tmuous introspection lvas in hope that he COltld nerit Jod's love so 
tha t he .. lOuld not be abandoned. }cyen after his identification .. lith 
Christ, Luther felt that Goo. '1'1OUld abaridoll hiTn except for his faith ~~n 
Christ. 
The second aspect of the shame dynamic operative in Luther is 
thai:i of the need for self respect and its concor:ri.tad, striving for 
superiority, to prove the self respect. Luther had introjected his 
father's ideals as his o~m ego ideal. Such ttings as thrift, hard 
vlOrk, and inde.pendence .. rere the goals of Luther. HOl.,rever, these very 
values presupposed that he must break fron! his fathe~'s direction and 
establish his om nlace in the Horld. The sudden entrance into the 
monastery "HaS probably the resultant of a conflict between his father's 
values, i.e. the introjected ego ideal, and his father's rlishes, i.e. 
that :·lartin would become a lawyer. For 2. time the ego ideal won the 
battle. But this was not l-lithout severe consequences in Luther's 
inner lifoe. This decision separated him from his father but at the same 
, 
time \Jas in accordance 'Io-Jith the ideals p:' ojected by the father. Although 
tLis might be seen as a mift from one authority figure, i.e. thE: father, 
to another au.thority figure, i.e. the Gnurch, its deeper iJnplicac.ion 
l-laS the begirming o.f self respect .for Luther. Luther did find in the 
monastery a way sLlperior tJ his father's way (in terms of the culture), 
even though the separa Gion was to give hLn a life long sense of 
f .l 1. al ure. 
After cOII1.mittins hi;'l~elf to the monastic way of life, Luther 
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gained a sense of self respect and superiority by a complete and fana-
tic obedience to the rules of hi:: order. As he later said, he was 
the best of all the monks. He not only follo't·;ed every law to the 
letter, but even a'·weeded t he law while yet continllin~ his studies. 
One coQld guess that the ve~v fact Luther confounded his confessors 
with laborious confessions instilled in him a sense of self resnect 
and superiority.2 
The advice of Dr. Staupitz that Luther study for h is doctorate 
vlOuld also find its meaning in the shame dynamic. Luther was not 
looking for ways to absolve his £uilt as was presupnosed in the mona-
stic system. Instead, he needed someone to ShOH resp:;ct for him and 
his capabilities. The suggestion of Staupitz directed itself to this 
need. Here was a man who res~)ected Hartin as a person with positive 
potentialities. This respect cormnunicated itself to Luther.. H is 
doubtful that Staupitz was as evangelical as' Luther would have him 
be. Staupitz never left the Roman Church as did his illustrious pro-
tege. In spite of his, Luther always felt that Staupitz was his "John 
the Baptist." Luther's need for the res;J8ct of Staupitz WOlS the hinee 
upon W1 ich their rela tionship SWWlg. This hinge was never broken.3 
1. Luther, Luther's Corre ondence and other 
II, 65-71; Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 
2. Erikson, Young Yffin Luther, pp. 154-158. 
Letters 
3. Ibid., pp. 37, 165. Luther, Lut.her' s Correspondence and other 
Conte!:~porary Letters, I, 91-93, 219-221; II, 202-203. 
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If Lut.~erl s relationship with the Ro:nan Church is critically 
examined, the drive for superiority becomes clearly manifested. The 
same is true for his relationships with his enemies and with the Bible. 
Luther l s criticism of the Church and his enemies 'Has often vitr Lolic 
and abusive. He attacked ar'yone who dM not agree Hith h:Lr: with the 
vengeance of an Old Testament prophet. Hodern day readers shudder at 
his attacks. Yet these l-lere the weapons of his superiority. By over-
whelming his enemies Hi th :: t arrent of abusive .1Ords, Luther raised 
himself over them. l 
The Bible was Luther I s authority. This kind of authorit.r cOLlld 
not be challenged or re~lUdiated by anyone. Therefore, by identifying 
himself wi th the i3ible, Luther could stand a ~ainst the whole Roman 
e;l1pire. He could find in the Bible the way to become s~perior to all 
men, even the mightiest. It is interesting that Luther could even say 
that the Gospel he preached Has superior to any other gospel, even if 
it were pl'eached by angels. Out of the inner sense of failure and 
self reproach sDruI'lt<. the over rompensatory drive toward superiority. 
This drive found its needed ally in the authority of the Bible G 2 
The shame dynamic seemed to be all pervasive i.n Luther I slife. 
All the threads of his life Doint to the continual struggle to be 
autonomous and self respecting. Luther1s identification with his 
father was not sufficient to overOOQe this shame in that the ideals 
1. Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 246-247. 
2. Wllem J. Kooiman, Luther and the Bible, translated by John Schmidt 
Philadelphia: I1uhlenberg Press, 1961), pp. 228-236. This gives a 
good picture of Luther1s view of the authority of the Bible. 
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of the father conflicted wiL~ ~he aspirations of the father. Thus 
Luther identified himself with the Church. nut this identification 
was inadequate since the Chlll"ch could not give him the self respect 
that he needed. Staupitz was ?artially successful as an identity 
figure but Luther .. ras not able to "lark out and overcome his shame in 
this relationship. In addition, Staupitz ,.;ras m.ore than likely infer-
ior to Luther in ambition and intelligence. 
Luther' 5 solution cane only as he transferred his struG31e onto 
a transcendent plane. men here it Has difficult because of the awe-
some figure of the rejecting 'Jod. There Hd s no Dossibility of identi-
fication with this God. Luther could only contrast his own inade-
quacy with that of the supremely adequate Gcxi figure~ in the person 
of Christ Luther found his identiiication figure. Since Christ was 
man and had entered into the struggles of man, Luther could visualize 
the possibilities of a "sameness." At the same time, the person of 
Christ represented a holy and perfect God. 3y allm·ling Christ to 
become his, Luther was able, in a sense, to introject God himself. 
Consequently, in spite of the shame, Luth:::r Has made respectable by 
taking on the righteousness of Christ. The formulation of "the just 
shall live by faith" was a ~prbol:ic representation of this identifi-
cation. Faith meant a cor'1plete identification and appropriation of 
Christ and Christ's righteousness. Lu t.her' s addition of the wo rd 
"alone", expressed th e complete and unalterable se:)aration between 
inadequacy and adequacy, failure and s8lf respect, inferiority and 
superiority. Christ's righteousness became Luther's; Christ's super-
iority became Luther's; Christ.' s po~ition as part of the Godhead 
bec2J;e Luther's key to self res~ect. In his Table Talks Luther 
expresses this in vari ous ways. 
When left and forsaken of all men, in my highest 
weakness, in trembling, and in fear of death, 
when persecuted of the wicked world, then I felt 
most deeply the divine pOHer which this name, 
Christ Jesus, cOTmmnicated unto me. l 
Therefore the world knows us not, much less does 
it see Christ in us. But we and the world are 
easily parted; they care nothing for us, and He 
nothing for them; thrJugh Christ the loforld is 
crucified unto us, and we to the world. Let 
them go with their Health, and leave us to our 
minas and manners. wben we have our sweet and 
loving Saviour Christ, we are rich and happy 
more than enough; we care nothing for their 
state, honor, and wealth.2 
He is our bridegroom and we are his bride. Wbat 
he, tile loving Saviour Christ has--yea himself, 
is ours; for we are members of his body, of his 
fIe sh and bone, as St. Paul says. And again, 
what we have, the same is also his. 3 
One more word needs to be said about t:1e presence of the 
Devil in Luther's life. The Devil, which was very vivid and real 
to the culture, became extremely personalized for Luther. l~ot only 
was the Devil behind all ohysical calamities but he was internalized 
in the cons~ience, sometimes took the shape of Christ, was res::Jon-
sible for extreme anxiety, and was constantly attemoting to pervert 
the Christian's faith. 4 Luther seemed to differ from the cultural 
interpretation of the Devil in that Luther's Devil was rwch more 
1. Luther, The Table Talk of Hartin Luther, p. 124. 
2. Ibid. , p. 117. 
3. Ibid., p. 101. 
4. Ibid., p. 307-332. 
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pervasive in the order of things; he Has a constant and consistent 
enenv of Luther; and he Has engaged in a life long battle Hith Luther. 
In one resnect, Luther's life can be seen as the battleground for 
the constant struggle betl .. een God and the Devil. l The Devil may 
have been the projection of Luther's shame. In his vivid struggles 
Hith t:,e Devil, :'uther was actually struggling with his ovm feelings 
of failure, hi~ feelin~s of negative self res;)ect, his feelings of 
be Lng abandoned. After his identification with Christ, he still 
suffered from these as saults. But nOH he cOclld remind himself of 
his own worth, his M1 superiority, his own autonomy through the 
screen of Cr..rist's Ivorth, su.periority, and loving care. 2 
The later relapse of· Luther in which he became quite vindictive 
and foul mouthed3 would probably be explained by a quotation from 
Piers. "The shame driven (individual) might be propelled beyond his 
natural capacities am break •••• 11 4 .So, the elderly Luther, in 
contrast to the young Luther, had become but a mere shell. His boqy 
Has wracked by physical ailments' and his emotions were becolT'ing rigi.:. 
dified. In order to maintain the precious balance that had been 
1. Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 243-249. See also, Albert ~, 
New Light on Martin Luther, pp. 112-113. 
2. Erikson, Young Y~n Luther, p. 244. 
3. Luther's childhood, lived in an atmosphere of still I"emembered 
peasantry, would predispose him to be foul mouthed as a natural 
course of events. However his obscenity was too explosive, too 
much related to holy things, and too unconsciously purposive, 
to be mere~ typical expressions of an age. It had a much 
deeper meaning. Ibid., pp. 245-247. 
4. Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, p. 29. 
obtained, it was necessary for Luther to convince himself again and 
again of his o~m righteousness and superiority. He could do this 
best by attacking his enemies ann shocking his fri.ends. 
iii. A Theological Interpretation: Pride 
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1'tvo limitat ions are inherent in th is theologica 1 interpretation 
of Luther's life. First is ~he fact that this dissertation is con-
cerned about sin and thus focuses upon this element. Consequently, 
there is a distortion that could only be remedied bJ an equal focus 
on salvation. Since this is beyond the l~its of space, it will 
have to be remembered that the following theological interpretation 
is only a partial interpretation and in no Hay to be construed as 
an evaluation or criticism of the validity of Luther's life and 
thought. Second, any man's life probably bears witness to all four 
flmdar.iental forms of sin. Luther's life is no exception. Yet the 
puroose of this case stud;y~ is to' illuminate the theoretical contri-
butions made by the dissertation. ConsequentLy, only the predominant 
form of sin is used as an illustration. 
Although t.l-:! eolo~ is primarily concerned with sin as it is man-
ifested in the relat ionship of man to God, the evidence for this sin 
is brought forth in the dynamics of the indi'lidual's relationship 
wi thin the context of his existen ce. A theological :interpretation of 
Luther's life that is illuminated by the psychological conceptualizations 
would focus on an analysis of Luther's sin in terma of pride. The 
whole impact of Luther's life manifests a self assertive aggressiveness 
and a searc.l-:!ing for autonoIW that is characteristic of shame and fulfills 
the definition of sin as pride. 
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The dynamic of pride is seen in the various si:~ificant rela-
tionships Hhich were "Ia rt of Luther's life. In his relationship with 
his father, Luther was ambivalent. He both sought hi 0: father's ap-
proval and asserted himself as an autonomous person over against his 
father. The dominant motif, ho"Tever, is the fact that Luther denies 
his dependence on his father and asserts himself as an autonomous 
being who will not follow the path of his father's choice. Although 
Luther many tinES seeks to gain his father's acceptance of his auton-
o~, he always establishes the rules for this acceptance on his own 
1 gro c1Ilds. 
This same observation can be made about Luther's rela tionship 
to the Church. He wanted the Church's acceptance of himself but he 
was not 1-1illing to let the Church lay down the guidelines for this 
accentance. Aggressively and ro mpulsively he sought to find accep-
tance based upon his own ter:n~ and hi3 a-rn needs. Luther rejected 
the way of the Church and fOClnd his own "lay to salvation. 
Luther's rela tions~ip 1.nth God Has also disrlpted by this same 
prideful self assertion; even thou~h this self assertion initially 
came as self subjection. There was only one side to Goo's face for 
Luther and that was the face of Holiness and Wrathfulness. Luther 
was not able or not Hilling to hear the gospel 01 grace and forgive-
ness. Consequently, Luther replaced the God of itevelation with a God 
1. This ambivalent attitude of Luther tOi{ard his father which issues 
in Luther setting the rules for acceptance is beautifully illus-
trated in a letter to Hans Luder written as a dedication of the 
Treatise on Monastic Vows. Luther" Luther's Correspondence and 
other Contemporary Letters, II, 65-71. 
of his a-.m :Ilakine;. The laHs of :Jod vle!'e corrupted tl fit Llx~herr s 
own conce"9tion af :lod o The forgi'reness rrEdiated by Christ was lost 
in the terror of anzer. In a word, Luther atte .1ptedLO replace :}od 
by circumscribing him with certain characterisLics and ;r.aking him 
demand certai:1 deeds. 1 
Each of th2se relationships sho'·:5.L,uther r s .L'lability to have a 
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dependent relationship. He stands alone out:. side of any iniposed system 
that would demanj certain standards of beha-vior or certain ideals to 
be fulfille'i. In each case, the identifiable' patterns are the same. 
Luther enters into a depenJen~ reJ? tionshi;J with a sienific;mt other, 
be that his i'atheC', the Church, or :Jod, but the very conditions of a 
dependent relationsl-Jip im~licitly demand Cf certain amount of subscrip-
tion to laws, ideals, and mutual interchanc;e. Invariably Luther must 
eventually assert hi~self as outside the limits of the conditions of 
the relation~lip and thus disrupt or ge~ert the relation~hip. 
The curious dialect:.ic of simultaneously be ing a sinner and 
righteous also gives evidence of the operation of pride in Luther. 
Luther's exposition of th e doctrine of oriGinal sin inversely glor-
ifies himself as the "best" of all the sinners. His peculiar deli3-ht 
1. Erikson, Young Han Lutiler, pp. 58, 168, gives the PS:'lchological 
rationale for this theological analysis. G~don Rupp, The Ri~ht­
eousness of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), pp. 102-
120, gives a poignant description of Luther's inability to hear 
or see anything but the wrath of God. Although the God of Wrath 
was a dominant motif in medieval piety, Luther carried it b~ond 
the bounds allotted by the Church. But even more distinctive of 
Luther is the fact that he would not allow God to be merciful 
through any of the usual pathways. Luther insisted on his own 
approach. Heinrich Boehmer, Martin Luther: Road to Reformation, 
translated by John Doberstein and Theodore G. Tappert (London: 
Thames and Hudson; 1957), pP. 87-98. 
in detailing the contrast between man as God intended hi::n to be ani 
man as he is in his corrupt st3 Le is ti l1;;ed wi th t.he prideful arro-
gance of a man reveling in the misery of his conditbn. No one rises 
to the he:i,ghts of sin as does TJuther. But at the same time, there is 
the re\rerse enphasis :lpon justification. To be justified is to be in 
oneness with1od; it is t be s'.lject to no ot.~er pe:rs.1n, institution, 
or thing; it is to live above and beyond the level of existence of 
other men. Once again there is the tinge of pride in Hhich Luther 
elevates himself to a place above and outside the Horld and endoHs 
his particular life with an infiniteness and autonomy not. given to 
other men. 1 
Luther's theological fornnlations are strllctured in such a way 
that they lose their finiteness and becoJlie invested with i.nfinitude. 
:-lis interpretations are '"he "right" interpretations to which the Bible 
1. This, of course, is not an interpretation of Luther'.s view of 
justification. It is, however, a theological statement about 
the doctrine of justification as it seemed to effect Luther's 
life. Luther used t..'1 is doctrine as his sure ground over against 
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n~s enemies. For example, in the Table Talks he co uld say, "\fuoso 
is able to believe this well and steadfastly is a doctor above all 
the doctors in the world." Luther, The Table Talk of Hartin Luther, 
p. ISO. After burning the bull of excommunication he could say 
that the only way to salvation was to leave the Church of Rome as 
he did. Erikson, Youn~ Man Luther, p. 230. At the Diet of Worms, 
although he a&~itted t e possibilIty of error, he refused to con-
cede anything saying that he protected Christ's doctrines. Hyma, 
New Light on Martin Luther, pp. 102-103. Luther's correspondence 
reveals his attitude of rigidity and inability to hear arguments 
against his position because he stands on God's Word. See as an 
example, Luther's Corres ondence and other Contem ra Letters, 
p. 499. u er s h l.ty l-laS reserved for Gcxi--~n this re ation-
ship he was most humble--and occasionally for his friends and 
the Elector. There is little evidence of humility before those 
who opposed him except prior to his break with Rome. 
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and Christ bear witness. This pride ,f intellect beco~des evident in 
his var~ous argu,llEmts with those who have a differenL point, of view. 
Luther becJmes vitriolic and abusi-ve in his language and he is unable 
to concede the ~rtiality of his "erspecti'le". The many tracts and 
pamphlets a gainst the Roman Catholic Church, t.l1e controversy Hith the 
Ent~usiasts, the dispute with Zwingli and Erasmus, ann even some of 
the ag~nizing arguments Luther had with his OM') followers bear this 
out. 1 
The re13tions11ip of Luther tl) the Bible and to Christ also bears 
elelller~ts of the operation of pride. 'l'hroughollt his life Lllt.'r)er con-
tinually llndercut all the authority structures that had been operative 
for him. He replaced all of these external authorities with the Bible 
and rrade it the authoritative voice. Ho-wever, the Bible is not an 
1. An interesting example of this point is Luther's relationship 
with Andrew Carlstadt'. Carlstadt was a radical who perverted 
Luther's teachings until they approached a new law. Circum-
stances arose in which Carlstadt f~lt he had to beg Luther's 
protection. As a price for this, Luther forced him to publish 
a recantation. Luther's means for this were SJ drastic that 
Carlstadt said he would have been better treated in Turkey. 
Luther, Luther's CorresDondence and otherConternporary Letters, 
I, p. 337. Luther's relationship m. th Zwingli, who was much 
less a radical than Carlstadt, alSJ bears this tinge of pride. 
For exa'llple, in a letter to Helanchthon ne says, "I believe 
Zwingli is worthy of holy hatred, so insolently and unworthily 
does he deal with the holy Word of God." Ibid., p. 419. Or 
again, in a letter to Justus Jonas, "Judasesas they are (Zwingli 
and ErasllDJ.s) they do well to stamp on nv wretched seli, making 
me feel as did Christ When He said: 'He persecuted the poor 
and needy man, that he might even slay the broken heart.'" 
Ibid., pp. 420-421, parenthesis is mine. Hilder hints at the 
same thing can be found in Ibid., pp. 495-496. E. Gordon Rupp, 
"Luther and Zwingli", LutherToo.~, pp. 147-164, gives some 
additional hints as to Luther' slin::l spot when he was dealing 
with Zwingli. 
authority in itself , it needs to be interpreted by so::;eone. Luther 
took upon hirse1f the task of interp!'etlng the Bible and thus sub-
jected it t·} his am unique approach. A historical judgment of 
Luther must Yisualize hi::l as submitting himself to the authority 
of the Bible yet placing himself in the role of interpreter of his 
authority. Thus there is the curous sight of Luther investing his 
own judgments with ultimate meaning through his elevation of th e 
3ible to an authoritative positiono l 
Even Lut!1er' s relationship to Christ is colored by the sin of 
pride. He identifie s himself with Christ and takes on t.'18 qualities 
of Christol'he superiority, the uniqueness, the righteousness, and 
the authority of Christ, becone Luther. He is a "little Christ"; he 
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is one with Christ; h8 and Christ stand against all others; his gospel 
1. Luther's relationship to the Bible has many aspects: his exege-
, tical approach, his dependence on other theologians for his 
. method of interpretation (es}:ecially Augustine and Faber), P.is 
view of Scripture as a whole, etc~ Two things are important for 
this dissertation. It'irst, Luther made Scripture the ~ ~ 
non of authority; and second, interpretation of Scripture was 
dependent not only upon a knoNledge of interpretative tools 
and the traditions of the Fathers out also upon a certain inner 
receptivity in the interpreter. There are many SUbtleties 
involved in this but it seems beyond question that at least one 
aspect of the authority of the Scriptures is the fact' that 
Luther approached the Scriptures from his own unique perspec-
tive. It is this unique perspective, colored by his own partic-
ular inner receptivity, that is involved in Luther's pride. 
This is not to deny other aspects of Luther's Biblical inter-
pretation, for instance his quotations from the Fathers in 
support of his interpretations, but it is t.o affirm the fact 
that Luther could, and did, stand alone when he felt his inter-
pretation was correct. vlarren A. Quanbeck, "Luther's Early 
Exegesisn, Luther Today, ppo 37-103, especia1~ pp. 82-103; 
Willem Kooiman, Luther and the Bible, pp. 43-54, 107-117; 
Philip S. Watson, Let God be God (Philadelphia: l1uhlenberg 
Press, 1947), pp.. 172-177. Naturally it is ttl is hint of pride 
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is Christ's gospel. l Occasionally, when Luther is speaking on t~is 
subject, there is a peculiar quality of arrogant pridefulness that 
is manifested. In his repUdiation of the peasants this pride is 
am subjectivism that is picked up by opponents of Luther. See 
John Eck's letter to Elector Fredric in Luther, Luther's Correspon-
dence and other Cont61lporary Letters, I, 202-204, 246-248; and 
Fredrich Richter, Hartin Luther and Ignatius Loyola, translated by 
Leonard Zwinger (Westminster, Harylcmd: The Newman Press, 1960), 
pD. 60-61. Luther himself SlOWS a gradual movement from obedience 
to the interpretation of Scripture as elucidated by the Fathers, 
Canon law, and the ?ope, to obedience to Scripture alone. Luther, 
Luther's Co~res ondence and other Contem- ra Letters I, 78, 87-
9, 1 -1 9, 21 -2 , 7- 1. Erikson, oung ~~n Luther, p. 210 
and Luther, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, pp. 286-291, are also 
illuminating on this general point. 
1. This is not to deny the evidences of humility, th e fear and trem-
bling, the v-ave feeling of responsibility, and the doubts that 
Luther had about his identification with Christ. These are self 
evident. However, Luther, The Table Talks of Martin Luther, pp. 
249, 250, 251-252, 335; Luther, Luther's Correspondence and other 
Contemporary Letters, 1,108-109; and Luther's address, "Luther's 
letter to the mayors and aldermen of all the cities of Germany in 
behalf of Christian Schools", in F. V .. N. Painter, Luther on Edu-
cation (Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1~89), p. 170ff, 
are just some of the references that point to the fact that Luther 
felt himself uniquely identified with Christ. In a revealing 
chapter, Kooiman, "Luther as He Saw Himself", The Nature Luther 
(Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press, 1959), pp. 76-93, the fact 
of Luther's hwnility is stressed. All that Luther did was not 
important to Luther himself. All Luther's deeds 1<lere God's work. 
Yet, at the same time, this humble dichotomy between Luther and 
God often bordered on an identi~~ For instance, Luther said, 
"l1any people all over the world have accepted the Gospel through 
me and consider me as teacher of the truth, in spite of the ex-
communication by the pope and the ra~e of e:::Jperors and princes, 
of rulers and priests, yea, of all the devils." Ibid., p. 92. 
And in terestingly eno'lgh, Kooirr.an can't resist theter:pt.ation to 
end his lecture Hith this quote from Luther, "I will go on for a 
while (with his lectures) ••• for the sake of the freshmen, so 
that later they can say: Once I used to go to Luther's lectures." 
Ibid o , p. 93, parenthesis is mine. Even Kooiman's sympathetic 
presentation can not exclude evidences of Luther's pride. 
Erikson, Young Nan Luther, pp. 241-245, also speaks to tl:is very 
point. 
shawl! clearly for he endm,s his dire juigments against the peasants 
W Hh the authority of Christ. J 
The theological defillit.l0D of sin as pricl e focused on the fact 
that pride is the highest forI!! of sin. In it man denies his depend-
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ency and fi 1,iteness and ~ra sps fOl' ir;aependence and infiniteness. It 
is t11i s quality that is evident in Luther's life. 2 He structures his 
life so that all IT.2nifestations of dependent relationships are dis-
rupted and broken. Even his relationship "\-lith God is built in sucp 
a wa~r that God is forced to recognize hLIl as an autonomous, saved 
creature by virtue of the llBrits of Chri~t. The parti-31 per spec-
tives inherent in his finitude are absoll1tized tr.rol1gh his Biblical 
interpretation and his identificat.ion Hith Christ. 
iv. A Correlative ,Swmnary 
The theological analysis of sin as pride and the psychological 
analysis of pride in terms of marne are correlated :in the life of 
1. Aside from Luther' s pa~!phlet, Against the Hurdering Hordes of 
Peasants, see also his letters to tricholas Amsdorf and John 
Ruhel, 'Luther, Luther's· Correspondence and other ContehlEorary 
Letters, II, 319-322. 
2. A mEn not unfavorable to Luther, Ulrich Zazius, captures this 
underlying spirit of Luther, "In short, supposing that what he 
says is true ••• what does he gai!l by wearing hirrself out in 
these arguments, which are fruitless and poisononous as well? 
We see how wretched is the condition of man, how easily he falls 
and declines who thinks he stands and can stand easily. Luther's 
case shows us how much danger lurks in a bitter controvers,y. 
How much harm will the determination to win at all costs bring? 
• • • \';ould that s o.'11e upright man would urge Luther not to go 
so far, but to keep the moderation he is always praising, and 
not to mix dross with his gold~1! Luther, Luther's Correspondence 
and other Contemporary Letters, I, 250-251. See also, ~., 
p. 263. 
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Luther. l'he structure of shanE drives hirr: to seek out his sell: 
wurth and self acceptance and avoid failure, hwllliation, and con-
tempt. In his desperate search for t.hese thin;s he e.;lphasizes his 
independence and autonollY and negates any relationship of dependence. 
Vis ambitious and aggressive behavior is an attempt to overcome his 
shame by exert.ing himself as an independent being apart from other 
persons. 
These psychological dynamics illtL'l1.inate the theolosical judgment 
of Luther's sin as pride. The important variable in Luther's rela-
tionship with God is the variable of dependence. He is unable to 
be dependent upon God but mast relate himself to God in such a way 
that his autu!lc1'IY and self worth is not t.hreatened. Luther is able 
to do this only as he is able to identifY hinlself with a God who 
gives him sell vJOrth and who allows him to be autonOI110us. Tris is 
also the structure of his pride. His autonoll\Y is used as a weapon 
against others. His partial perspectives are absolutized. His iden-
tification with Christ becomes a Hall which protects him from recog-
nizing and accepting his errors. 
3. Hiss Small: A Case Stu~ 
i. Hiss Sl'Ilall's Life 
Hiss Small was an unattractive middle a:;ed vTornan. She usually 
dressed quite unfemininely and lvas often slop'JY ani unkempt in appear-
ance. Her voice was often loud and harsh; her namer Has ne:ovous and 
tense; her walk was slouched and slNT. She often gave the appearance 
of t~ing to please withoutknowing quite how to do it. 
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Most o:f hiss Small's life 'Has spent in a snaIl midwestern farming 
community in 'l-/hich morals and mores were :fairly rigid and consistent. 
Host of the people in the corrununity had seldom gone Jr.ore than fifty 
miles from home. The community cO~.lld probably be characterized as 
in grolm, self satisfied, and resistan t to chanee. The people Here 
conservative, ri:;id, and dedicated to the traditions of their fathers. 
Since the COJ1'1l'lunity existed for ih e purpose of serving the needs of 
the :fanners there Has a basic sense of dependence upon natureo 
Both of Miss Small's grandpa~ents had spent their entire lives 
in and around this COrr.r:1unity. Thus there Has a continuit;7 to her 
existence o Since the grandparents lived '\-I'ith Hiss SlTl2II's parents, 
Hiss Small herself was aware of this continuity. ~Jhen she Has born 
the fanil:r consisted of both sets of grandparents, mother, father, and 
two older siblings. 
The father was a bumblinG, good natured, easy going man who was 
liked by most everyone. He Has constantly lending money or giving 
assistance to others Hho were in need. ;"t home he Has fairly quiet 
and passive leaving the decisions and the a~gressiveness to his wife. 
The mother was the opposite of the father. She l-laS aggressive, bde-
pendent, not soft hearted, rather cold, and lacking in ability to 
eA~ress af:fection. She had a good head for business and ran the house-
hold on a business basis. 
Very early in }.liss Small's life tb e family farm 'l-las sold and a 
small farm implement store was purchased. Her father hod been unsuc-
cessful farming and hoped to provide for his family by going into 
business~ ,The Smalls purchased a heuse in tov.'n and the fa,::ily reoriented 
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their life to'l-.rard business rather than far:-!iing. Ho"lever, Niss Small's 
father failed at this venture also. Loss of the st.ore was irnnli,'1ent 
when the mother's interference saved the investment. A national chain 
promised to underwrite th e store if Ers. Small Hould assume an active 
role in the managelTEnt •. -rhus the control of the business left the 
hands of Hr. Small and Has placed in the 1:ands of his Hife. Hr. ~mall 
became a helper. 
Hiss Small's life in early childhood Has characterized by lone-
liness. She had no close friends nor did she have ell ildren of the 
neighborhood who T.rJo1ud play at her house. lier brother and sister did 
not include her in their activities. when l..;iss Small was about four, 
her mother began to spend full time at the store. Thus 'lihe young child 
Has left in the company of her grandparents. This was especially dif-
ficult for her because she had all-,ays. been told t.hat she Has her limother's 
child." The older son had "belonged" to the father and the older sister 
had "belonged" to one of t.he grandparents. Family legend had it that 
l'!rs. Small had said at the birth of Hiss Small that "this child is 
going to be mine." 
'llie school days of Hiss Small were quite miserable. 'l11e finan-
cial situation at home was not good. lliany things the other cbildren 
took for granted, ;·;iss Small could not have. In addition, her nother 
was not appreciative of her daughter's need to be like the other 
children. Consequently rass Sffi211 felt different and apart from her 
peers. Her old fashioned clothing, the rigid starrlards of her mother 
(beyond that of the rest of the community), and the sparse Victorian 
atmosphere of the home, drove a wedge between Iviiss Small and her classmates. 
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In late childhood Eiss Small contracted a disease "h,ylicn severely 
limited her activities. She '-las allowed to attend school but this 'l'IaS 
the outer limits of her activities. For the most part she was confined 
to her home and Has cautioned to sp end most of her time resting. This 
reinforced her nrevious sen~.;e of loneliness and separated her further 
from any contact with her O1oJn age grrlUp. At the same time, it sep-
arated her more consistently from her mother. 11rs. Small snent an 
increasing amount of time at the store and less and less tinE in the 
horne. 11iss Small took over many of the household tasks including the 
preparation of the evening meal for her father. 
l'he only bright spot Hiss Small could remer:ber in her childhood 
was her relationship with her father. He would often. stay horre with 
her when she was not feeling well and occasionally 'l'lOuld bring her 
presents. She recalls that it 'l'13S her father Vlho would stay home 
wi th her m en the rest of the family Hould go on trips or go Visiting. 
On occa sion Hiss Small's mother '-!auld allow her to help out in 
the store or do errands on store business. 1:'iss Small enjoyed this 
immensely and often begged to stay at the store. HOHever these pleas 
were rarely answered affirmatively. 
At the age of fourteen, }~. Small died. He had been confined 
to a hospital for a week prior to his death. During this time Hiss 
Small had not been allowed to visit him and had no indkation that 
the illness was serious. 'fhe family fel t ircapable of informng Hiss 
Small of the death of her father. Finally, inadvertently, she received 
the news from a ne ighbor. Immediate1y after t.l-} is 111's. Small made ar-
rangements for her daughter to live with an aunt in a nearby city. 
Consequently, Hiss Small never felt the impact of her father's death. 
She returned for tm funeral but othenvise had no part in the grief 
process. She often still feels that he is alive. 
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Hiss Small's high school relationships were much like her child-
hood experiences. She felt different and separated from her peers 
and had very few normal relationships with either girls or boys. Through 
sexual curiosity she became involved with a hired hand of the family. 
This ivas both frightening and fascinating since she had never been 
instructed in the fa:;jily. 
After graduation from high school, J.lrs. Small insisted that her 
daughter attend college. Hiss Small did not desire this but, at her 
mother's insistence, enrolle::l. in a university some distance from home. 
Her real desire was to stay home \-lith her mother yet she felt that 
she had to comply with her mother's wishes. College life was very 
unsatisfactory. She was constantly homesick. She did not mix with 
the other students but continued her pattern of isolation. During 
the five years of college Hiss Small rarely Sal" her mother. Even 
during vacations she was not able to come home since her mother had 
taken a job caring for an elderly man. Thus, for five years she was 
separated from her ',1other in spite of the fact that her strongest desire 
was to be with her mother. llt the end of her college education Hiss 
Small graduated with a degree in bookkeeping. 
After college Hiss Small returned to her hometown to live with 
her mother. ~iith the heip of a loan from her mother, she bought and 
operated a small business. Primarily through the efforts of a sales-
man whom she hired, the business was a success. At this point, however, 
she became involved in an affair with her salesman. Although he was 
married the affair was kept secret for some time" When grs. Small 
finally discovered what was happening she insisted that her daughter 
discharge the salesman. Miss Small cOi1:plied but when her mother in-
sisted that the salesman also be deprived of his small share of the 
business, the situation becane tense. l'russ Small exploded in anger, 
left home, and went to the East Coasto 
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During her fifteen years on the East Coast Hiss Small continu,ed 
her pattern of separation. During the first five years s."r}e worked as 
a bookkeeper in a hospital. Through this job she became friendly with 
a girl muCh younger than herself and became part of her family. Also 
during these five years she became involved in another affair with a 
married man. In the course of this relationship Hiss Sr.l.all lent him 
a great deal of money. This he repaid Hith a bogus chec.1{ after he 
had moved to the West Coa st "for his wife's health." The break up 
of the affair and the bogus check culr:linated in making Hiss Small so 
nervous and tense that she quit her job at the hospital. 
After a short period of time she became a bookkeeper in a small 
family business. This job thrilled her because the business was just 
beginning and she was part of its birth. But even more than this was 
the fact that the business was so small that there were close intimate 
relationships between all the partners. 1ventually Miss Small became 
involved sexually 1~th one of the partners. He often spoke of divor-
cing his Hife and narrying Hiss Small. Hiss Small always reacted 
negatively to this. The rela tionmip becar.e increasingly tense and 
tempestuous arguments became the rule rather than the exception. During 
these arguments Miss Small would often tell her boyfriend that he 
ought to fire her. Natural~ she felt that he would not do this but 
dudng the course 01" one argument, he did. Miss Small always felt 
that pressure from the other partners precipitated ~~iso 
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This phase of life had driven Miss Small into deep depressions. 
She was wnder a physician's care and began to take tranquilizers. She 
spent a month at home with her rrother but finally returned to the East 
Coast. On her return she again became employed as a bookkeeper in 
another small firm. Hiss Small did not enjoy this job as much because 
it was never "like a family." However she spent most of her time at 
the job doing more than her share of the work. During this tine she 
again became involved with her previous boy friend even though "she 
did not want to do it." She struggled against the temptation but 
always succeeded in failing. 
After a year or so Miss Small decided that her mother was becoming 
senile. She felt that it was her duty to return home and care for her. 
Although Hiss Small had lived on the East Coast for fifteen years she 
had never real~ left her midwestern home. She spent all of her va-
cations there; she kept her driver's license in thtt state; all of her 
friends were either from there or had friends who lived there. The 
impending permanent return, however, aroused a great deal of anxiety. 
She was very fearful of returning to her ,nother's domination. At. the 
same time, she felt that she was compelled to return to care for her 
mother. 
This ambivalence was reflected in Miss Small's life. She sold the 
home she had bought, but sl- 3 continued to live in it. She told her 
employer to find a replacement fOT her but she rejected applicant 
after applicant as incon:petent. She took her final 'vacation from 
her job with the announced intention of not returning but so mani-
pulated the work that they had to call her back to straighten out the 
confusion. In exas!",eration 11er employer finally fired her. After 
many false starts Hiss Small returned to be with her mother. Inter-
estingly enough her automobile brol-::e dovm just outside of her hore 
tOlm so that she had to be hauled into tovm. 
A sUlTD11ary of Miss Small's relationships would fa cus on four 
areas. First, she was never adept in interpersonal relationships. 
She always felt uneasy and frightened. Very often she would begin 
a relationship and then find some reason to break it. Because she 
always felt inferior and. inadequate she tended to withdraw fro~ most 
relationships and focus her attention on her job and her home .. 
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Second., in her work relationships Hiss Small put heavy emphasis 
upon the need for the job to be "like a family .. " She not only attempted 
to do her job but also atte?lpted to learn everything about the business. 
She prided herself on her devotion to the job and often felt that she 
kneH more about the business than the owner. It was not unusual for 
her to spend many extra hours at the job. At the same time, she felt 
that no one reco~nized the work she did. In fact, she often l'iOndered 
if the others were taking advantage of her "goodness." 
Third, in her relationships with men Hiss Small was very insecure. 
Almost inevitably she found herself involved in a se~~al relationship 
with a married man. These relationships made her feel guilty and 
ashamed. Yet, aside from business relationships, she did not know any 
other way to reL3te to the opposite sexo Interestingly enough she 
never became involved with an unmarried man. 
Fourth, Hiss Small was plagued by depression. These periods 
aluays came inunediately after sexual intercourse. HOrTever they also 
came following a real or seeming rejection from others. In fact, 
}uss Small would become depressed when she projected the advent of 
some rejection. Essentially Miss Small felt that her life was 
hopeless, that she was a "black &leep", am that no one couli pos-
sibly care for her. 
ii. A Psychological Interpretation: Guilt 
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The basic dynamic operative in Hiss Small's life is that of 
guilt. This can be inferred from many factors, not the least of ,.;rhich 
is her behavioral patterns. ~uss Small w~s beset by cycles of depres-
:=;ion. She felt so inadequate am insecure in interpersonal relation-
ships that she preferred to be alone. In new situations or in a group 
of persons, Hiss S.'1lall would withdraw from active interaction with 
those about her. She was inhibited in thinking processes and i!1 motor 
action. Very often her thoughts would be rambling and occasionally 
she would make simple mistakes in arithmetic. Her movements were 
jerky and uncoordinated. 
The previous anal.vsis of guilt has shown that guilty persons 
often seem to involve themselves in situations in Hhich their actions 
invariably result in some kind of actual or psychical punishment. Hiss 
Small was const.antly imolved in this kind of situation. In tlfO of 
her jobs she manipulated the situation until there was no choice for 
her superiors but to fire her. In all 01' her sexual involvements 
she was the t.hird party who was bound to be rejected. In fact, her 
actions usually precipitated the rejectiono 
The outstanding characteristic of Hiss Small was depressi:m 
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1-1i th its concomitant of re9ressed anger. Three events early in life 
were the p~chological foundations for this. First, Miss Small learned 
early in life that affection was given in proportion to the willingness 
with which she obeyed the rules and regulations. Anger brought on~ 
increased rejection. The mother's dominance of the household insured 
that Miss Small Hould learn to respond in terms of ~llilt and right-
eousness. Second, at the crucial age in development mother absented 
herself from the household and Miss Small was often left in close 
contact with her father. This terrif,ying closeness was increased in 
later years by the father's kind responses to her and the care of the 
father that was forced upon her. Third, lV1iss Small was told, and con-
sequently felt, that there ought to be a special kind of bond between 
herself and her mother. She was her motner's child am ought to have 
special responsibilities and special privileges with her mother because 
of that. 
These p~chological foundations resulted in a constant sense of 
badness and guiltiness. She felt anger a gainst her mother but me 
should. not; she "replaced" her mother in her father's affection; mother 
should feel kindly toward her but mother rejected her. Very early in 
life she was deprived of her mother's presence. All through life she 
found that her mother, while dominating her, did not real~ care for 
her. Miss Small obeyed her mother yet never received the affection she 
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required. 'lbe restricting and punishing superego she had introjected 
blamed this state of affairs upon her own badness rather than upon 
t~e rejecting nature of her mother. 
The pS,Ychoanalytic conception of the Oedipal period has special 
relevance for Miss Smallo All the phantasies of this period of devel-
\ opment gai~ed terrifying reality in the sense that, (1) she cared for 
her father like a wife, (2) the father responded to her with kin::l.ness 
and affection while withdrawing from his wife, and (3) the mother 
seemed to leave the household by spending her time in the business. 
Theso things would combine to leave Miss Small with a residue of 
s8Xllal guilt. '!'his guilt ~uld be furthered by the fact. that Mrs. 
Small did not allow her daughter to participate in the death of the 
father nor even have the courage to inform her of his death. Uncon-
sciously Miss Small might wonder if she had driven the father away. 
Miss Small attempted to overcome her g',lilt and gain a sense 
of righteousness by identif.ying'herself with her mother. She has 
S'Jent a lifetime in IOOdeling her life after the mother. Miss Small 
became a business woman; she forsook family life for the sake of this 
vocation; she, like her mother, attempted to make the business her 
"family"; she has begun to try to become interested in those avocations 
pursued by her mother. 
the supreme sacrifice. 
mother's dominatioDo 
This life long reparation reached a climax in 
Miss Small has gone back to be under her 
Miss Small's sexual relationships with lOOn also point to the 
fact of guilt. Over the course of years she has succeeded in seducing 
a number of married nen. Each of these affairs not only spring from 
237 
guilt but also increase guilt. They sho1'11 the dynamic triangle of 
the guilt conception: guilt, punishment, reparation, increased guilt, 
and so forth. 
Her first affair began with her hired salesman. It must not 
be forgotten that the business really belonged to Miss Small's mother. 
In a sense, the salesman "belonged" to the lIlOther. When the affair 
was discovered (as it was bound to be in such a small town), Miss 
Small's hostility erupted against her motlwr. However, she could 
not stand this direct expression of anger. Inst.ead she ran from her 
mother by moving to the East r~ast. In spite of the distance, Miss 
Small's guilt was so great that she returned to the mO~1er each year, 
for one month. She denied herself the pleasure of a vacation and 
devoted this ti.il6 to "vacationing with mother." 
Miss Small's second affair was with a married man liho used 
her for his own purnoses. He staye~ at her house, borrowed large 
s~ of lIlOney from her, and finally deserted her in order to care 
for his "sick" wife. In spite of the obvious fact that this man was 
using her, Miss Sma 11 co uld not put an end to the affair nor confront 
him with his behavior. Even when the loan was repaid with a bogus 
cileck she could not bring herself to prosecute him. Her need for 
punishment and reparation was just too great. She felt that she 
deserved all that she was receiving. 
The third affair was again with a married man. He was her boss 
in the small family business. This man also used Miss Small for his 
own ends. Because of the relationship, Miss Small worked long hours 
to help organize and streamline the business. In addition she was the 
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emotional outl·~t for his O1m personal and marital troubles. Even 
after the affair had "officially" ended she spent one month helping 
organize another business as a favor to him. And, in addition, she 
c'Jntinued to see him intermittently so that he could pour out his 
troubles. This man offered. to marry His s Small but she refused. She 
said that she could never be a party to breaking up a home. In reality 
her guilt was so great that she could not ver.r well ail01-1 herself to 
thilL~ of being married. 
This brings up the fact that Miss Small manipulated her life 
in such a w~ that she was never in a position to marry and have a 
family. Her affairs were with married. men. The guilt t.'1at had begun 
in ear~ childhood and increased with each affair would not allow her 
to fulfill herself in this way. In order to placate her guilt, she 
must always remain alone. This was true in spite of the fact that her 
greatest longing was to have a family and be in a family. She con-
stantly referred to her jobs as IIbeing like a family" and the counseling 
relationship was likened to a "family relationship. II 
Miss Small's every rela tionship was tinged with guilt. Her 
relationships with men are irwariab~ sexualized to the extent that 
there are onJ.y two alternatives: either seduce the man or break off 
the relationship. Her relationships with women are so confined that 
she is able only to relate tc either much younger or much older women. 
With the older women she plays the role of the child who needs gUiiance 
and listens to advice. With younger women she is the vicarious mother 
who guides, directs, lays out the rules, and lives her own life through 
them. Her relationships with authority figures alternate between 
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passive submission and active seeking of affection. She atte~pts 
to anticipate the wants and feelings of authority figures so that she 
can respond to them before they are manifest and thus both insure her 
own safety in the relationships and receive affection. At the same 
time she does not believe that she deserves the affection she receives 
so she manipulates the staff or the situation in such a way that the 
authority figures become angry with her. 
~~ss Small's guilt does not allow her to enter mutual spontaneous 
relationships. There must aJl.lays be a predetermined pattern which will 
allow her to activate her guilt am receive punishment. Thus every re-
lationship offers a minimum of gratification. If, by cllance, she does 
receive gratification, there must OCCQr opportuni~ for adequate self 
punishment, i.e. de~ression and/or self depreciation. If a relation-
ship overcomes these barriars, Miss Small is compelled to disrupt it 
or end it. 
Niss Small evidences all the characteristics of a guilt reaction. 
She was inhibited both p~sically and emotionally. Althoug~ she was 
a good bookkeeper, she made small errors or misplaced L~portant papers 
so that her work was undercut. She was constantly depressed. This 
was expressed. L'1 her mannerisms, her facial movements, crying spells, 
self depreciation, and protestations that she could do nothing. A 
characteristic pattern was withdrawal. She avoided personal relation-
ships as much as possible and spent most of her time alone in her 
home or working at the office. Yet underlying all of this was an 
atmosphere of hostility. Most of this was turned inward upon herself 
but occasionally it broke out into the open. 
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Psychologically Miss Small felt that she was bad, no good, a 
black sheep. She could not possibly see how anyone could like her 
or even toleraGe her. Most of her verbalizations and many of her 
actions cried out for punishment. Somehow she felt that her only 
salvation .. Tas to be punished. Yet, at the same time, Miss Small 
S'Jught after righteousness. She told of the many extra hours she 
spent at work, the rr~y extra favors she did for others, and the 
small amount of gratification she al101-1ed herself. Although she came 
for counseling because she feared her mother's domination, there was 
a continuing impli.cit need to have the counselor cormnend her for her 
loyal attitude toward her mother. 
In the end Miss Small could not accept forgiveness and the 
opportunity to reorganize her life around some other focus than the 
guilt axis. In many ways she atte'1lpted to coerce the counselor into 
punishing her or rejecting her. When this did not succeed she broke 
off the counseling relationship, uIrier the pretext of doing her II duty " 
toward her mother. AlthoJ.gh she seemed to sense that me had an op-
portunity for a new lile, her guilt was too great. She had to con-
tinue to make reparation. 
iii. A Theological Interpretation: Concupiscence 
A fe1-1 introductory remarks are appropriate prior to a theological 
analysis of Miss Small's life. First is the fact that there was nothing 
overtly "religious ll about Miss Small. Aside from the fact that she was 
referred to the Pastoral Counseling Center by a pastor (with whom she 
had had only infrequent contact) and the fact that she attended church 
inLermi ttently, Hi-s5 Small was only casually interested in religion. 
During the counseling she did begin to read the Bible and for a short 
time participated in a religioQs discQssion group offered by a down-
town church. However, both of these activities were used on the one 
hand, to show her affection and respect for the cOilllselor, and on 
the other, to enforce her previous pattern of behavior. Part of 
the pUl'pose of using the life history of a person like Miss Small 
is to show that theological analysis need not depend on overt "reli-
it' "b h . sl.OUS e aVl.or" Participation in church activities mayor may not 
be religiouso One of ~~e writer's assumptions is that any person's 
life may be interpreted theologically. 
A second fact is the difficulty of analyzing one person's life 
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in terms of one variable. Naturally there are ~~y theological factors 
relevant to an analysis of Miss Small's life just as there are many 
psycholo6ical factors that are relevant. She, like Luther l shows 
some of the characteristics of all four forms of sin. At the same 
time, there are places where cornmentson the doctrine of rede~ption, 
the religious nature of family life, the doctrine of sanctifica~ion, 
etc., would be apprcpriate. Although we must confine ourselves to one 
specific aspect of theological analysis it is not to say that other 
aspects not considered are not equally as apvlicable md valuable. In 
terms of the theological analysis of sin, Miss Small's life becomes 
meaningful under the rubric of concupiscence. 
The theological analysis of sin has sho~m that concupiscence is 
the religious pursuit of material or corporeal satisfactions. It is 
a deification of a part aspect of the oerson or the world. This 
deification seeks to organize a person I s life around the deified 
impulse. Very often the part aspect isolated for deification is 
the sexual drive. This is the case in be life of 11iss Small. 
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For Miss Small the sexual impulse had many reanings. It was 
~rmbolic of goodness, of love, of badness, of evil, and of many other 
things between these extremes: friendship, companionship, enjoyment, 
naughtiness, a~gressiveness, and anger. But regardless of the 
meal1ings, sexuality, in the broadest sense, was the coordinating 
point of her life. Around it revolved all those things that make 
life fulfilling. 
Miss Small's relationship with men are the most obvious expli-
cation of this point. The only way she was able to relate herself to 
a man was to sexualize the relationship. With the salesman, with her 
lover, and with her employer, this eventuated in extra-marital sexual 
acts. Yet, it was not only the acute physical sexual act that pin-
pointed Hiss Small I s ooncupiscence. It was the total rela tionships 
with these men in which all aspects were sexualized. The physical act 
was only the culmination of continuous dedication to sexuality. ~iss 
Small surrounded these men lfl. th herself. She devoted many hours to 
their work. She found many excuses to "help" them. She did her best 
to please them. Although she Has not physically attractive, she made 
herself economically and administratively indispensable. Besides this, 
she had a ready ear for their m~rital troubles. Consciously these 
things were related to her desire to heln and to the upholding of 
the traditions she had learned from home and community: thrift, hard 
work, and loyal~ to onels job. Unconsciously they were related to her 
concupiscent pursuit of sexuality. 
The phraa8 "like a family" typifies Hiss Small! s concupiscence. 
Hiss Small gave up any opportunity to have a family by her unmarried 
state, by her inability to relate to men, and by her sexual affairs 
with married men exclusively. In spite of this her great desire was 
to be in a family. ~en though she had left her home some fifteen 
years T)rior to cotUlseling, she still maintained various ties with 
home. These ties gave her a sense of belonging and enforced the 
standards and regulations which ordered her psychic life. Through 
these ties she was able to control her sexuality in some degree. But 
more important, she could "feel guilty!! about he:r sexual escapades. 
By suffer~ng guilt sexuality became more important as a way of life. 
Being in a family meant pursuing sexuality :in such a way thaT. guilt 
and reparation were inevitable. 
The break with mother and flight to the East Coast can be seen 
in this perspective. l1rs. Small's anger at her daughter was justified 
in the light of the standards of both the community and herself. It 
was also justified in the eyes of Hiss Small. Yet ;·1iss Small broke 
from her mother because staying would have meant obliteration of any 
chance to continue to exercise her sexuality. By coming to the East 
Coast but sti1.l retaining the standards of home, Hiss Small could 
both pursue sexuality and be guilty about it. This also meant that 
open antagonism between her mother and herself would not become 
evident and thus the hostility .. muld not break out into the open. 
Miss Small used the criterion of being !!like a family!! to appraise 
all e:nployment opportunities. If the business was small it 'Was like 
being in a family and thus was good. If the business WaS large, the 
reverse was true. l1iss Small operated in h,-or .. rcrk as if she were co-
partner with the owner. In a very sJrmbolic sense she thought of her-
self as a mother to the rest of the employees and a wife to the owner. 
This was another indication of her pursuit. of sex~lity. Miss Small 
was not able to function in her job on the basis of realistic goals, 
realistic expectations, and realistic aopraisals of the human relation-
ships involved. Every relationship wi thin the job situation rlas 
perceived as a family relationship with family implications. 11iss 
Small reacted to her employers as father and/or husband. She perceived 
the other em?loyees as siblings or children. She was es?ecially on 
guard against women e:nployees. Interestingly enough, she usually held 
a job in which either she was the only woman in the business or she' 
was the only woman mo worked closely with the employer. 
From this .kim of perceived job situation, Miss Small made many 
misperceptionS of the human relationships involved in the day- to· day 
business of work operations. Simple criticisms of her work by the 
employer were taken as rejections of herself as a woman~ Simple 
praise was over valued. Office arguments becrune life and death struggles 
for the affection of the employer. 
i'uss Small's relationship with her mother can also be seen in 
the light of her concupiscence. Basically Miss Srr~ll saw her mother 
as one who would not let her pursue her sexuality, yet her mother was 
the one who had the power to confer sexuality upon her. Thus it was 
a constant struggle between attempting to fulfill herself through her 
mother or outside of her mother's power. This struggle is seen all 
through her childhood. She alternates between being her mother'~ 
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child and spending her time with her father. Miss Small shuts herself 
off from her peers and pours all of her energy into relationships with 
mother and/or father. When ruther rings her expressions of affection 
.. 1ith regulative behavioral demands and impossible stipulations, }'Iiss 
Small gradually turns to her father. She becomes a pseudo-wife to 
him and in return receives his small presents of time, affection, and 
companionship. With the death of the father, Miss Small attempts once 
more to receive fulfillment through her ':lother but this is blocked. 
Consequently she moves outside her mother's s?here and pursues life 
independent of mother--but always with mother in the background as 
judge and true goal of life. 
This triangle (self, sexuality, mother) is at the heart of ~liss 
Small's concupiscence. She has organized her life around the pursuit. 
of one aspect of her total personality, that of the sexual component. 
Her world is populated with meri. Her thoughts and her actions are 
constantly preocaupied 1-1ith ways of putting herself in close contact 
with men. She buys a house and ha s men come to it. She secures jobs 
in 'Which her predominant companions are men. Yet she constantly 
suffers for her one· sided pursuit of life. Interpersonal realities 
and relationships intrude and are difficult; depressions haunt her; 
imaginary rebuffs plague her; and endless !lSychosomatic symptoms 
appear. On the fringe of her life synthesis is the ronstant knowledge 
that her pursuit of sexuality is somehow "wrong" or "bad". 
This knowledge drives her into counseling and, significantly 
enough, religious counseling. Her complaint is that she feels that 
she "must" go back and care for her mother but that she does not want 
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to do this. Essentially she does not want to give up her life style • 
.At the same time it is apparent that she is just exchanging one type 
of concupiscence for another. Instead of receiving satisfaction 
through relationships with men, she would receive satisfaction through 
expected affection from her mother for services rendered. Instead of 
caring for, keeping house for, and being loyal to, a man, she would 
do the same for her mother. 
Concupiscence can be a many faceted thing. ~tiss Small struggled 
between two facets of it. On the one harrl, there was the socially dis-
anproved facet, that of having relationships with married men. On the 
other hands there was the socially approved facet, having relationships 
1-lith older women. The latter aspect had always been a ?art of Niss 
Small's life. In addition to slending her vacations with mother, Miss 
Small's only real friends were elderly women. She snent much time at 
their homes, taking them for auto drives, etc. Now, at middle age, 
this facet began to break through. Yet it must be remembered, that 
thou~~ this facet is a social~ approved life style, it was still the 
pursuit of sexuality for Miss Small. By caring for her mother, by 
following the rules and regulations of home and community, by being a 
ngood" girl, Hiss Small hoped to receive love and affection. As she 
put it, "I hope I'll receive all those things I missed as a child." 
In its core this maant that Miss Small hoped that she ID uld receive 
those caresses and that tender loving care that mothers ordinarily 
give their children. 
The theological definition of sin as concupiscence adequately 
characterizes Yuss Small's life. Her pursuit of se)::tlality as the 
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organizing principle of life had broken dOrm at marv points. Although 
she came to counseling with the question of how me could change her 
life synthesis from pursuit of· one kind of sexuality to the pursuit of 
another, she was basically asking another kind of question. Under-
neath she was attempting to discover a new principle of organizing 
life so ;that she might be fulfilled and break through the destructive 
triangle of concupiscence. This kind of question is a theological 
question and can be answered only in a theological frame of reference. 
iv. A Correlative StllllImry 
The ~h~ological analysis of sin as concupiscence and the psy-
chological anaJysis of concupiscence in terms of guilt are correlated 
in the life of Hiss SIIklll.. The structure of guilt drives Miss Small 
into situations in which she wlll be punished; it inhibits her life, 
confronts her with depression, and pushes her to withdraw from life. 
In wrestling with these things, she hopes to avoid armihilation and 
seeks out punishment as a solution. The modus operanii for guilt 
is Sexuality. By emphasizing ser~ality and seekL,g for affection, 
she is able to be guilty. 
These psychological dynamics illuminate the theological judgment 
of Hiss Small! s sin as concupiscence. The pursuit of sexuality allorls 
Hiss Small to organize and live her life in the day to day world. It 
gives Niss Small's life a certain amount of mastery and IlEaning. It 
provides the motivational thrust to live. With this hard core of sex-
uality she is able to work, to enter into certain kinds of relation-
ships, and to establish a home. At the same time, however, her god 
is false. It provides her with certain thin:ss and it allorls her to 
be guilty, but it does not give meaning to the totality of her life. 
Life is encompassed by punishment, work, dullness, and hard~~ip. 
There is no joy or gladness, no hope or love. In short, life is 
truncated. Hiss Small is caught in a pursuit that alHays leads to 
inner and outer destructiveness. 
l1iss Small has not come to a satisfactory resolution of her 
concupiscence. She would like to reorganize her life in another way 
but she does not know hovl. It is at this point that the theological 
answer of forgiveness m uld become relevant. 
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CHAPTER vm 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has focused on the phenomenon of sin as it 
has been stated and experienced in the theological enterprise and 
in the life of persons. A historical survey consisting of an exa-
mination of eight theologians' conceptions of sin in four historical 
periods was Wldertaken in order to form a definition of sin that was, 
and is, central to the Western Christian tradition. This definition 
was forlllllated as follows: Sin is the universal and inevitable non-
recognition, denial, or defiance by man of the life giving dependent 
relationship of man upon God. This non-recognition, denial, or defi-
ance is predicated. in the condit.ions of existence aId brings about a 
disruption of the man-God relationship. In this disruption milO dis-
obeys God and is unable to become what God intended him to be. Unbe-
lief is the core element of the disruption and it eventuates in rebel-
lion, pride, and concupiscence. 
The proposed definition of sin seeks to incorporate three things: 
(1) The primary focus of sin is the God-man relationship. All sin is 
sin in relation to God. (2) The basic elements in a theological defi-
nition of sin are six: the Wliversality of sin, the inevitability of 
sin, the fundamental importance of man's dependent relationship upon 
God as the prerequisite of life, the fact that the conditions of exis-
tence are the preconditions for sin, the inability of man to fulfill 
the absolute standards demanded by God, and the radical discontinuity 
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between man as he is in existence and man as he is intended to be 
according to God l s plan. (3) The fundamental forms of sin through 
which man expresses his state of sin are four: unbelief, rebellion, 
pride, and concupiscence. 
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As can be readily seen, this is a highly stylized and somewhat 
individualistic definition of sin. There are other elements that 
would need. to be included in a complete analysis of the concept of 
sin. For example, this definition says nothing about the will of 
man or the effects of redemption on the sinful nature of man. It 
s~s very little about the consequences of sin on man's relationship 
to God, to others, and to the community or the effects of sin on the. 
created nature of man. The explcination for this is two fold. First, 
the focus of this dissertat:iDn is on sin qua sin. It attempts to 
delineate the nature am structure of sin as well as outline the way 
sin is expressed in a person's life. Second, the purpose and method 
of the dissertation limits the scope of inquiry. 
The purpose of the dissertation is to allow the :insights of 
the psychological discipline to illuminate, as much as possible, 
the concept of sin. In order to relate the disciplines of psychology 
am theology, a nWlber of considerations are important. First, the 
two disciplines are separate knowledge building enterprises with 
distinct goals, purposes, languages, etc. Second, neither discipline 
is wlified bu.t ~ch has its branches and sub-branches. Third, at 
least to some extent, ~ch discipline seeks to conceptualize man's 
experience through systems of constructs in order to bGttG:i:' under-
stand and relate to man in his every day existence. 
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The first consideration dictated the format and mAthod of the 
dissertation. The dissertation js divided into three sections: the-
ological, ps.ychological, and correlational. The method of the dis-
sertation is correlational because of the distinctive nature of the 
two disciplines. The second consideration outlined the task of deci-
ding which theology and \b ich psychology were to be examinedo The 
problem of which theology was decided by attempting a historical 
survey of theologians with the focus on cne concept, sin. The problem 
of which psychology' was decided by choosing the psychological system 
that seemed to be most complete in terms of systems of constructs, 
attention to the lbole man, and attempts at clinical Talidation of 
comepta. The psychological system that most closely conformed to 
these criteria was the psychoanalytic theory of personality. The 
third consideration, as well as the first, formsd the method of the 
dissertation. Each discipline conceptualizes a manls experiences 
within its own particular framework-. In order to relate the tvo 
disciplines, without violating either, the method of correlation 
was adopted. This method. allows the relating of correlative concepts 
from each discipline by focusing on the identical experience of man 
which the concepts seek to conceptualize. 
The choice of psychoanalJrtic psychology, although it is the 
most comprehensive and detailed in its explanation of personalit,y, 
has necessarily limited the breadth of the dissertation. Because of 
its emphasis upon intra-psychic factors, certain important elements 
in the concept ()f sin are not considered. Wh:Ue this has limited the 
dissertation in scope, it has deepened it in terms of the particular 
252 
elements of the concept of sin that are considered. It allows these 
elements to be outlined in deDth. 
Through the ana~sis of the ps,ychoanalytic theory of person-
ality certain concepts, correlative with elements in the defi.."lition 
or sin, were ident1£iede 
Theological 
1. The universality of sin 
2. The inevitability of sin 
3. The dependence of man upon 
(}cd for life 
4. The conditions of existence 
are the preoondi tions of sin 
5. Man transgresses certain 
absol~te standards 
6. Man is not what he ought to 
be 
Ps,ychoagical 
1. The universality of the 
deve~l pattern 
2. The inevitability of neg-
ative solutions to devel-
opmental crisfls 
3. The importance of depend-
ent relationships with 
significant pe~sons 
4. The dialectics of growth 
5. The tension between the 
ego and the superego 
6. The tension between the 
ego and the ego ideal 
The four forms of sin: unbelief, rebellion, pride, and concupiscence 
were correlated. with the psychoana~ic concepts of Slame and guUt. 
Each of the four forms of sin are illumi..'"lated by the concepts of 
shame and guilt but pride-shame ani concupiscence-gUilt were the basic 
correlates. 
'!he heart of a correlative study such a s t.~is is found in its 
application to the life experience of man. The validity of th e cor-
relations are upheld or invalidated by the illumination they shed upon 
man I S experience. Ideally each of the six elements, and their psycho-
logical correlates~ as weU as each of the forms of sin,ll and their 
correlates, should be examined in the context of a case study. 
Practically this was an impossible task. Consequently, two fo~ 
of sin, pride and concupiscence, and their correlates, were used 
as explanatory concepts in the analysis of two life histories. 
Martin Luther's life was analyzed in terms of pride-shame the life 
of Miss Small, a former counselee of the writer, was analyzed in 
terms of guil+.-concupiscence. 
It ~~uld seem that the method of correlation used in this 
dissertation is fruitful in illuminating certain theological con-
cepts which are concerned with the nature of man and his life style. 
In regard to the concept of sin certain conclusions have emerged. 
1. The doctrine of sin conceptualizes certain basic 
psychological "truths" about man. It is a doctrine 
that has relevance to the life of man in that it 
speaks directly to certain psychological processes 
evident in the life of man. 
2. Part elements of the doctrine of sin are analogous 
to part elements of the psychological nature of man. 
The part elements within the psychological frame of 
reference illuminate and deepen a theological under-
standing of the analogous part elements in the 
doctrine of sino 
a. The universality of sin: All men are bound 
together in the matrix of sin by virtue of a 
common developmental pattern. As man is both 
pushed and pulled towards growth, he is con-
fronted with possibilities which demand a choice. 
Man chooses solutions whicn lead to a rejection 
of his essential self. 
b. The inevitability of sin~ The psychological cor-
relate of the inevitability of negative solutions 
to developmental crises points out the psycho-
logical foundation of this theological statement. 
Each developmental crisis presents the person 
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with various alternative solutions from which he 
must choose. Because the solutions are conditioned 
by many factors, they are ambiguous. The indivi-
dual is never fully able to. make a choice that "~ll 
completely fulfill his potentials but inevitably 
chooses only a partially fulfilling solution. 
Thus there is always some estrangment or alie-
nation involved which separates man from himself, 
from others, and from God. 
c. Man is dependent upon God for "life.": This theo-
logical statement focuses upon the life giving 
qualities of a dependent relationship with God. 
The psychological correlate points to the various 
ways in which the dependent relationship can be 
perverted. A mutual reciprocity based on trust 
can degenerate into a legal relatioship which 
makes God the law giver and man the one who con-
forma and/or the one who rebels. The life giving 
dependent relationship can become parasitic in 
which man submerges and denies his own selfhood 
or it can become antagonistic in which man denies 
his dependency and makes his autonomy the apex 
of existence. Each of these perversions of the 
necessary dependent relationship leads to a 
truncation of the self. 
The correlate also points out the fact that 
a life giving relationship is, in some sense, a 
dependent relationship. One must be the stronger 
and the other the weaker; one must be the giver 
and the other the receiver. However, underlying 
this is a mutual trust in which each commits 
himself to the other. 
d. The preconditions of sin are the conditions of 
existencez The psychological correlate gives 
an empirical foundation to this theological 
statement. The dialectics of growth emphasises 
the many "givens" inherent in the human condition. 
Man is driven by his physiological needs; he is 
forced to integrate conflicting psychological 
drives; he is confronted with competing modalities 
through which he can fulfill himself; he develops 
wi thin cultures and sub-cultures vrhich presBIlt 
him with various ideologies. All of these come 
to a focus in the individual and induce anxiety. 
e. Man transgresses certain absolute standards: The 
psychological correlate points out any number of 
illuminating aspects of this. First, ~~ has the 
need for boundaries within which he can live. He 
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is not able to exist continuous1.y in an unstructured 
situation. Second, the foundation for absolute 
standards rests on both fear and love. Fear is 
evoked because man will be destroyed if he trans-
gresses the boundaries. Love is evoked because 
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the standards are given by one who cares for him. 
Third, there is always a tension between the in-
dividual and the standarrls. This tension some-
times eventuates in transgression of the standards 
which automatically brings punishment. Sometimes 
it eventuates in fulfillment of the standards which 
automatically brings a reward. Fourth, the abso-
lute standards are subject to perversion based on 
the needs of the individual or the institutional, 
social, and cultural demands. 
f. Man is not what he ought to be: Man not only needs 
bOllndaries but he also needs goals and ideals toward 
which he is pulled. The psychological correlate,6f 
the tension between the ego and the ego ideal shows 
that'man is pulled by goals. Second, these goals 
are relevant only when they come from one who bath 
exhibits the attainment of the goals and has a re-
lationship of love with the one who incorporates 
the goals. Third, there is always a tension between 
the individual and his goals. This tension can 
be constructive and lead to a pursuit of the goals, 
or it can be destructive end lead to repudiation of 
the goals or a sense of failure in relation to the 
goals. Fourth, the goals are subject to unreal-
istic idealization which eventuates in destructive 
consequences to the individual. 
3. The forms of sin traditionally explicated by theolo-
gians take on new meaning in the light of psycholo-
gical understanding. The genesis, development, and 
dynamics of sin in the life of an individual can be 
analyzed and outlined. 
a. The form of sin called pride has certain elements 
which are illuminated by the correlation with shame. 
These elements are: a drive to make the self the 
center of existence which is based on an underlying 
fear of failure; an inability of the self to allow 
dependent relationships which grows out of a fear 
of abandonment if dependent relationships should 
materialize; the absolutizing of partial perspec-
tives which is made necessar,r by the possibility 
of humiliation involved in holding less than the 
absolute; and the one-sided emphasis on autonomy 
which springs from a recurring but on~ dimly 
perceived fEeling that one is not truly autonomous. 
b. The form of sin called concupiscence has certain 
elements which are illuminated by the correlation 
with guilt. These elements are: the need to or-
ganize the self around part aspects of the self 
which is based on an underlying fear of being 
contemptible; the deification of this part aspect 
of the self in order to reject other aspects of 
the self which attempt to realize themselves; the 
refusal of the self to allow relationships except 
as they are structured by this' part asp'ect because 
any other basis for relationship would bring re-
jection and annihilation; the ever present over-
flow of hostility which springs from the rejected 
aspects of the self. 
c. Although this is very tentative, it would seem 
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that each form of sin could be traced to its ori-
gir~ting point in the life of man. Pride origi-
nates in that period when the individual is strug-
gling with his own autonoII\Y and autonomy in relation 
to an other upon whom he is dependent. Concupiscence 
originates in that period of development in which 
the individual has to deal with powerful feelings 
that erupt in his relationships with significant 
persons. From these origins the development of the 
forms of sin can be outlined. 
These conclusions have specific implications for both the prac-
tical and the theoretical aspects of the life of the Church. In the 
area of religious education this dissertation points to the fact that 
sin is a qynamic, not a static, state of man. Sin evolves, in the 
life of man, through various forms, differentiations, and manifesta-
tions. Certain psychological conditions in the atmosphere of the 
developing child lay down the potent.ialities for the formation of 
certain types of sin. For example, psychological conditions that 
lead to the development of shame seem to predispose the child to the 
form of sin called pride, and psychological conditions that are 
operative in the formation of guilt seem to ~Fedispose the child to 
the form of sin called concupiscence. 
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Investigation into the analogues of unbelief and rebellion in 
the ps,ychological field might uncover a ps,ycho-religious developmental 
scheme. From this dissertation one might conclude that the sin of 
pride has its genesis in the p~choanalytic developmental p3riod of 
anality while the sin of concupiscence has its genesis in the phallic 
period. Further study might point the way to appropriate treological 
formulation an"d adequate theological answers for such things as: 
theologi ca I norms for, the religious education of specific age groups; 
appropriate theological formulation of fa~ life with specific 
reference to the way families create the atmosphere in which certain 
forms of sin are developed, the nature of specific religious questions 
that arise during certain IiIases of a person' 5 life cycle, etc. 
Another area this dissertation speaks to is that of pastoral 
counseling. Since its inception pastoral counseling has been struggling 
with the problem of what is "pastoral" in pastoral counseling. This 
dissertation points the way to some pa rtial solutions to the problem. 
In pastoral counseling the dimensions of sin and grace are the inten-
sive focus. Through this kiln of research, aspects of sin can be 
delineated and examined. Sin can be given operational definition so 
that it can be tested and analyzed. Further research could point to 
aspects of redemption tll.at correlate with aspects of sin. For example, 
there would seem to be certain subtle differences between forgiveness 
and acceptance. Forgiveness focuses on acts of a person while a.cceptance 
focuses on the total person. This might nean that an appropriate ~sk 
of pastoral counseling with an individual who manifests the sin of 
pride would be the communication of God's acceptance of him as a person. 
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The focus with an :individual lilo manifests the sin of concupiscence 
would be the communication of God's forgiveness of his deeds (whether 
they be fact or phantasy). 
Many questions remain to be asked and answered. The six basic 
elements of sin need to be further explored both theologically and 
psychologically. This dissertation has o~ mde a begirming. A par-
ticularly fruitful area would be that of the precornii tions of sin. 
The psychoanalytic concept of the dialectics of growth migllt identify 
and clarify some aspects of this. Another fruitful area would be that 
of distinguishing more specifically the distinction between man as he 
is and man as he ought to be. Psychoanalysis is just beginning to 
penetrate the realm of morals and values. 
Other theological concepts also need to be explored. The 
doctrines of the atonement, redemption, justification, and salvation 
can be further illuminated by examining correlative concepts within 
psychology. 
A..."lother area for research is the method of correlation itself. 
The validity of this nethod lies in its analogic character. Careful 
atte~tion must be paid to the characteristics of the analogues. Certain 
questions mst be asked about the nature of the underlying experience 
which the correlative concepts seek to conceptualize. 
Finally, research needs to be attel'llpted ld. thin the frrulleworks 
of other psychological systems. Psychoanalysis has its limitations, 
specifically llt terms of the little attention it gives to group 
processes. Other 'fSychological. disciplines may be better suited to 
illuminate such things as the nature of the Church and the process 
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of worship. In terms of the presuppositional bases of ps,ychology, 
examinations and comparisons need to be made in order to discover 
the differences and compatibilities with theological presuppositions. 
One of the purposes of this dissertaion has been to seek to 
extend and illuminate the correlative method of research. Through 
this method, despite its limitations, new data become.- available 
for the use of theology. This method is not a total or final 
answer but it does give stimulation to continue the struggle. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the Christian 
conception of sin throuPh the disciplines of theology and psycholoVY. 
The method of correlation is used in order that the distinctive nature 
of each discipline can be retained while the insight of one discipline, 
psychology, can be used to illuminate a theological concept, sin. 
The basic elements of a Christian view of sin are discovered 
through a historical survey of the writings of eight theologians •. From 
this, sin is defined as the universal and inevitable non-recognition, 
denial, or defiance by man of the life-giving dependent relationship of 
man upon God o This non-recognition, denial, or defiance is predicated 
in the conditions of existence and brings about a disruption of the man-
God relationship. In this disruption man disobeys God and is unable to 
become what God intended him to be. Unbelief is the core element of 
the disruption and it eventuates in rebellio~, pride, and concupiscence~ 
The psychological system with which the theological definition is 
correlated is that of psychoanalytic psycholo~. From an examination of 
the pS,Ychoanalytic theory of personality certain concepts are isolated 
as correlative, and thus illuminating, to the basic elements of the 
theological definition of sin. 
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The 'universality of sin is illuminated by the psychoanalytic 
view of man's developmental pattern. Every person must wrestle with 
the same successive stapes of growth. 
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The inevitability of sin is correlated with the psychoanalytic 
view of negative solutions to developmental crises. Each man is bOlmd 
'to choose solutions which only partially fulfill his potentialities o 
The dependence of man upon God for life is correlated with the 
psychoanalytic view that maturity is based on healthy dependency re-
lationships in infancy. 'l'his correlation clarifies the many ways 
man can pervert hi5 dependency upon God and illuminates the quality 
of life-giving that occurs in wholesome dependency relationships. 
The conditions of existence are the preconditions of sin, and 
this correlates with the psychoanalytic concept of the dialectics of 
frOwth. This correlation identifies some of the factors in existence 
which form the possibility of sin. 
The view'that man transgresses certain absolute standards is 
correlated with the psychoanalytic concept of the tension between 
the ego and the e(!o ideal. This Sh01iS that man needs boundaries 
within which he can structure his life, that absolute standards are 
fundamentally based on both fear and love, that man and the a.bsolute 
standards are in tension, and that absolute standards are subject to 
perversion. 
Finally, the fact that man is not what he ought to be is cor-
related with the psychoanalytic view of the tension betwepn the ego 
and the superego. This outlines man as one who is pulled by ideals 
and goals s who responds to goals only if they are presented ~ one 
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who both has attained the goals and has a relationship of love with 
man, who is always in tension with the goals~ and who has a tendency 
to unrealistically idealize the i"oals 0 
Special attention is riven to the psychoanalytic concepts of 
shame and ~uilt in order to illuminate the forms of sin: unbelief, 
rebellion, pride and concupiscence. Shame is a pre-social pheno-
menon that has its onset at the close of the anal period of develop-
ment. Its focus in the personality is the total self; it is a 
result of the tension between the ego and the eEo ideal; ~ld it is 
primarily unconscious although there are many conscious manifesta-
tions. The psychological content of shame (feelinfs of failure, con-
temptibleness and unworthine8s) is motivated by the unconscious threat 
of abandonment or humiliation. The psychological need of shame is 
assertion and the psychological. goal cf shame is autonomy. These 
result in behavioral activi~ of ambition, striving, and seeking con-
firmation of self worth. 
Guilt is the result of social adjustment and has its onset at 
the close of the phallic period. Its focus is discret; it is the 
result of tension between the efO and the superego; and it is pri-
marily unconscious although there are conscious manifestations. The 
psychological content of guilt (feelings of badness, being hated, and 
deserving punishment) is motivated by the unconscious threat of anni-
hilation or punishment. The psychological goal of guilt is right-
eousness and the psychological need of guilt is reparation. These 
result in behavioral activity of inhibition, depression, withdrawal, 
and punishment seekinfo 
The pride-shame and concupiscence-guilt correlations are the 
most illuminatin? of the four forms of sino The form of sin called 
pride is manjSested in the drive to make the self the center of ex-
istence, the inability of the self to allow dependent relationships 
on others, the absolutizinr of partial perspectives, and the one-
sided emphasis upon autonomy. 
The form of sin called concupiscence is manifested in the 
need to organize life around sex or other partial aspects of the 
self, in the d~;~ication of this partial aspect of the self, in 
the refusal to allow relationships except as they are structured 
by this partial aspect, and in the eruption of hostility. Both 
pride and concupisceY1ce are delineated more fully through case 
studies. 
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